Thirty-four years ago, a hotchpotch of SA’s political parties and organisations gathered at the World Trade Centre in Auckland Park for the beginning of multiparty negotiations, in what came to be known as the Convention for a Democratic SA (Codesa). Among the entities that were represented were the various homeland governments and the so-called independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.
On the agenda for that inaugural Codesa meeting on December 21 1991 was the adoption of a declaration of intent. This was an important founding document that anchored all subsequent negotiations. It committed participants to most of the values that today find expression in our constitution, such as bringing about “an undivided SA, with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty”, working to heal the divisions of the past, and striving to improve the quality of South Africans’ lives.
It set in motion a process of writing the country’s interim constitution that would have all the freedoms we take for granted today, and ensured that the constitution was the supreme law of the country, “be guarded over by an independent, nonracial and impartial judiciary”.
Until then, the most important agreements had been reached primarily between the National Party (NP) government and the ANC in a series of bilateral meetings. The adoption of the declaration of intent by all the other parties in that gathering gave it huge legitimacy, thus ensuring that it was binding on all parties and organisations that participated in the process.
However, without a commitment from then-president FW de Klerk’s government to bind itself by agreements reached in that forum, Codesa would have been a colossal waste of time. It was therefore important that in the same declaration of intent De Klerk committed his government to implement Codesa agreements.
— On numerous indices SA is worse off now than it was when Ramaphosa came to office in 2018.
The last paragraph of the declaration stated: “We, the SA government, declare ourselves to be bound by agreements we reach together with other participants in Codesa in accordance with the standing rules and hereby commit ourselves to the implementation thereof within our capacity, powers and authority.”
It was that last part of the declaration of intent that encouraged the different parties to participate in the process, confident that any agreements that they reached would be implemented. De Klerk could give that commitment because his party — which subsequently won a whites-only reform referendum by more than a two-thirds majority — had a majority in the House of Assembly.
In the 1989 elections, the NP had obtained 52.7% of the vote, against the Conservative Party’s 26.83% and the Democratic Party’s 15.12%. He knew that on its own, his party would have the numbers to pass legislation giving effect to agreements flowing from the Codesa talks.
I was fortunate to be there throughout the Codesa 1 and Codesa 2 negotiations, covering our transition to a democracy as a political reporter, and subsequently a political correspondent, with The Star in Johannesburg.
In recent weeks, South Africans have expressed different views on the usefulness of the recent national convention that took place at the Unisa campus. We are told by President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government that the former was a precursor to “a nationwide, people-led national dialogue process”.
At this stage, I must immediately associate myself with the millions of South Africans who have grave reservations about the wisdom and utility of the proposed national dialogue. Like them, I hold the view that it will be a colossal waste of people’s time and the state’s meagre resources, which may lead to more anger being unleashed against Ramaphosa’s government. The more I think about it, the more I see the proposed national dialogue process as a big public relations exercise to mollify South Africans and get them to feel heard.
Unfortunately, when people eventually realise that they have been played their anger is bound to multiply. The fact remains that SA is in the terrible state it is in today because of the ANC. Regrettably, the Ramaphosa presidency — which promised so much — has not made much of a difference. On numerous indices SA is worse off now than it was when Ramaphosa came to office in 2018.
I have sympathy with those who argue, trenchantly, that SA’s problems are well known. What is required is real leadership that is capable of taking tough decisions to turn our situation around. Sadly, ANC leaders have long been more concerned about advancing their own selfish interests and their organisation’s putative unity than they have been about taking the tough decisions that could change the country’s economic trajectory.
That is by the way. Much of this argument has been made elsewhere by others. This article seeks to concern itself with one important question: what will be the consequence of the national dialogue process? As I indicated above concerning Codesa, De Klerk and his party gave the categorical assurance that they would “be bound by agreements we reach together with other participants in Codesa”.
In the unlikely event that any concrete agreement eventuates from the national dialogue process (say, on the need for the constitution to be amended to provide for a death sentence), what will its status be? Who will give effect to it? We know the ANC only managed 40% of the vote in the last election. How will it ensure that the government of national unity (GNU) that it leads accepts and implements the outcome of the national dialogue? How will it ensure that parliament approves and implements whatever agreement eventuates from that expensive talk show?
We may remember that Ramaphosa once chaired the National Planning Commission, at the request of Trevor Manuel and then-president Jacob Zuma.
Even then, the National Development Plan that resulted from that process was formally adopted first by the cabinet and subsequently by parliament in 2012. Only then was it considered an official document that was binding on the country. Leave aside, for a moment, that we have been terrible when it comes to its implementation.
Not only are some key members of the GNU not part of the national dialogue, but several parties in parliament are also vehemently opposed to it. How, then, will Ramaphosa ensure that its outcome is binding? Why should SA suddenly believe a man who told the electorate in the run-up to the 2024 elections that his organisation “would win, whether they like it or not”?
Nothing I have read or heard so far has given any indication of the status of the outcome of the national dialogue process. Will it be a document to be stored in file 13, never to be looked at again, or will it merely be referred to in passing from time to time, whenever the masses raise discontent about the country’s governance?
Until such time that these questions can be answered with confidence, the whole national dialogue process is nothing but a poor PR exercise that is likely to backfire badly.
• A former newspaper editor, Dr Nyatsumba is a turnaround strategy expert, business rescue practitioner, chartered director (SA) and author of “Corporate Newsman — A Life of Integrity”.
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