GARETH VAN ONSELEN: The state of the EFF

Recently, the Social Research Foundation (SRF) commissioned Victory Research to undertake an extensive market survey into the political landscape (disclaimer: I am the CEO of Victory Research).

With the SRF’s kind permission, what follows is the third of three essays on some of those findings, regarding the ANC, DA and EFF. Today, the EFF (click here for the first essay on the ANC and here for the second essay on the DA).

First, the methodological parameters of the survey. It was conducted from June 27 to July 31 via mobile phone, using a single-frame, random digit-dialling sampling design, from which a probability sample was drawn. The sample comprised 3,204 registered voters and was fully representative of the voting population (that is, it mirrored the voting population and in terms of all demographic indicators: age, race, education, rural/urban, gender, etc). The margin of error for the national sample was 1.7%, at a confidence level of 95% (that is, we are confident that 95% of the time the findings won’t vary more than 1.7 percentage points up or down from reality).

Finally, we upsized three subsamples: the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, to make sure we could get statistically meaningful readings off those provinces. They each have a subsample size of about 500, and a margin of error of about 4.4%.

EFF national support levels

Below are the EFF’s current support levels. The raw numbers are not modelled for turnout. In other words, this would be the EFF’s support if 100% of all voters voted. In reality, that never happens. So we need a way of taking out those people least likely to vote. We do that by asking respondents a series of questions about how likely they are to vote, taking those least likely to vote out of the sample and seeing what it does to the numbers. Doing that gives us two scenarios: 66% (the 2019 turnout level) and 56%:

• EFF national support (raw): 12.8%
• EFF national support (using 2019 turnout levels, about 66%): 12%
• EFF national support (56% turnout): 11%

For the record, this is not a prediction — these are current EFF support levels, 18 months out from an election.

In the 2019 elections the EFF won 10.8% of the national vote, up just more than four percentage points from its electoral debut in 2014, when it won 6.4%.

The 12.8% figure suggests some small growth for the EFF but, given the 1.7% margin of error, it is possible also that the EFF remains at about 11%, and has stagnated somewhat. It will need a significant bump in the coming year to match the four percentage point jump it experienced last time round.

The EFF is, in a number of important respects, a more radical version of the ANC. Its primary and often contradictory message is that the ANC has failed both democracy and the revolution. That and the EFF is the true custodian of the revolutionary flame. So its small growth needs to be seen against the backdrop of the ANC’s substantive decline, for the ANC vote share is the EFF’s only real feeding trough.

Using that measure, 12.8% will be of some serious concern to the party. Given that the ANC is, according to the SRF survey, down about eight percentage points from 2019, it doesn’t appear as if the EFF is the first port of call for many of the ANC alienated and angry.

This is a long-standing problem for the EFF. Anger is a powerful electoral tool, but it can translate into one of two things: a protest vote (or better still, a genuine switch to the EFF) or apathy. And it would seem the EFF is losing that particular battle, given the potential out there.

There were signs of this in the 2021 local government elections. While it is not strictly accurate to compare local and national elections, general trends do matter, and the 10.2% the EFF secured then, as the ANC dropped eight percentage points, was a relatively poor performance. Simultaneously, turnout dropped through the floor and more ANC voters chose to opt out rather than to vote EFF. And that right there is the EFF’s problem.

As we shall see, it is a problem compounded by changes to the EFF’s brand and a decline in its leader's favourability. The SRF survey suggests its standard formula for success — vitriolic contempt and grandstanding — is starting to reach a ceiling, in terms of its potential for growth, although it is likely that there also just isn’t that big a market in SA — a reasonably conservative electorate — for radical socialism.

Turnout, as ever, will be critical for all opposition parties, but less so for the EFF. While our modelling does not account for differential turnout in the EFF’s favour (if opposition voters turn out on election day in greater numbers than ANC voters — a real possibility given the enthusing prospect of the ANC dropping below 50%), the lower turnout models do suggest the EFF’s vote share might drop a fraction (bearing in mind the margin of error), down to 11% on the 56% model.

That too makes sense: low turnout means less voter enthusiasm. If you trade on anger, you run the risk of your pool of potential not voting at all. 

The big-picture takeaway: The EFF has the potential for some small growth and its vote share seems relatively stable at about 12%. But, given the ANC’s decline and the EFF’s positing (as the one true keeper of the revolutionary flame), this a relatively poor showing. By trading primarily on anger, and without any substantive positive offer, it runs the risk of losing out to apathy, particularly among alienated ANC voters, its core market. This could hurt the party on low turnout.

The big three provinces

Here are the EFF’s current support levels in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape (margin of error: 4.4%):

• Gauteng (raw): 16%
• Gauteng (2019): 13%
• Gauteng (56%): 15%
• KwaZulu-Natal (raw): 11%
• KwaZulu-Natal (2019): 4%
• KwaZulu-Natal (56%): 4%
• Western Cape (raw): 15%
• Western Cape (2019): 8%
• Western Cape (56%): 6%

A few observations: the survey did not differentiate between the national and provincial ballot. These are all indicative of national support by province. The option of a provincial ballot (and vote splitting) could affect these numbers slightly, but history suggests not by much.

The problem with the EFF’s national support levels is replicated at provincial levels. With the exception of Gauteng, where the EFF stays solid at about 16% even on lower turnout, its relatively healthy base support levels in KwaZulu-Natal (11%) and the Western Cape (15%) seem fragile when turnout drops. At 56% they drop to 4% and 6% respectively. That suggests support for the EFF in these provinces is relatively broad, more than it is deep.

The EFF has poured an enormous amount of time and money into provinces like KwaZulu-Natal. But by-elections seem to suggest it is the IFP that best capitalising on the ANC’s decline there. 

In 2019 (on the provincial ballot), the EFF secured 14.7% in Gauteng, 9.7% in KwaZulu-Natal and 4% in the Western Cape. There has been no great movement in any of these provinces. As with the DA, Gauteng — traditionally an EFF stronghold (in 2014, 42% of all EFF support came from that province) — will be a big concern. Next to no growth in a province where the ANC is imploding is a relative failure.

This a general problem for the EFF. The thing about being an “alternative ANC” of a sort, is that your support will always be broad in turn: a certain small amount in every province, but no real focal point where you can realistically push for a majority or enough votes to be a stand-alone opposition. The DA has the Western Cape, the IFP has KwaZulu-Natal, Action SA (ASA) has Gauteng, but the EFF has everywhere, and nowhere. So it is absolutely reliant on other parties to secure power, and almost always without enough power to dominate decision making. Only with the most tentative and fragile coalition agreements can the EFF get its foot in the door, and even then, it often appears for the sake of political grandstanding more than a commitment to actual governance or the concerns of the people.

Owing to the EFF’s refusal to formally govern, other opposition parties have a chance to demonstrate — for better or worse — their performance in governments. The EFF cannot, or will not. And given that we are in an age of coalitions, it is thus next to impossible for EFF voters to measure the capability of the EFF in this regard. Opposition voters want an alternative to the ANC, but the EFF offers them little more than troublemaking in this regard. That, too, hurts its credibility, as we shall see. You cannot trust a party that refuses to give you an opportunity to trust them.

The big picture takeaway: as at national level, the EFF’s vote appears to have relatively stagnated in the big three urban provinces. Where there is the potential for some small growth, it seems fragile and susceptible to decline as turnout drops. The party appears to have no stronghold, and its refusal to formally govern means it is unable to develop any local reputation as a serious coalition partner.

The composition of the EFF’s support

Like the ANC, for all intents and purposes, the EFF’s support remains racially homogeneous: 93% of its vote share comes from black South Africans and, on the back of some small support in the Western Cape, 7% from Coloured South Africans. It has no support among white and Indian South Africans, unsurprising given its hostility towards both these minorities.

Outside of race, the EFF’s support splits 64%-36% between urban and rural voters, respectively. Sixty-two percent of EFF voters are unemployed; 32% are aged between 18 and 29 years; 52% between 30 and 59 years; and 14% are 60 or older. Seventy-five percent of EFF voters have an average monthly household income of R4,999 or less; 99% have a grade 12 education or lower; and 39% are female and 61% male.

Big picture takeaway: the EFF’s support remains racially homogeneous and almost exclusively comprises black South Africans. Its hostility towards white and Indian South Africans has eradicated these two constituencies as options for the EFF. While the majority of EFF supporters are unemployed or poor with low education levels, it is interesting that 61% of its support is male (a finding at odds with the general voting population profile, which splits 49%-51% between females and males respectively), perhaps a consequence of its reliance on what Umberto Eco would call “machismo and weaponry”.

Leader favourability

Leader favourability is critical to any party. It is typically bigger than that of the party as the leader is the flag-bearer, ostensibly the embodiment of its offer in the best sense. One-man parties — like the EFF — are thus doubly reliant on their leader; the party is typically fashioned around them and so they are in many respects the be-all and end-all of that party. A good test of this is to imagine the party without its leader, and to ask what would be left behind?

Fifteen years of notoriety, inside and outside the ANC, have given Julius Malema a national profile on par with or above anyone in the ANC. He is universally recognised as a political leader, but the price he pays for his fundamental approach to politics is he splits voters almost absolutely: you either love him or you hate him, and increasingly voters seem to be moving towards the latter. Here are his current favourabilty ratings:

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 24%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 59%
• Unfamiliar: 2%

A 24% favourable figure is a relatively good showing for Malema. Certainly it is a figure above the party’s support levels, and suggests a pool of potential for Malema and the EFF, into which he can still tap. That said, a 59% unfavourability rating is extreme, and suggests that if the EFF does have a long term desire to win a national majority it is simply not possible with Malema as leader. But that will not be the EFF’s immediate concern; it will want to capitalise on the 24%.

The problem, however, is that that pool seems to be shrinking. Compare his current levels to those just before the 2019 election. In another poll by Victory Research, using the same methodology (of 1,800 registered voters), in February 2019, Malema faired as follows:

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 33%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 45%

Like Cyril Ramaphosa, Julius Malema’s favourability is dropping, down nine percentage points from February 2019 (33% to 24%). In turn, his unfavourably rating is growing, up a significant 14 percentage points from 45% in February 2019 to 59%. Like Ramaphosa, some of that can be attributed to time, all leaders lose capital the longer they stay in office, but the decline is serious and so you can be sure other factors are contributing too.

There are two other markets worth looking at on this front, both very important to Malema and the EFF. The first is what ANC voters think of Malema — his primary target;  the second is EFF voters — his core constituency.

Here is the comparison for ANC voters:

February 2019

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 30%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 40%

July 2022

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 19%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 52%

Here is the comparison for EFF voters:

February 2019

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 85%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 6%

July 2022

• Somewhat and strongly favourable: 73%
• Somewhat and strongly unfavourable: 6%

Malema’s favourability among ANC voters has declined significantly, down 11 percentage points from 30% to 19%. That represents a real problem for the EFF leader: his ability to tap into, and win over, alienated ANC voters is key to the party’s success; decline in that market and the EFF has nowhere else to turn.

Among EFF voters, Malema still enjoys a cult-like status: 73% internal favourability is still extremely high — the highest of any of the big three leaders. But even here there is a decline, of 12 percentage points, down from 85% to 73%. Those EFF voters are not becoming unfavourable towards Malema, at least not yet. It is the neutral category (not shown above because it is generally negligible) that has increased, from 8% to 19%. So they are first becoming uncertain. If the trend continues, they will eventually shift to unfavourable.

Big picture takeaway: Malema’s favourability is still relatively strong, and exceeds the party’s support levels suggesting there is still some small room for him to appeal to potential new voters. However, Malema’s favourability is declining, and so that pool of potential is likely to be shrinking too. In particular, it is shrinking among ANC voters.

Simultaneously Malema’s unfavourability has grown to a very high level, suggesting that, while an effective leader of a relatively small minority party, Malema does not have the national appeal or potential to deliver a majority in the medium to long term. His support among EFF voters remains incredibly strong, but a small proportion of EFF voters have shifted from favourable to uncertain, with regard to their leader.

The EFF’s brand

The SRF asked respondents, regardless of which party they supported, which of the big three parties — the ANC, DA and EFF — were best at the following core governance issues. Here is how the EFF performed:

• Service delivery: 17.1% (DA best at 42.3%)
• Clean governance: 17.6% (DA best at 33.6%)
• Good policies: 20.3% (DA best at 35.4%)
• Good leadership: 17.1% (ANC best at 35.4%)
• Accountability: 22.5% (DA best at 34.6%)

The thing that stands out about the DA’s performance is that its percentages are way above its actual support levels (25%). This means more voters than support the DA believe it is generally best at these core governance attributes, even better than the ANC in most cases. It has done that through its track record in governance, in the Western Cape and Cape Town. One of the reasons the EFF cannot compete, and in every category finishes third, is because it refuses to actually govern anywhere. So it suffers the worst reputation of the big three parties.

This is reinforced by another set of questions from the survey, which asked respondents to say which words and phrases they most associated with either the ANC, DA, EFF or ASA. Following on from the above, the following percentage of voters most associated the EFF with the following:

• “Best at providing service delivery”: 12.1% (DA most associated at 36.6%)
• “Best at providing clean governance”: 13.6% (DA most associated at 32.7%)
• “Has good policies”: 12.9% (DA most associated at 29.5%)
• “Provides good leadership”: 16.2% (DA most associated at 30%)
• “Provides accountability”: 17.6% (DA most associated at 33.8%)

No governance track record means great uncertainty about the EFF when it comes to issues of governance.

The SRF, however, did not just put positive attributes to respondents: it asked which of the big three political parties were best described by a series of negative attributes too. Here is how the EFF faired on those:

• Is racist: 35.4% (ANC: 13.5%, DA: 26.6%)
• Breaks promises: 4.9% (ANC: 73.8%, DA: 8.1%)
• Only cares about themselves: 10.4% (ANC: 55.7%, DA: 16.8%)
• Spreads hatred: 51% (ANC: 19.5%, DA: 7.8%)
• Is violent: 69.2% (ANC: 14.2%, DA: 1.3%)

On three negative categories the EFF comes out worst: that it is racist (35%), spreads hatred (51%) and is violent (69%). So, it is not just that voters have no real idea about, and thus no real faith in, the EFF as a party of government — it is that a significant number regard the party as hateful and violent too. Unfortunately, we do not have any comparative data for these indicators, but given the high levels, these are most likely strong contributing factors to the EFF’s relative stagnation.

And they hold true among a significant number of ANC voters in particular:

• Spreads hatred: 47% agree strongly or somewhat.
• Is violent: 71% agree strongly or somewhat.

Those are not the sort of attributes you want among your core pool of potential. It goes some way too, to explaining the following result: when asked by the SRF whether they agree with the statement, “The EFF is a more radical and dangerous version of the ANC,” a total of 67.4% of all voters agreed strongly or somewhat with it; 29.6% disagreed strongly or somewhat, and among ANC voters, 64% agreed and 33% disagreed.

Big picture takeaway: the EFF’s brand is defined by great uncertainty when it comes to core governance attributes, and it finishes significantly behind the DA and ANC. Without a track record in government to counter this, it will probably remain defined by uncertainty, a drawback in an age of coalitions. In the other direction, there are a number of powerful negative attributes — racism, hatred and violence — powerfully associated with the EFF brand, across the board. These will act to limit its potential for growth, and are most likely contributing factors to its relative stagnation and the decline in its leader’s favourability.

Conclusion

The EFF’s national support levels remain stable at about 12%, with the possibility of some small growth. This is also true of its provincial support levels in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape; however, in the latter two provinces, its vote share does seem vulnerable to lower turnout.

All this represents a relatively poor showing for the party, given its primary market is the ANC, and the ANC’s dramatic decline, particularly in urban centres such as Gauteng. Party support almost exclusively comprises black South Africans, and is skewed towards males.

Party leader Julius Malema still enjoys a favourability rating above party support levels, suggesting some potential, but in the big picture his favourability is in decline, and his unfavourability rating is at a very high level. This trend is true among ANC voters too.

The EFF’s brand is defined by uncertainty when it comes to issues of governance — voters simply do not have any experience of the EFF in government and so it fares significantly worse than the ANC and DA on core governance issues and attributes.

In the other direction, racism, hatred and violence are now powerfully associated with the EFF brand across the board, and have most likely contributed to its relatively small growth and the decline in its leader’s favourability, in an environment rich with potential for opposition parties.