SA’s foreign policy positions — and clashes with foreign governments over those positions — have dominated headlines over the past two weeks. However, for all of the public debate and discussion they have catalysed there are aspects of the government’s foreign policy framework that are often overlooked and need more attention.
President Cyril Ramaphosa said in his state of the nation address last week that “Africa remains at the centre of our foreign policy”, but that hasn’t actually been true for a number of years. The Zuma and now Ramaphosa administrations have been hyper-focused on building a platform for SA on the global stage, through its membership of the Brics bloc, attending Group of Seven meetings as an observer nation, and then becoming a member of the Group of Twenty. But in so doing, some of our most important partnerships in Africa have been neglected.
One could argue that the government’s consistent leadership in security, defence and economic co-operation in the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership of the AU from 2012 to 2017, are examples of an Africa-focused foreign policy agenda. But again, SA’s most strategic relationships in Africa have been neglected. That is a trend that needs to be reversed.
I don’t say this because we now have a real-time example of just how rapidly relations can deteriorate between two presidents and their governments, as they have between Ramaphosa and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Rather, our own economic and trade interests, as well as the efficacy of our soft diplomatic power over the next decade, will be shaped by those African partnerships and not necessarily those on global platforms.
It is worth noting that there has been some recognition of this. In December 2024 alone Ramaphosa hosted Nigerian President Bola Tinubu in Cape Town for the 11th session of the SA-Nigeria Bi-National Commission. Days later he travelled to Algeria, where he and President Abdelmadjid Tebboune chaired the seventh session of the SA-Algeria Bi-National Commission. And that was followed soon after by a state visit to Pretoria by Angolan President Joao Lourenco.
A blitz campaign to shore up relationships is a good start, but it is only a start. If SA is to capitalise on the intense competition for access to critical minerals taking place between the US, various European states and China, our government will have to realise that this has already begun to spur competition between African states. As various governments position themselves to become the preferential export hubs to markets in the West, the Gulf and Far East, SA’s own mining and export capabilities could well fall far behind those of our neighbours if we are not proactive.
Namibia has begun to develop a green hydrogen strategy and has already attracted major investments in that sector — one our own government hopes to develop in the near future. In late November I wrote about the US and EU’s commitment to the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to connect critical and rare earth mineral mines and refinement plants to the port city of Lobito for more efficient exports to the US and Europe.
Moving those goods from as far as western Tanzania to southern Angola would eventually bypass existing road and rail routes to Durban, Richards Bay and other ports in SA, leaving us out of important opportunities for mineral beneficiation and the creation of new jobs.
The same can be said of the development over the next five years of the megaport project in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, by the state and private partners from Tanzania, China and Oman, and upgrades to the port of Dar es Salaam that could eventually rival the capacity of ports in SA. The government of Mozambique has and will continue to invest in its ports in Maputo and Beira, which have already reaped the benefit of inefficiencies in Transnet’s freight rail and port operations, diverting exports from Eswatini, Zimbabwe and Zambia.
While it was never realistic for SA to think that it would dominate the Sadc or the continent’s infrastructure and trade routes in perpetuity, we now risk being left behind by our own regional partners because we have not developed strong enough incentives to co-ordinate rather than compete for investments with our partners.
Last Thursday Ramaphosa said: “We know that our future prosperity is inextricably bound to the prosperity of the African continent” and he could not have been more correct. But it is not enough for him to merely declare this — he and his coalition government must now begin to strategically strengthen our diplomatic and trade ties closer to home for mutual benefit.
• Stuurman is an independent political risk analyst.
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