Observers of the Forum of China-Africa Co-operation, attended by 50 African leaders in Beijing last week, debated the rise, decline and future of rival powers.
These analysts are in good company — historians ranging from North African Ibn Khaldūn in the 14th century to 20th century British historian Paul Kennedy have spent much time analysing the ebb and flow between hegemonic powers.
They were standing on the shoulders of ancient scholars such as Thucydides, the Greek historian, who argued that the central cause of the 434-401 BCE Peloponnesian War was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta”.
The Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (Mistra) will be hosting a conference in October focusing on contemporary manifestations of power transitions, asking whether the current geopolitical rivalries will lead to greater conflict or a more co-operative, multipolar world.
The triennial China-Africa forum should be seen alongside many other countries’ attempts to court Africa. In 2021 President Emmanuel Macron hosted a France-Africa summit, while in the past two years President Joe Biden hosted a US-Africa summit.
Russia President Vladimir Putin hosted the second Russia-Africa gathering and in March Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted an Italy-Africa gathering. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia have also been “rediscovering” the strategic importance of Africa.
Much of this interest is due to Africa’s rapid population growth as it represents a huge market for their goods, a high concentration of critical minerals and 54 votes at the UN. This attention has seen a broadening of trade relations. India has become Africa’s third-biggest trading partner after the EU and China, while the United Arab Emirates’ trade with Africa has increased almost 500% in the past two decades. The UAE is now also the fourth biggest investor in Africa, having ploughed in nearly $60bn in the past decade.
How should Africa handle these developments? Lazarus Chakwera, Malawi’s president and a seasoned summiteer, recently said while it was “good to have a Chinese meal sometimes”, an all-you-can eat buffet was even better. Chidi Odinkalu of the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy is worried that Africa continues to find itself on the menu and that it is disconcerting that single countries think it’s OK to negotiate with the collective leaders of Africa at once.
Alex Vines of Chatham House cites the case of Djibouti to describe the strategy of being friends with many nations but the client of none. This tiny state has rented out its Red Sea coastline for the bases of competing powers, including China, the US, France and Japan.
However, such openness to external alliances can contribute to tragedy as seen in the Sudan war, which began in 2023 and involves a range of powers including the Gulf states as well as Egypt and Ethiopia. Coups in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have seen the expulsion of French and US troops and the forging of closer ties with Russia and mercenary group Wagner.
The sweeping generalisations that marked coverage of last week’s forum gathering overlooked two important developments in Africa-China relations. The first, as articulated by President Cyril Ramaphosa, is that African countries “would like to narrow the trade deficit and address the structure of our trade” and his call for “more sustainable manufacturing and job-creating investments”.
The other development is the shifting nature of the financing of projects, an example of which is the Tazara railway line $1bn refurbishment. Built in the 1970s with Chinese help under Mao Zedong, it connects Zambia to Tanzania. The new investment will avoid borrowing and raise cash through a concession to Chinese investors, encouraging more direct investment.
There is also a geopolitical angle to this development: the line will compete with a US-backed railway running from the central African copper belt to Angola’s Atlantic coast in a bid to access the continent’s critical minerals.
Mistra’s conference will need to reflect on these various developments as part of the process of developing a new African agenda, one that is drafted with and implemented by scholars, business, labour and governments.
• Abba Omar is director of operations at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.
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