A wandering albatross shared a chilling recollection with me after the president’s state of the nation address (Sona) that was enough to straighten any back to what is potentially coming down the pipe.
My albatross was one of about 3,000 protesters participating at an Electricity Action Campaign event near Cape Town’s city hall, where parliament sat for the Sona. These mostly civic organisations had gathered to add their voices to the chorus of discontent over SA’s 15 years of load-shedding but as they had to stay about 1.5km away from the city hall because of “gathering” regulations, the planned march was called off.
But my albatross flew over city hall, avoiding the razor wire, barricades, police and army Buffels (those big armed cars), and was struck by the size of the security presence. Having participated in many marches in the 1980s and ’90s, an ill wind of déjà vu is blowing through his feathers.
As an election is due in about a year, one has to ask, what will happen then given that most credible, scientific assessments of the electricity crisis point to the earliest termination of load-shedding being in more than 24 months?
As we approach the 2024 elections the energy crisis is expected to worsen. The effects of load-shedding will become increasingly severe, with cascading crisis manifesting primarily in the critical water-energy-food nexus. These risks are compounded by the likelihood of protests and instability, as seen in the recent demonstrations in Thembisa, causing four deaths, over high power costs.
The use of the national state of disaster to quell protest could lead to a vicious spiral, raising constitutional questions and the possibility of next year’s elections being imperilled. Does anyone know if the SA constitution deals with the question of elections during a state of disaster?
Justifies lifting
If the state of disaster needs to be in force now, how will things plausibly have improved sufficiently by February 2024 so that it can be lifted before the election? If it is in place to enable actions that take longer than a year (there are many), surely lifting it in time for the 2024 elections will be hugely problematic?
Will the ANC push to postpone the elections, especially if it faces the prospect of not doing well, as most polls suggest? And if it postpones once because of prevailing conditions, when will those conditions improve to the point that justifies lifting them, and what is the likelihood of that happening?
Given these risks, those arguing in favour of the energy state of disaster stand on flimsy ground, especially as existing legislation provides for most actions to end load-shedding. The benefits of the few things not provided for do not outweigh the huge risks.
The other glaring issue in the Sona was the proposed appointment of an electricity minister. While the idea of having a dedicated minister to address the crisis is commendable, the challenge will be in ensuring the minister has the power to implement policies and is held accountable by the president.
The change to schedule 2 of the National Electricity Regulation Act (the “100MW exception”) is only one example of the recurring policy issues that have plagued SA’s energy industry. The president must settle these differences and ensure policy pronouncements are implemented, a basic element of cabinet government. However, this is not occurring, as certain cabinet members openly flout presidential policy pronouncements and undermine them through inactivity. Here the finger points to unresolved policy differences within the tripartite alliance.
President promised
The proposed electricity minister faces significant hurdles, starting with who will be appointed to the role. It remains to be seen whether the minister will have enough power and influence within the ANC to outmanoeuvre the energy minister, and whether the electricity minister will be able to navigate the complex technicalities of laws and regulations that are hard-coded with the term “energy minister”.
The problem is political. While the president promised in his 2019 Sona that Eskom would be unbundled into three separate entities handling transmission, distribution and generation “without delay”, here we sit four years later with essentially nothing to show for all this breathless talk of urgency.
Maybe those ANC ministers clearly impeding this critical, complex, multiyear electricity market reorganisation and corporate restructuring and turnaround have forgotten that this is the route most countries have followed, particularly our emerging market and Brics peers.
The State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) was formed in 2002 by the division of the old State Electric Power Corporation’s assets into five power-generating groups and five regional grid subsidiaries. As a result, SGCC now employs about 1-million people, serves 1.1-billion people, and has a reported revenue of $348,9bn.
To maintain energy supply security Turkey split its vertically integrated utility into two state-owned firms in the 1990s: Turkish Electricity Generation & Transmission Company and the Turkish Electricity Distribution Company. The Brazilian energy provider Eletrobras was in financial trouble in the 1980s, but changes in the 1990s established an independent system operator and halved the frequency and length of power outages within four years.
To paraphrase my albatross, the beloved country once again requires an active citizenry to defend against a new, dangerous threat to our democracy.
• Avery, a financial journalist and broadcaster, produces BDTV’s Business Watch. Contact him at badger@businesslive.co.za.







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