OBSERVERS of the post-Polokwane African National Congress (ANC) sometimes claim it is steering the country into uncharted waters. Investors and diplomats are keeping a wary eye on the internal politics of the liberation movement, nervously looking out for shifts to left or right or the erosion of the doctrine of nonracialism.
Critics sometimes argue that political uncertainty has been created by a new fluidity in ANC politics. On this account, we do not know how or where policy decisions are made, and what role Luthuli House and the tripartite alliance play in making them. The government is purportedly in upheaval because of the creation of a plethora of new institutions.
is supposedly pulled this way and that by members of the unruly Polokwane coalition that elected him. Internal ANC disarray allegedly encourages unpredictable interactions between disparate constituencies, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), regional party barons, black business elites, traditional leaders and the ANC Youth League. These collisions of complex and unfathomable forces leave us with no real basis for prediction.
Such ideas have resulted in refreshingly exciting political reportage. It is questionable, however, whether institutional and political realities have changed much. New ministries for planning and monitoring have built on Mbeki-era foundations. Orthodoxy has persisted in economic policy. Proposed innovations in health insurance and social security have been parked in advisory bodies and policy committees. There are three reasons why the politics of the “new” ANC may look more tumultuous than they really are.
First, we are still adjusting to a post-Mbeki world. Mbeki and team created a strong historical narrative with them as our indispensible heroes. They imposed antidemocratic and unsustainable conformity. Supposedly leading a unified nation and continent to renewal, they harassed into silence any “off-message” individuals questioning their unlikely tale.
Jacob Zuma promised a collective leadership. So far he has delivered on this promise. Senior ANC, alliance and government leaders have been engaging in a more open debate about policy and institutions. We have yet to adjust to the diversity of voices that is necessary in a democratic society.
Talk, however, should not be confused with power. “Alliance summits”, in which the ANC is perversely outnumbered by junior partners, have given the false impression of a balance of forces. Luthuli House, we should remember, has voluntarily chosen to attend – and so lend credence to — such talking shops.
Second, Zuma has deliberately generated uncertainty about his own future. Last year he made his famous claim that “I would prefer to leave after one term”, words that unwary analysts misinterpreted as a promise. His central point, one he has since reiterated, was that “the ANC will decide”.
We know from the pledges of numerous powerful office holders that it will be hard to build a coalition against a second Zuma term. His allies in “national intelligence” will doubtless forewarn and forearm him if such a challenge begins to emerge.
Third, Zuma’s laissez-faire approach has encouraged an explosion of ideological and racial background noise. Cosatu has insisted its voice must be heard. Shoot-to-kill hysterics of Zuma’s policing cronies have added to an aura of legal-system instability. Youth League attack poodle Julius Malema has barked up the tree of mine nationalisation.
Once we recognise the background noise for what it is, it is no longer credible to claim that a radical and interventionist state is emerging, driven by a fast- changing and volatile ANC. What we are experiencing is a fast-changing external environment, characterised by growing unemployment, deindustrialisation, water and electricity system crises, community protest, and soaring AIDS deaths. These realities are closing in rapidly on a liberation movement that has found it hard to modernise its ideas and energise its political and organisational systems. The ANC will have to change more profoundly, and faster, if it is to begin to fashion a viable post-apartheid state.
Butler teaches politics at Wits University.