Why is it that opposition parties cannot come together in a meaningful and sustainable way, to form a substantive alternative to the ANC? It is perplexing.
Certainly there is enough that is broken to unite around fixing — at least in the short and medium term. And there is opportunity: an ANC electoral base that is fracturing and declining, leading to much low-hanging fruit, especially in urban centres. But this, it seems, is not enough.
Many coalitions have collapsed and, generally speaking, the bigger the stakes — that is, the bigger the government — the more fragile any coalition. Gauteng is the epicentre of this chaos. Johannesburg has had nine mayors since 2016 (Mpho Phalatse twice), Tshwane five and Ekurhuleni four. Some of these were due to death as opposed to politics, but the numbers speak to significant turmoil: 18 mayors, where normality would dictate six.
The one external contributing factor is the ANC and the tiny gap that typically separates any opposition alliance from an ANC-led alternative. All it takes is one or two smaller parties to switch, and a government falls. But that switch is powered by internal opposition unhappiness more often than it is by ANC manipulation.
The weakest kind of glue
The big-picture truth — the glaringly obvious truth — is that the glue which binds the opposition together in these places is weak. Indeed, it is difficult to say what the glue is, exactly.
The common claim is that it is the prospect of an ANC government. Certainly the ANC (and the EFF) is the binding agent the DA relies upon when it speaks of a moonshot pact. But that is a negative force, and history suggests they tend to be the weakest kind of glue. That said, it is a hard, measurable bottom line.
On the positive side, things become more subjective: ideas like unity, hope, common interest and the common good. These can be immensely powerful, but they live or die by how believable they are. If you preach unity but practice factionalism, if you emphasise common interest but pursue a partisan purpose, and if you offer hope but deliver disappointment, people will associate you with what they experience, not what you say. Seeing is believing.
Most opposition parties agree with the negative, but few seem able to invest fully in the positive, outside of rhetoric.
Why? Here are some contributing factors:
First, most opposition parties have as their primary focus minority voters, whatever they claim otherwise. Thus, they regard any coalition as a potential threat, more than a potential opportunity. And this is epitomised by their attitude to the DA. The idea that a rising tide raises all ships is too abstract for them. It is a tsunami they fear, under the weight of which all smaller ships would be subsumed.
Second, and not unrelated, many opposition parties have implicit to their core offer some base ethnic appeal, often along racial lines. This is difficult to reconcile with a “for the people” approach, for they are more of the “for our people” school of thought. Some parties, the Cape Coloured Congress (CCC) for example, are explicit on this front. Others, the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) for example, serve their particular constituency implicitly. They are inwardly focused, not outward looking.
An addendum to this: this problem manifests regionally too. ActionSA’s primary stronghold is in Gauteng, and Johannesburg in particular, one based almost entirely around Herman Mashaba’s mayoralty. Outside that province, it fades into nothing. Joburg is the world for ActionSA.
Third, some parties have no interest in a coalition working, as they believe there is more political capital to be made in them failing. This is a dangerous and myopic game, but the thinking is: if it can be demonstrated to the public that party A caused the collapse by behaving poorly, and that party B acted honestly and nobly, people will switch to party B.
The Patriotic Alliance, for example, having stolen from the EFF’s template, has this approach to coalitions. It is entirely pragmatic. And it is the pragmatism of self-interest.
There is no evidence this actually works, however. Typically people cannot distil from all the complexity who is responsible and adopt “a pox on all their houses” attitude. But it is believed nonetheless. And so game-playing is as ubiquitous as it is destructive.
There seems an inability to distinguish individuals from their party stereotype, or to evaluate them on their own terms.
Fourth, related to this, is the selfish pursuit of positions. The motivation here can be personal greed, but it is also the prominence that comes with high office. Parties like Al Jama-ah know that the mayoralty in Johannesburg will deliver more PR for that party than any election campaign ever could. It doesn’t matter if it works out or not, it delivers name recognition on a scale the party itself could never afford.
Fifth, is distrust. This is a complex multifaceted barrier to co-operation, but there is a powerful element of conspiracy and mythmaking inherent to it. Many parties are beholden to an archetypal understanding of their competition: they believe they are inherently racist, corrupt, untrustworthy or self-interested. Now, blind faith in the other direction is no good either, but there seems an inability to distinguish individuals from their party stereotype, or to evaluate them on their own terms.
Unfortunately this is worsened by an obsession among many parties with centralised control. The elected officials in actual coalition negotiations are often proxies, or simply bypassed altogether by the real power brokers. That happens in politics the world over and is unavoidable to a degree; but here it is extreme and fuels the suspicion that any regional coalition is merely a metaphor for some other hidden objective.
A vicious circle
Sixth, following on from this, the truth is that a great many of those involved in negotiations, from elected representatives, to political leaders, to national power brokers and strategists are simply B-league players at best. Few things reveal that better than social media, where the petulance that defines online hostility is laid bare for everyone to see. We are bereft of statesmen and women, able to rise above the fray, with long-term insight and strategic patience. Rather, SA is awash in short-term tactical adolescence. And by people who are provoked into war by the smallest slight.
It is a vicious circle. The characters central to any party’s ability to negotiate in good faith are so addicted to point-scoring online, they become touch points for targeted hostility and distrust. And they take into any negotiation all this baggage, true or untrue. So it goes, until there is no-one able to resist the lure of online warfare, or able to talk in private, as honest brokers, without some divisive and publicly predetermined reputation accompanying them.
There is no “safe space” in SA negotiations. And no player not predefined by an archetype. In turn, social media has made every member of every political party a peripheral player in all negotiations.
We are bereft of statesmen and women with long-term insight and strategic patience. Rather, SA is awash in short-term tactical adolescence.
Seventh, personal grievance. Underpinning the above is often hostility. ActionSA, for example, is largely built around people who left the DA, from its leader, to its national chair, to a great many of its senior public representatives. And they all left on poor terms. It makes sense then, that a significant part of the ASA zeitgeist comprises a latent hostility and animosity towards the DA. In turn, a great hostility on the part of the DA exists towards those who left, and the damage they did in doing so. It is as inescapable as it is palpable, and all too raw and recent to be constrained by maturity on either side.
Eighth, and finally, there exists a pervasive false equivalence. Coalitions are not equal in terms of power. Power is determined by the electorate and size. Necessary compromise dictates smaller parties have a larger say, and bigger parties a smaller say, but it is all relative. Ignore that reality, pretend all parties are absolutely equal in every way, and no agreement will ever be reached. Many smaller parties (typically one-person parties with populist leaders) cannot reconcile their egos with their actual size. Their measure is some imagined future, where they are as big as feel they deserve to be. Thus, the price they demand for co-operation is both unreasonable and unrealistic.
All of these come together in a vortex, along with several other factors. At its centre is the promise of unity and coherence. But no party ever reaches the middle. It is not strong enough to pull anyone inside. Instead all parties swirl perpetually around and around, fighting to position themselves as close to the inner edge as possible and the perceived credibility that comes with it.
It is true, some parties may have a genuine interest in what lies on the other side. It too does not seem a strong enough desire to break with the other forces at play. Certainly, no opposition party seems strong enough, or to possess leadership compelling enough, to pull others in with them.
At their most believable, unity and hope are pre-eminent when it comes to generating enthusiasm. And the opposition desperately needs that. It needs every opposition voter to turn out if it wants 51% nationally. But infighting and division are pre-eminent when it comes to augmenting alienation and apathy. And that serves the ANC and its objective of 51%.
In this way, the opposition is its worst enemy: the more it seems to try to deliver on its greatest electoral weapon — hope — the more people experience that attempt as disappointment. And so it risks manifesting the very thing it is trying to overcome.
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