BIG READ: Whatever we call it, the ‘war’ in Ukraine is at a tipping point

Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” has gradually morphed into something worse than he imagined. With Putin’s draft of an estimated 300,000 reservists to enter Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people, the “special military operation” is what it always has been; it’s war because war it is, never mind what it’s called or what its meaning or intent is. Naming of wars imputes value and meaning, for better or for worse.

This imputing meaning to particular wars has been a constant feature of war and of the people who wage wars. The journalist and writer Chris Hedges, who covered wars and conflict in South America, the Balkans and the Middle East for more than two decades, explained in his book War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning: “Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent.”

This habit of giving meaning is captured in the language, in the names and in the words that are used to describe particular wars — before or after the guns have fallen silent. For instance, World War 1 was described by HG Wells as “the war that will end war”. Well, that war ended in 1945 with a 20-year break between 1919 and 1939, and was a constant across the world for the next 70 years.

The very idea that the European wars were described as “world” wars is probably best understood as Ptolemaic parochialism and/or the fact that most of the world was under the yoke of European colonists at the time. In other words, if you believe you are the world, and that the rest of the world is home to a people without a history, then your war is a world war.

If you believe you are the world, and that the rest of the world is home to a people without a history, then your war is a world war

The US, which has walked away, tail between its legs, from almost all its wars since the 1950s — they lost in Vietnam, were humiliated in Somalia, left a God-awful mess (and enduring conflict) in Iraq, were embarrassed in Afghanistan — has been the most dramatic, even romantic, with its nomenclature. The US “war on global terrorism” was named “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Sometimes the names are functional, “The Gulf War” , which started in 1990, “ended” when the US left Iraq in 2011. That purported war ending did not end war in Iraq.

It really depends on who names wars. For example, the Israeli military occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights is often referred to as The Six Day War. Palestinians refer to the 1967 war as “Naksah” (Day of the setback).

We get then to Putin’s “special military operation”. Never mind Mr Putin, his war on the Ukrainian people is just that. It is war. That it has reportedly now been escalated with the conscription of 300,000 reserve troops may be attributed to at least two shifts, both of which are encapsulated in the philosophical observation that once started, war tends to take on a mind of its own.

The first of the two shifts has been Putin’s apparent underestimation of Ukrainian capabilities and commitment. Closely linked is Putin’s apparent belief that his war was simply “a special military operation”, which carried the meaning that it would be a simple, almost managerial or transactional effort.

Putin may have named his war as merely “a special military operation”, but for the Ukrainians it was a war to defend their sovereignty, a war which effectively started in 2014. That was when Moscow more brazenly began to (more publicly) embrace the notion of Russkiy Mir (Russian World). The concept had lain somewhat dormant for two decades following its introduction as state policy by Putin in 2001.

The idea of Russkiy Mir included “recapturing territories” of the former Russian Empire as far back as the reign of Catherine the Great in the late 18th century. It served as the ideational basis for the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The “Crimean Crisis”, as the willful annexation was named, prepared the Ukrainians psychologically; so it seems from a distance, anyway. Early in the current conflict, Russia began what may be described as a total war. It used a range of weapons and tactics across vast territories (beyond the initially stated intents) with unconventional combatants appearing on battlefields, and disregarded any just war principles.

Just war principles refer to the belief that reasons for entering a war have to be just, conduct of war (especially rules of engagement) has to be just and proportional. In other words, in search of Osama bin Laden there was no reason to bomb Afghanistan “back to the stone age”. The US, of course, saw this war on the Afghan people as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and as Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Freedom is good, who does not like freedom?

The annexation of Crimea had prepared the Ukrainians, and when dense fog began to settle over battlefields over the past six or seven months the Ukrainians went to war. This was a war to defend their homeland, and not a special military operation. They launched successful attacks on Russian soldiers, and recaptured regions that the Russians had captured. The Ukrainians adapted early, which may yet turn the Russian invasion on its head, if only for Moscow’s miscalculation and underestimation of Ukraine.

As the British historian Michael Howard wrote several years ago: “It is not surprising that there has often been a high proportion of failures among senior commanders at the beginning of any war. These unfortunate men may either take too long to adjust themselves to reality ... or they may have had their minds so far shaped by a lifetime of pure administration that they have ceased to be soldiers.”

Moscow’s stated objective that the invasion of Ukraine was a simple military operation was met with Ukrainian resistance and a fightback, which calls into question Russia’s conventional military capabilities. With this Russia played roulette. As the commander in chief of the Russian military Putin has, as Howard explained (above), taken too long to adjust to reality. It started when Putin “interfered” directly in military manoeuvres. One reason the US lost the war in Vietnam was precisely because politicians were “calling the shots”.

When states go to war, the job of politicians, after the decision is made to go to war, is to let the generals and the most senior military officials conduct the war. The job of politicians is to gain support of the public. The military is responsible for waging war. The only things it requires, apart from military hardware, is the knowledge that they have support of politicians and the public. Consider the way some US soldiers were treated by the public when they arrived back from Vietnam. This triangle — roles of politicians, the public and the military — is fundamental to the success of war.

We are at a point now when it has become clear that Russia entered its “special military operation” ill-prepared and ill-equipped. Russia has two military capabilities that can be likened to a slingshot, and a nuclear warhead. The “slingshot” has been outmanoeuvred and the other available option is a nuclear warhead. Such a vertical expansion of the war is obviously dangerous in many ways.

Russia now has to find something else; military capabilities between the slingshot and the warhead. Russia needs boots on the ground, hence the call-up of 300,000 reservists, and it needs to deploy a range of ordnance (guns, cannons, tanks) and aerial power. This massive deployment starts, as it has, with Putin, who has to hand daily military strategic operations to his generals.

In some ways, Ukraine was ahead of Russia in terms of the post-Cold war military strategic curve. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Ukraine made significant improvements to its weapons, military technologies and support systems. These changes and adaptations were driven in large part by Nato’s largesse. These changes and adaptations included the acquisition of new air defence and anti-armour artillery and armoured vehicles.

“It has required an extraordinary level of institutional adaptation by the Ukrainians as they not only absorb many different weapon types in a short period of time, but also fully reform their logistic support systems to align with Nato standards. In western military institutions, it can take several years to introduce new weapons and their accompanying training and support elements. That the Ukrainians have been able to do so in a matter of weeks — Himars is just one example — speaks to the adaptive capacity the Ukrainian armed forces have developed in the past six months,” wrote Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Army major general and author of War Transformed, a book on the future of war.

It seems the Ukrainian military adapted to the Russian invasion faster than did the invaders. Colloquially put, the Ukrainians upped their game; they went to war against a special military operation. Russia played roulette and came out bloody.

It is probably no surprise, given the times we’re in, that the Ukrainians used knowledge and information networks swiftly and to great effect. At least greater than Russia. It should be said, though, that in global public opinion, Russia started on the wrong foot. Hearts bled for Ukraine around the world. This emboldened Ukraine to tap into generally sympathetic global information community networks. It worked to great effect.

Most of the world sat up and paid attention when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky went to the airwaves and the internet and told the world: “I need ammunition, not a ride.” Having already won the hearts and minds, of especially the North Atlantic community, Ukraine received humanitarian, military, economic and intelligence support. It should be pointed out that Russia, and Putin in particular, was the bette noir of the Europeans, even before the start of the war in 2014, when he ordered the annexation of Crimea.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainians recognised early that the Russian infantry was poorly equipped and generally ill-prepared. And if you have a military that stays inactive over years, soldiers might lose their tactical nous and the will to fight. Within weeks of the invasion, Ukrainian troops rapidly encircled Russian platoons with dismounted infantry anti-armour teams and exploited the confusion among Russian soldiers — which was not helped by Putin’s direct meddling. It’s not too far a leap to imagine that the Ukraine had been preparing for the current phase of the war that started in 2014 when the Crimean Peninsula was annexed.

Seven months to the day (as I am writing this), on February 24, Russia went on a “special military operation” as if it were a simple technical or managerial tinkering. The invading Russian forces were met by Ukrainians who were willing to fight and die for their country; to them it was an existential war. If they lost, the Ukrainians would cede parts if not the whole of their country. Russia wanted it all.

Two years ago, in February 2020, Vladislav Suslov, a Kremlin elder, averred that there was no Ukraine only Ukraine-ness, which he dismissed as “a specific disorder of the mind”. Writing about the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin himself described Ukraine as part of an anti-Russian project.

Here we have echoes of the 19th century debate about Moscow’s reveries of empire. These reveries and imaginaries have had the opposite effect of what was intended; they  intensified the civic, national identity and pride of the Ukrainians. Russia seriously miscalculated the strength of the Ukrainians. Things may well turn out in favour of the Russians, but as things stand, the Ukrainians have forced Russia back to the drawing board.