There is a sense in which President Cyril Ramaphosa’s running of the government of national unity (GNU) can be likened to Dwight Eisenhower’s command of the supreme headquarters allied expeditionary force, the joint US-British military structure that prosecuted World War 2 against Germany from late 1943 to 1945.
Just as the success of the GNU will depend on Ramaphosa’s ability to herd political cats, the success of the allied forces during World War 2 had a lot to do with Eisenhower’s ability, to quote historian Norman Gelb, “to get people of divergent interests and different personalities to work together”.
Eisenhower’s biggest challenge was managing Monty Montgomery, the British general who, according to Gelb, was “arrogant, conceited, boastful, abrasive, tactless and capable of gross boorishness”. Montgomery took criticism as confirmation of the ineptitude of his critics.
He was of a peculiar bent. Late in his life he sought a companion. “He did so as if going into battle, not easy for someone his age with no previous experience in that sort of campaign. He reconnoitred the terrain, first on vacation in the south of France, where he permitted himself to grow infatuated with a pretty 17-year-old English girl. It was a brief and strange courtship.”
The courtship took place on the beach where, according to Gelb’s account, Montgomery explained to the young girl, who was far more interested in popular music and dancing, how he would command troops, “drawing diagrams in the sand with his walking stick to show how he would deploy men and tanks”. Unsurprisingly, Montgomery lost the courtship battle.
Ramaphosa has a fair share of Montgomerys to deal with, both within his own party and outside it. How he deals with them will determine the GNUs success — both in terms of lasting till the end of the current administration’s term of office and policy achievements. The president’s performance in this regard will also shed light on him as a leader, leaving ample evidence with which historians and political scientists will evaluate the success or failure of his leadership.
So far, like Eisenhower he has been decisive only when the decision was not to do something. His dilly-dallying over Thembi Simelane’s case is a good example.
Much has been said about Ramaphosa’s ability to get a choir together. This is mostly in relation to his days as the leader of the National Union of Mineworkers in the 1980s, and his role in the negotiations that led to the 1994 democratic elections. His success, or failure, in managing the GNU to the end of his administration’s term of office, and in getting it to achieve its policy objectives, will tell whether he still can get people from different political camps to work together.
So far, like Eisenhower he has been decisive only when the decision was not to do something. His dilly-dallying over Thembi Simelane’s case is a good example. The justice & constitutional development minister is at the centre of a scandal related to the collapse of VBS Mutual Bank. When she was mayor of Polokwane the council illegally placed its deposits with VBS, a deal that was facilitated by Gundo, a company that “lent” money to Simelane to buy a coffee shop in Sandton.
Eisenhower’s colleagues during the war, including Alan Brooke (head of the British army) and Montgomery, regarded him as “irresolute and inconsistent”. Military historian DKR Crosswell writes that Eisenhower was prone to “maddening bouts of indecision and preferred compromise to affirmative control”, an approach that left him “prey to his fractious and wilful senior subordinates”.
But Gelb writes that despite his occasional waverings, Eisenhower did in the end perform “with great proficiency as MD of the momentous Allied effort”. Crosswell also says Eisenhower’s defenders pointed to Eisenhower’s skilful plotting of his course, “balancing the need to preserve the support of his political chiefs with the need to buttress Allied public opinion”, while using his formal powers selectively to accomplish his mission.
“Part of the reason for Eisenhower’s successful high-wire act of managing personalities was, of course, the character of the supreme commander, but also vital was the role played by Beetle Smith (his chief of staff),” writes Crosswell. Similarly, Ramaphosa’s success or failure as chair and MD of the GNU will depend on whether he is overwhelmed by his bouts of indecision, or assumes affirmative control.
Failure on the latter point will leave him exposed to his “fractious and wilful colleagues”, something that will become more magnified as the ANC gets closer to its elective conference. Just like Eisenhower, Ramaphosa must also keep the support of his party and the GNU partners at the same time as he buttresses public and investor opinions.
• Sikhakhane, a former spokesperson for the finance minister, National Treasury and SA Reserve Bank, is editor of The Conversation Africa. He writes in his personal capacity.
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