Over the past few months the media and analysts have been worrying about the survival of the government of national unity (GNU) — a tactical but not strategic pact. A tangential question that has not been asked is whether SA can survive without Cyril Ramaphosa.
South Africans should not have to worry about this. At the outset it has to be said that Ramaphosa deserves the Person of the Year award for outsmarting, outwitting and outgunning his opponents in and outside his party.
When it was announced that the ANC, his party, had failed to win a majority in last May’s elections, fears were rampant over who it would partner with to form a new administration.
The two potential formulations were: first, the ANC could partner with Julius Malema’s EFF, Jacob Zuma’s MK party and other tiny black-focused parties to form a new government; and second, it could partner with the DA and IFP to achieve the same end.
The second formulation was preferred by major political party funders, not least because it was believed, and actively promoted, that this was necessary for the sake of a market-orientated economy.
The first option was more logical in some ways. After all, it would be a coming together of past ANC factions that had split from the ANC. Zuma, who still claims to be an ANC member, has said MK exists to save the ANC (from Ramaphosa).
In a stroke of genius, Ramaphosa talked with everyone and kept everyone, including his inner circle, guessing about what he had in mind.
At the end of June, he announced his choice, borrowing a term from Nelson Mandela (the GNU) to label his coalition, and leaving the EFF and MK out. This decision is explainable in two parts.
The man is in a corner. There is a playbook that still works. It is too late to complain about why this is happening — it is more a case of it being his turn, rather than his fault.
First, they were badly organised, and second they proved to be unsellable to major funders who, unlike the party faithful, tend to have far crisper agendas.
Crucially, though, while he ensured the ANC stayed on in power and he secured his place as a two-term ANC and republic president, he left much of his party and its allies behind. His grip on the party has manifestly been loosened — a bad outcome for the country and its fragile economy.
Ramaphosa’s supposed alliance partners now openly sing songs denouncing his new administration. The SACP has said it will contest next year’s municipal elections independently, but supports the current GNU arrangement. And, in an act of open defiance, his new minister of basic education, Siviwe Gwarube of the DA, even boycotted the signing of the Basic Education Laws Amendment Act (Bela) that her party had campaigned against.
Sensing the political incongruence, Ramaphosa has sought to back-pedal to solidify his shaky political ground. For example, he signed the Bela into law while promising to renegotiate two of its clauses. And he half-opened the door for renegotiation of National Health Insurance.
His tripartite alliance partners are not only denouncing his administration, but his DA partners in the GNU are also openly holding press conferences to voice their anger and frustration at the direction his government is taking. The DA has even threatened court action against the government in which they serve.
The man is in a corner. There is a playbook that still works. It is too late to complain about why this is happening — it is more a case of it being his turn, rather than his fault.
In the 1990s, Ramaphosa’s role model, Mandela, found himself in a far more serious predicament. After decisively winning the 1994 first all-race election, Mandela invited a range of parties to form a GNU, which Ramaphosa emulated.
Two years later, Mandela faced two crises: first, his white finance ministers resigned one after the other, and second, the National Party (NP) left his GNU. Mandela prayed for strength; he did not complain about why it was happening to him. He knew it was his turn, not his fault.
He soldiered on and even did the unthinkable: he appointed a black ANC finance minister, Trevor Manuel, who went on to become the longest-serving and perhaps most successful finance minister in SA’s history. The sky did not fall.
A year or so later, questions started being asked. The most recurring one was what happens when Mandela goes? Well, he left, and the sky did not fall. Thabo Mbeki, by far SA’s most impactful president, took over. The same question arose when everyone realised he did not have horns.
Back to the current situation. The DA is within its rights to toss its toys out of the cot. It can also try what the NP tried, and walk out. However, it is important to note the differences between the Ramaphosa, Mandela and Mbeki situations. The latter two presided over a strong and predictable ANC. Ramaphosa is heading a highly fractious and severely weakened one. This matters.
A relatively strong ANC produced Zuma in 2007. The sky nearly fell then, especially during his second term. The question today is not whether the GNU can — and ought to — survive, but what comes after Ramaphosa. Can the ANC survive?
Ramaphosa has options. He can call early elections in 2027 (aligning with his party’s leadership election calendar). This will put a strain on his party, but reducing the uncertainty would be good for SA.
• Dludlu, a former editor of The Sowetan, is CEO of the Small Business Institute.
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