The Trump government’s scepticism towards multilateralism and bureaucratic expansion will determine the future of a group at risk of collapsing under its own weight.
When President Cyril Ramaphosa launched SA’s G20 presidency on December 3 2024, he showed a level of restraint uncommon among previous G20 leaders: “South Africa will not create any new working groups or permanent structures. We will build on previous presidencies and provide momentum to existing structures and processes.”
This decision was likely driven by the sheer scale of the existing G20 framework that SA inherited: seven working groups focused on international financial co-operation under the finance track, 16 senior or ministerial-level groups under the sherpa track reporting to the summit, and 13 engagement platforms aimed at raising the visibility of key global issues
The UK (2009-01, first half) structured three working groups to develop consensus proposals for approval by finance ministers and heads of state. In early 2009, these groups focused on building agreement about issues directly tied to the global financial crisis. These focused on improving macroeconomic co-operation (Framework Working Group) and evaluating the fitness of the international financial system for 21st-century challenges (International Financial Architecture Working Group). The UK also initiated regular reporting from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to G20 finance ministers on global financial market stability (Financial Sector Issues).
When the US resumed the G20 presidency in the second half of 2009 under president Barack Obama, the agenda remained focused on essential co-operation to deal with the persisting fallout from the global financial crisis, with no expansion of the agenda. The G20 presidency at that point followed a six-month rotation.
Canada (2010-01) introduced two new working groups: International Taxation (Finance Track) and Anticorruption (Sherpa Track). These priorities reflected prime minister Stephen Harper’s goal of positioning Canada as a global leader in financial governance and international development, and newly empowered public sectors looking for additional sources of government revenue. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had already done extensive technical work on this issue, and elevation to the G20 was thought to accelerate progress.
Amid growing criticism that the G20 was merely a “club” for bailing out banks, the G20 agreed to add engagement groups and Canada (2010-01) convened meetings of private sector leaders (Business20), legislative bodies (Parliament20) and young people (Youth20). Korea (2010-02) added a Development Working Group to build consensus within the G20 on supporting economic growth in non-G20 countries, particularly low-income nations.
By late 2010, concerns about the G20’s expanding agenda prompted President Nicolas Sarkozy to commission UK prime minister David Cameron to review its priorities. In his report, “The G20: A Practical Agenda for Growth and Jobs”, Cameron recommended that: “[G20] resources, particularly its leaders’ time and political capital, are limited. It must therefore manage its formal agenda accordingly, by balancing the changing agenda of an annual presidency with the need to retain focus and avoid overstretch.”
However, by the time Cameron’s report was presented at the Cannes Summit, G20 members had agreed to extend the presidency term from six months to one year, while France (2011) had expanded the Sherpa Track to include agriculture and employment, and introduced the Labor2 engagement group. Thereafter, successive G20 presidencies have added at least one new working or engagement group, with varying emphasis depending on national priorities and global challenges.
Despite the participation of US officials in the G20 “handover” or troika process, it is highly unlikely that the US under President Donald Trump is interested in continuing the practice of an ever-expanding agenda. His administration has consistently expressed deep scepticism towards international organisations and multilateral processes. On his first day in office, Trump withdrew the US from the World Health Organisation and the Paris Agreement on climate change. He also directed the US treasury to withdraw from commitments under the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Beps), commonly referred to as the “Global Tax Deal”. This initiative — central to the work of the G20’s International Taxation Working Group — aims to ensure that major US-based tech firms such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook pay more taxes in jurisdictions in which they operate.
While the US has not formally withdrawn from the International Taxation or Anti-Corruption Working Groups, it has downgraded the level of representation at these meetings. The administration is also expected to resist strong language in G20 communiqués if it perceives conflicts with its deregulatory agenda or the interests of US corporations.
What will the Trump administration prioritise at the G20 in 2026? During the four G20 summits in his first term, Trump’s government and Trump himself maintained a consistent agenda: opposing the Paris Agreement, promoting “clean” fossil fuels, and emphasising energy security and access. The US firmly resisted global rules that might constrain US businesses, advocating “regulatory sovereignty” over multilateral co-operation instead. The administration also championed private investment and expressed the greatest interest in the Business20 (B20) priorities.
If the US decides it is worthwhile to take on the presidency of the G20 in 2026, the smart money is on energy, deregulation and the private sector. As for the rest of the agenda, it is at odds with much of what consensus there is within the G20 on climate, international taxation and the global financial architecture.
At their May 21 meeting in the Oval Office, Ramaphosa made a determined effort to persuade Trump to reconsider his decision not to attend the G20 Summit in SA, underscoring the importance of US participation. Trump agreed that, “without the US, it is not very important”. Trump tellingly did not respond when Ramaphosa stressed the handover of the G20 presidency to the US in 2026. It remains unclear how much of the current agenda the US will take forward, but it is unlikely that all 36 structures that now convene under the G20 umbrella will endure.
• Dr Rose-Innes, a former senior Treasury official and adviser to the executive director of the World Bank representing Angola, Nigeria and SA, is a development finance consultant based in Washington.
Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.