It is entirely fitting that the ANC’s ability to hold on to power is now under threat due to the same inadequacies that it has inflicted on the government and the country: ineptitude of deployed staff and leaders; infighting that paralyses processes and decisions; and an inability to make the hard decisions necessary to live within its means.
It is not clear yet how the issue of reopening candidates lists will be resolved. While the Electoral Commission of SA (IEC) has said it will restart the entire process, allowing candidate registration to reopen, the DA is set to challenge this in court, so it may be a little while before we know. While it is probable that the ANC is saved this time by the IEC, whose decision does look rational, it has come too close to disaster to continue with business as usual.
Even if the crisis about election lists is resolved favourably for the ANC and it gets to add the missing candidates, the ANC is still in trouble on multiple fronts. It is clear from the election lists debacle and the simultaneous funding crisis the party faces that its business and operating model has run out of road and it must adapt or die.
For more than two decades the ANC has run an excessively large and expensive party bureaucracy. The salaries of the top officials were benchmarked against ministerial salaries so as not to penalise those who serve the party. There has also been a growing number of senior staff, as those displaced from parliamentary lists or from the cabinet needed to be taken care of and well paid.
As we know from the frank evidence of tenderpreneur Edwin Sodi to the Zondo state capture commission, the ANC lurched from payroll crisis to payroll crisis each month for many years. The way it coped was to call up somebody like Sodi at short notice and hit them up for a couple of million to make sure salaries were paid.
That modus operandi is no longer possible: fear of exposure and the Political Party Funding Act have closed the taps. Donors must now disclose every donation above R100,000 and their annual contribution is capped at R15m.
The existence of the act itself is due to ANC ineptitude. By the time the party realised the full implications of the new law, which it had supported in parliament while distracted by factional internal battles, and tried to stop it, it was too late. Under threat from legal action by Corruption Watch, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the act into force after delaying as long as possible, as lawyers stood ready to force him to do so.
The ANC will now have to adapt its cost structure at national, provincial and regional levels. This will have political implications, not just because cadres who have been sheltered will have to go out into the world or find jobs in government. The ANC campaign will have to be smaller and cheaper.
The big, loud campaign with free T-shirts, lunch packs for volunteers and celebrity performances, will not be possible. As the ANC campaign has been responsible for significant mobilisation, during which period support increases substantially, this will be a new danger for the party.
There is also evidence that voter confidence in the ANC is waning, indicated by a large drop in public trust levels, even when it comes to its best drawcard, Ramaphosa himself. The Afrobarometer survey on public trust released in August would have concerned all political parties. While Ramaphosa has always been more popular than the ANC, public trust in him has plummeted, with only 38% of respondents saying they trust him. The result for the ANC and opposition parties was even more dire: the ANC enjoyed trust levels of 27% and opposition parties 24%.
This is a possible indicator of a low turnout election, which usually suits the DA as it is able to more successfully mobilise voters to get to the polls. Few opinion polls have been held in the run-up to the election, but an Ipsos poll released on Monday showed declining support for the ANC (at 49% from 57.5% in 2019) and DA (18% from 21% in 2019), and significant growth for the EFF at 15% (11% in 2019).
Pollster Dawie Scholtz has also been simulating the outcome for the metros if turnout trends remain the same as 2019. The ANC is marginal in Tshwane, Johannesburg and even Ekurhuleni, where it is projected to get only 51%. In Gqeberha and Cape Town the ANC is well below 50%.
The governing party has so far refused to reform, preferring to hope it can cajole and squeeze its way out of trouble. That is no longer viable. It has hurt the country and is now hurting the ANC.
• Paton is editor at large.
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