We have become so wired to expect bad things from bad people — the evildoers — that we often miss how good people can also do bad things. Not intentionally, perhaps, but as an automatic reaction to specific situations.
There is plenty evidence globally that good people and organisations with good intentions do make bad and disastrous decisions, often with some people in these organisations being aware of the impending catastrophe but doing nothing about it.
Such outcomes happen because of the interaction of two factors. First is the universal predisposition to do counterproductive things — what Canadian academic Roger Martin refers to as the universal frailty that always lurks in all humanity. Second are three factors that constitute the steering mechanisms of organisations (irrespective whether they are profit or nonprofit entities, public or private sector).
Drawing on the work of the late Chris Argyris, an American business theorist and professor, Martin says counterproductive behaviour by individuals is driven by a set of values that are focused on winning, staying in control and avoiding embarrassment.
“When pushed beyond our comfort levels we will engage in defensive behaviour aimed at avoiding failure and the resultant embarrassment and loss of control. We will avoid telling the truth or asking questions, especially if it involves challenging the opinions of others in a manner that threatens to produce embarrassment.
“The result is that we will cover up our mistakes, even if it means making a bad situation worse,” writes Martin in a paper, “Why do people & organisations produce the opposite of what they intend?”
Martin, a professor emeritus at the Rotman School of Management at University of Toronto where he was dean (1998-2013), prepared the paper for the inquiry into the 2000 public health disaster caused by the bacterial contamination of municipal water in Walkerton, Ontario, Canada. His paper is not about the disaster itself, but organisations in general.
Fear of failure
He adds that while the “universal frailty” — primarily the fear of failure — that may lead all of us to do counterproductive things “lurks at all times”, there are variances in the capacity for it to cause such bad outcomes. This variance has two sources.
Defensiveness among individuals varies and organisations in which these individuals operate differ in creating the enabling environment. In organisations the enabling environment is caused by three factors (steering mechanisms) — formal systems, interpersonal patterns and cultures. Each, or the interaction of all three, can worsen or ameliorate defensive behaviour.
Formal systems refer to structures and processes — who makes decisions, performance measures and rewards — that guide an organisation towards its goals. Interpersonal mechanisms are about how people within an organisation work together, including how conflict is managed and how errors are dealt with.
Then there is culture — what Martin refers to as “the norms, maps and myths that guide collective interpretations and actions” within an organisation. “Every organisation has cultural mechanisms, though in most cases they take shape in unplanned ways and are often not documented. Nevertheless, they are powerful mechanisms in guiding behaviour.”
Working as an interrelated and mutually reinforcing structure, these organisational steering mechanisms can create institutions where good people end up acting in a manner that produces bad or disastrous outcomes.
The Life Esidimeni tragedy — which justice Dikgang Moseneke has described as “a harrowing account of the death, torture and disappearance of utterly vulnerable mental healthcare users” — is such a perfect example of the effect of these organisational steering mechanisms.
Yet so much of our collective focus has been on identifying and calling for the hanging of the bad people whose decisions caused the tragedy. For sure, the people who took the decision that caused the “searing and public anguish” Moseneke described should be held accountable. But we shouldn’t ignore the culture — the norms, maps and myths — and other institutional steering mechanisms that enabled Life Esidimeni to happen.
A close examination of the Gauteng government steering mechanisms may reveal the enablers of Life Esidimeni tragedy and help prevent future ones. Some have pointed fingers at “austerity” — the greater focus on balancing government finances. Perhaps. But this may miss the point that there are ways of steering public finances to health without causing a Life Esidimeni tragedy.
The metaphorical hanging of the key individuals may satisfy the public demand for blood but will not necessarily address the universal frailty and the organisational steering mechanisms that could enable another tragedy.
• Sikhakhane, a former spokesperson for the finance minister, National Treasury and SA Reserve Bank, is editor of The Conversation Africa. He writes in his personal capacity.
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