Is Western dominance over? And if so, what comes next? In The Once and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West, international relations (IR) scholar Amitav Acharya argues that global civilisation has never been the sole domain of the West, and it certainly won’t end with it. Instead, he envisions a more decentralised, pluralistic future: a “multiplex world order”, where power, culture and governance are shared across regions, institutions and civilisations.
Acharya’s optimistic vision has struck a chord in an era of fractured alliances and rising multipolarity. But it has also sparked debate. Critics argue that his emphasis on non-Western contributions risks oversimplifying history into a binary of “West vs the rest”. Others question whether a multiplex order is even feasible amid rising nationalism, inequality and geopolitical instability. Feminist scholars have flagged the book’s limited engagement with gender dynamics, pointing out that the global struggle for women’s rights and the insights of feminist IR theory are largely absent from his otherwise sweeping re-evaluation of power.
In this interview, Acharya unpacks the ideas behind his new book, reflects on his own global journey from Odisha to Washington, and explains why a post-Western future might be more stable than we think.
What prompted you to write this book at this moment in history?
Most mainstream books about global order, whether by Henry Kissinger or Niall Ferguson, are very Eurocentric. They focus almost entirely on the West’s role in building modern civilisation, while portraying the Global South as passive recipients of ideas like sovereignty, human rights or free trade. I wanted to challenge that. The truth is civilisations like those in India, China, Africa and Mesoamerica contributed to these ideas in their own ways, often long before Europe did. It’s not about denying Western achievements. It’s about restoring balance and historical accuracy.
You argue that the decline of the West doesn’t mean global collapse. Why are you optimistic?
Because civilisation is not — and never has been — the monopoly of one region. We talk about “Western civilisation” as if others had no equivalent. But Chinese and Indian civilisations have endured for thousands of years. They’ve evolved, adapted, absorbed modernity, but they haven’t lost their core values. What I call “global civilisation” is not a homogenised culture. It’s a shared space where different traditions coexist and influence each other. The West’s relative decline won’t erase that. It may even strengthen it.
What is the “multiplex world order” you describe in the book?
It’s a metaphor borrowed from the cinema: many screens, many stories. In international relations, it means a system without a single dominant actor. Not unipolar, bipolar or even multipolar in the traditional sense. Instead, it’s decentralised, diverse and complex. Power and influence are distributed among states, regions, corporations, civil society and cultural producers. We’re moving away from a world where one nation — or a handful — set the rules for everyone else.
Some say this idea is overly idealistic. That the world is too divided and competitive to make this work.
That’s a common concern, and I understand it. But “fragmentation” is not necessarily a bad thing. I prefer to call it “pluralisation”. Yes, it’s messy. But it’s more reflective of how the world actually works. We’ve had decentralised co-operation before — the Indian Ocean trade network, for example, linked East Africa to Southeast Asia without a single empire controlling it. There was no Nato of the seas, yet it was stable and prosperous. My book draws on 5,000 years of history to show that alternative models are not only possible but did once exist.
You talk about cultural soft power — Bollywood, Nollywood, regional media — as part of this new global dynamic. Why does it matter?
Culture is often underestimated in international relations. But it’s incredibly powerful. For most of us, our world views are shaped not by political treaties but by stories, films, books, music, food. Hollywood used to dominate that space. But now you have Korean dramas, Indian cinema and Nigerian pop culture gaining influence. People consume global culture on their own terms. They blend it with local identity. And that’s what I mean by a multiplex world. It’s not only about who has the biggest army. It’s about who tells the stories that resonate.
You write that nationalism and protectionism aren’t as widespread as many assume. Isn’t that a bit optimistic?
Not really. It’s true that nationalism has gained ground in some places, especially under leaders like US President Donald Trump. But look at what happened: most of the world rejected his unilateralism. Trade agreements continued. Multilateral
co-operation deepened in Asia. Even Europe started building new partnerships with India and Africa. The US became isolated — not the world. That tells us something. Most countries still see value in rules-based co-operation, even if the old liberal order is fading.
You’ve been criticised for giving short shrift to Western achievements and for relying on selective historical interpretation.
Look, for generations we’ve heard only about the West’s virtues and the supposed failings of everyone else. I’ve simply flipped the lens. That may feel uncomfortable to some, but it’s overdue. I don’t claim that non-Western civilisations were perfect. No-one is. But I want people to question the idea that modernity was invented by Europe and gifted to the world. That narrative erases too much.
Do you think institutions like the UN are equipped for this new world you describe?
Not yet, but they could be. The UN needs deep reform. Not just in the Security Council, but in how it hires, funds and connects with the world. It should be less reliant on powerful states for funding. It should bring in civil society and regional organisations in a real way, not just token participation. And it should become more meritocratic — less driven by patronage and quotas. If it can evolve, the UN could still be a cornerstone of multiplex governance.
What role does the Global South play in shaping this new order?
A huge one. The Global South has often been treated as a passive recipient of ideas. But that’s changing. We’re seeing new intellectual contributions from African, Asian and Latin American scholars. Young people in these regions are starting to ask: why are we still using frameworks built in the West for the West? I hope this book encourages them to explore their own histories, philosophies, and political models. Not just as alternatives, but as co-creators of the future.
How has your personal journey shaped your thinking?
I was born in India, studied in Australia, taught in Singapore, Canada, the UK, and now I’m based in Washington, DC. I’ve also lived in China and SA. That kind of exposure makes you realise just how connected and yet how different people are. My mentors were Indian, Chinese, Jewish, British. My wife is Chinese. My life is a celebration of diversity. And that’s the core of my optimism: I’ve seen first-hand how co-operation is possible, how enriching diversity really is. As I often say, we must make the world safe for diversity, not just democracy.
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