In 1994 Nelson Mandela cobbled together a power-sharing arrangement, which would become known at the government of national unity (GNU). It principally comprised three protagonists: the ANC (with a clear majority across the country except in KwaZulu-Natal), FW de Klerk’s National Party (NP) and Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s IFP.
Over the past fortnight South Africans have been sold various versions of what their next government could look like. The dominant view, apparently preferred by President Cyril Ramaphosa and his faction in the ANC, is a modern-day version of the GNU that includes as many parties as possible rather than a two- or three-party negotiated coalition.
This obsession with a GNU is both self-serving and opportunistic because it would ensure that the ANC could continue to dominate the government despite the clear message the voters expressed at the polls. More concerning, it is misplaced as it ignores the lessons of the 1994 GNU.
Mandela’s GNU, which was formed after a violent pre-election season, was not that successful. Within two years, the NP, then the second-largest party, had withdrawn from the arrangement. Two non-ANC finance ministers — Derek Keys and Chris Liebenberg — left the job before the five-year term had expired, both having been airdropped in from business to placate investors, a goal that was not optimally achieved.
When Mandela finally plucked up the courage to appoint Trevor Manuel as SA’s first black finance minister, it spooked the markets. But, to their credit, both soldiered on and toughed it out.
In 1996, Manuel introduced an austerity programme known as the Growth, Employment & Redistribution (Gear) strategy to sort out the hangover from apartheid’s chaotic finances. Among the ANC’s communist and trade union alliance partners, Gear was seen as a further attempt to assuage the markets.
Manuel would go on to become the longest-serving post-apartheid finance minister. Only the IFP, which was allowed to run KwaZulu-Natal, stayed on through the five-year period of the GNU.
Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded Mandela as ANC and the country’s president, tried and failed to appoint Buthelezi as his deputy president of the republic. He then resorted to dishing out insignificant jobs to smaller party leaders, a tradition Jacob Zuma and Ramaphosa continued — to the detriment of the junior partners, which have invariably ended in oblivion.
What helped make that GNU possible, though it was short-lived, were at least three factors. First, SA had adults in the room back then; second, apartheid as an ideology and model had become unviable; and third, the interlocutors were tired of the civil war raging in the black townships. The consequent economic crisis forced the partners to work together.
After Mandela, the GNU model became one of SA’s best exports. Every country emerging from conflict or a stolen election was told to form a GNU as a way out. For instance, Morgan Tsvangirai, the late former trade unionist who formed the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, became Robert Mugabe’s prime minister thanks to the GNU model recommended by Mbeki.
However, today’s circumstances are different from 1994. The ANC is divided, with several factions vying for dominance even after two of them — Julius Malema’s EFF and Zuma’s MK party — left the ANC.
The GNU construction is not universally favoured despite its limited utility. A coalition with the DA is a hard sell to the ANC’s core support base. So too is a wider one including the EFF and MK, which people realise would fail to secure long-term stability or inspire investor confidence.
Unlike in 1994, today’s ANC is negotiating from a position of weakness. With its electoral support having fallen 17 percentage points to a little over 40%, it can scarcely make tough demands. The rejection by voters has been loud and clear.
The most serious stumbling block to a GNU is the quality of today’s leadership.
There are other pressing issues. The economy is failing to perform, social stability is at risk thanks to poverty and unemployment, and foreign policy has become a critical issue in governance.
The ANC, DA and EFF have wildly different positions on these issues, while MK’s stance remains a mystery on everything and the EFF is unashamedly socialist. Meanwhile, the ANC has grudgingly accepted that business has an important role to play in fixing Eskom, the railways and collapsing municipalities. Its posture is now not too far from the DA’s on these issues.
Conflict over foreign policy has the potential to make a GNU hard, if not completely unviable. The ANC’s position on the Gaza conflict is opposite to the DA’s. Nor do the two parties see eye to eye over the two-year war between Russia and Ukraine.
Further sharp differences would emerge on issues such as SA’s approach to dealing with illegal immigrants. For example, Malema has repeatedly stated that he wants SA’s borders to be thrown open to all Africans.
It will be difficult to have a GNU without a programme of minimal co-operation. This will only get SA back to where it is today: most disputes are decided by the courts. This is not an ideal situation. The courts should be arbiters of last resort.
The most serious stumbling block to a GNU is the quality of today’s leadership. For example, there is no shared appreciation of what the results mean among the main parties. The two major parties believe their own propaganda about the numbers.
Finally, in the unlikely event that a GNU pact is struck, the allocation of ministerial posts is likely to be another major sticking point. The first step would likely be kissing goodbye to the idea of a smaller government.
• Dludlu, a former editor of Sowetan, is CEO of the Small Business Institute.
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