The Southern African Development Community (Sadc) force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was supposedly deployed to “support [the DRC] to neutralise negative forces and armed groups in the eastern DRC”.
Instead, the Sadc force has itself been neutralised by the M23 rebel group and, if reports are correct, Rwandan forces. Its troops are essentially confined to their base in Sake and the base at Goma airport. That represents complete mission failure, and Sadc and SA need to understand and accept this as the starting point in considering what to do next.
It is also past time to claim that this was a peacekeeping mission. “Neutralising” armed groups is at best peace enforcement, not peacekeeping. Further, the Sadc itself set out the role of the regional force in the DRC as being to work with the country's armed forces “in fighting armed groups operating in the eastern DRC”,
The commander of the regional force, Maj-Gen Monwabisi Dyakopu, has stated that: “[The regional force] has an offensive mandate to support the DRC to neutralise negative forces and illegal armed groups in the eastern DRC.”
Finally, the DRC’s foreign minister was quoted by the BBC on January 20 as saying that Sadc had been given the mandate “to support the Congolese army in fighting and eradicating the M23 and other armed groups”.
That mission has clearly failed, and the fact that the Sadc specifically entered the conflict on the side of the DRC government as a party to the conflict rules out any neutral role in resolving the situation in the east of DRC. That leaves the Sadc and SA with two possible courses of action:
- Negotiate an elegant withdrawal of the Sadc contingents from DRC; or
- Mount a major operation to relieve the Sadc forces at Sake and Goma and resume the original mission after that.
Given the failure of the mission, the limited availability of combat forces and the difficulty of any quick deployment for such an operation, a negotiated solution seems to be the better part of valour in this case.
According to media reports, Sadc leaders instead agreed at an extraordinary meeting in Harare on January 31 to “maintain peacekeeping forces in eastern DRC” and were apparently urged by Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa to take “bold and decisive steps” to boost the capability of the regional force.
That would make sense if Sadc could muster and quickly deploy a force of sufficient strength to deter M23 and Rwanda from further offensive action. However, a slow or weak deployment would be more likely to bring M23 and Rwanda to the conclusion that they must disarm and take the Sadc troops at Sake and Goma prisoner, to remove them as a threat, and then deploy forces to block access to the theatre. That would confront the Sadc with a more complex and dangerous situation than at present.
Whether Sadc can mount an effective operation to this end is an open question. Given that it was not able to deploy the full envisaged 5,000 troops in DRC in the first place, nor for that matter the far smaller force originally envisaged for deployment in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, that does not seem likely. Certainly, the state of our defence force does not hold out much promise of that being possible.
Focusing more tightly, where does all this leave SA? The first step should be to consider the lessons from the past three deployments: Bangui and the Sadc missions in Mozambique and the DRC:
- We do not have the military capability to undertake any major operations. At Bangui in 2013 we could still respond by swiftly deploying forces to stand by in the area, deterring any attack on our force in the city. That capability no longer exists.
- We cannot rely on other forces. Assuming that others will meet their commitments did not work in Bangui, in Cabo Delgado or now in the DRC. Any future operations must be based on what the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) can do autonomously.
- We must therefore, for the time being, give up any pretensions to being a regional or even subregional power.
That brings us back to the core of things: the government must decide what role SA should play in the immediate or wider region and then fund the SANDF accordingly. Or we must decide that we will stay behind our borders and hope others will deal with any threats in the region. The latter is hardly a safe option given the spread of armed conflict in Africa and the renewed major power competition in the world, which is unlikely to spare Africa at least proxy conflicts.
The rational course of action will be to begin rebuilding defence capability to a level that can at least protect SA and our vital national interests. That would have to include some level of regional capability. During the Defence Review process, the responsible committee was directed that we should have the capability to mount an autonomous combat group level intervention capability by air or sea to protect our interests.
That made sense, but will require the acquisition of heavy lift/long-range transport aircraft and in-flight refuelling aircraft as well as sealift ships, and expanding other related capabilities — not least our special forces, the fighter and helicopter forces, and the surface fleet of the navy.
At the same time, we will need to maintain conventional warfare capability, in part against the unlikely threat of conventional attack but more importantly because irregular forces have long become too well led, well trained and well armed to engage with just light forces.
None of that will be cheap. Nor will it be quick — it takes time to acquire equipment and bring it into service and then to train crews and educate commanders in the optimal utilisation of that equipment. Just regaining subregional capability will arguably take a decade if we move with due care to avoid costly mistakes.
It is worth remembering that as long ago as 2009 the joint standing committee on defence warned that the SANDF was in a “fatal downward spiral” and called for defence funding of at least 1.7% of the then GDP. Instead, the budget today is below 0.7% of a GDP that is also smaller in real terms than in 2009.
Finally, it is worth quoting a former chief of the Angolan navy. Arguing for expansion of the navy and asked about the cost, his response was to ask what the cost would be of not having a navy. SA has reached the point where that question is being answered.
• Heitman is an independent security and defence analyst.
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