The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), long considered the bedrock of European security, is facing its most profound internal crisis since its founding in 1949. As the alliance contends with diverging member interests, military conflict on its doorstep and an increasingly antagonistic trade war instigated by the Trump administration, questions are mounting about its future relevance — and whether Europe needs a new approach to collective defence.
For decades Nato has served as the primary guarantor of transatlantic security, deterring external threats and fostering co-operation among its members. However, recent events have exposed deep fissures within the alliance. Notably, the governments of Hungary and Slovakia have adopted increasingly pro-Russian positions, openly courting Moscow while remaining within Nato’s fold. This has led to policy deadlocks, particularly around sanctions and military support for Ukraine, raising concerns about the alliance’s ability to act decisively.
At the same time the US — the alliance’s largest and most influential member — has shown signs of deviation, with domestic political imperatives fuelling uncertainty about its long-term commitment to European security. As Washington turns inward European leaders are being forced to confront the uncomfortable reality that the post-World War 2 security architecture may no longer be fit for purpose.
The risks of consensus paralysis
Nato and the EU both operate on consensus-based decision-making, a structure designed to ensure unity but which increasingly allows individual states to block collective action. Hungary’s repeated vetoes on EU sanctions against Russia and Slovakia’s wavering stance on military aid to Ukraine have highlighted the vulnerability of this model. The presence of “fifth-column” states — members whose interests diverge sharply from the alliance’s core objectives — raises the spectre of paralysis during moments of crisis.
This situation is far from being solely of theoretical consequence. In recent months important decisions on sanctions, military deployments and intelligence sharing have been delayed or diluted due to internal dissent. The risk evidenced by contemporary events is that Nato becomes a treaty in name only — unable to respond to the very threats it was conceived to counter.
Towards new security frameworks
In response, several European leaders are exploring alternative models for defence co-operation. The UK-Norway defence partnership, announced last month, offers a potential blueprint: two sovereign nations deepening military ties outside existing institutions, with a focus on rapid response and shared strategic interests. Similar bilateral and “minilateral” arrangements are being discussed among France, Germany, Poland, Finland and Sweden, with the aim of building a more agile and resilient security network.
These initiatives, while not doing away with Nato outright, reflect a pragmatic recognition that the alliance’s current structure may be ill-suited to the challenges of a more fragmented and unpredictable world. By creating parallel frameworks among like-minded states, Europe hopes to ensure that its security is not held hostage by members whose loyalties lie elsewhere.
Broader implications
The prospect of a weakened or divided Nato has significant ramifications for global markets and investor confidence. Defence spending is likely to rise as European states seek to bolster their capabilities, potentially diverting resources from other priorities. For SA businesses with interests in Europe, increased geopolitical risk may translate into greater volatility in trade, investment and currency markets.
As Europe’s security architecture undergoes a fundamental reconfiguration, SA’s deepening co-operation with Russia, China and Iran is poised to come under increased scrutiny.
As Europe’s security architecture undergoes a fundamental reconfiguration, SA’s deepening co-operation with Russia, China and Iran is poised to come under increased scrutiny.
While Pretoria continues to champion an “active nonalignment” policy, its growing engagement with these powers — evident through Brics membership, joint naval exercises, and expanding commercial and energy ties — signals a pragmatic shift in its international posture.
This alignment has tangible policy implications. SA’s openness to Russian and Iranian participation in its nuclear power expansion, for instance, underscores its willingness to diversify strategic partnerships beyond traditional Western allies, even as such moves risk straining relations with the EU. In a European context where Nato’s unity is increasingly questioned and new security coalitions are forming, SA’s relationships with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran may complicate its ability to act as a neutral broker or trusted partner in multilateral forums.
For Europe, the period of comfortable illusions has passed. As it weighs its options the imperative is not to abandon old alliances but to build new ones — founded on shared values, clear commitments and the flexibility to meet emerging threats.
• Kajee is a lecturer at Southern Utah University, a nonresident research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy and a researcher for the SeaLight maritime transparency initiative at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.
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