Dozens of obituaries and requiems have trumpeted the imminent demise of the government of national unity (GNU) since it came into being after the May 2024 elections. Yet, almost a year later, it remains for most South Africans the only hope for a stable, peaceful and possibly prosperous future.
At the centre of it looms the figure of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who is enjoying a rebound in public approval as he tries to balance not only the many parties in our raucous democracy but also factions within the noisy ANC and its boisterous alliance with the SACP and Cosatu.
Two moments in recent German history could prove useful for us to keep in mind. Germany’s 2005-2009 grand coalition emerged after an unexpected electoral stalemate, similar to SA’s GNU, which was formed after the ANC lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994.
Germany used a “coalition committee” system to facilitate top leadership negotiations outside public scrutiny. While SA has established a coalition council and “clearing house” mechanism serving a similar function, this could be enhanced by drawing on the vast reservoir of dispute resolution specialists we are blessed with.
At the time, German chancellor Angela Merkel had a low-key, consensus-orientated leadership style that helped manage coalition tensions and saw her serve from 2005 to 2021. Similarly, SA does depend on Ramaphosa’s consensus-seeking style.
There has been speculation around the cause of the demise of the more recent “traffic light” coalition of Germany, formed in 2021 led by the SPD’s Olaf Scholz. Much has been made of the speed at which SA’s GNU statement of intent was hammered out, and its brevity. At 1,300 words, it is a far simpler, shorter document than the 144-page agreement of the Scholz coalition. Perhaps we can agree that verbosity does not guarantee longevity.
A key factor for the demise, which parallels the challenge the GNU now faces, is that economic pressures test coalition stability. Budget disagreements in Berlin arose within the coalition government largely due to the debt brake constitutional limitation and the economic impact of the Ukraine war. An important takeaway is that the GNU should prioritise developing consensus around fiscal policy and budget frameworks to prevent a repeat of the current budget impasse or future ruptures.
Another factor is the possibility of policy differentiation versus coalition cohesion. For example, the FDP struggled with balancing its liberal economic identity with coalition compromises, leading to electoral losses in regional elections and forcing it to take on confrontational positions to distinguish itself.
But such strong-arm tactics saw it lose even further support in this year’s elections, without any representation in the German parliament. Finding ways to allow coalition partners to “win” on some issues could help prevent the identity crisis that undermined the Scholz coalition.
“Coalition fatigue” is a thing — analysts argue that by 2024 the Scholz coalition had diminishing trust between partners and increasing public dissatisfaction with governmental gridlock. In SA we would call it the gatvol factor, which could be reduced or avoided by more confidence-building measures among coalition partners as well as the GNU taking the public into its confidence, instead of depending on leaks.
The continued existence of the GNU is more important than the tantrums thrown by different political factions within the various parties. It can help restore confidence in the public space, meaning an even better turnout in next year’s local government elections and the 2029 general election.
• Abba Omar is director of operations at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.
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