President Cyril Ramaphosa has been leaning into the Russia-Ukraine conflict more directly as the UN General Assembly and G20 meetings in September and November loom closer. The presidency released a statement on August 23 saying Ramaphosa had telephone calls with European leaders about the situation, and calling on all parties “to seize this moment and sustain the momentum towards peace between Russia and Ukraine.”
Ramaphosa’s intervention follows meetings hosted last week by US President Donald Trump with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders, which yielded some iconic photographs but ultimately unsuccessful outcomes. The conflict continued during and after the talks, where no ceasefire was agreed upon. Putin remains a particularly nimble and difficult-to-read negotiator.
Ramaphosa’s soft-power style invokes SA’s legacy of moral authority, negotiation and reconciliation. But this approach contrasts starkly with Trump’s recent White House meetings. The US president projected unilateral authority, prioritising immediate US interests while flexing direct influence and transactional power. But Trump’s style also risks escalation.
Ramaphosa will be keen to cement SA’s strategic importance as a potential mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war ahead of the G20 Summit, while building a bridge to Trump, who has cultivated a diplomatic froideur between the US and SA. Ramaphosa has been emphasising SA’s skill at mediation amid a diplomatic “non-alignment” strategy.
SA’s transition from apartheid to democracy gave the world one of its most powerful stories of negotiation and reconciliation. But part of that story is a warm relationship with Moscow. Russia historically supported SA’s struggle against apartheid, and today extends support through the multilateral South-South forum of the Brics bloc. Additionally, Ramaphosa speaking up on Ukraine signals Africa’s ascendant agency in shaping the world order through the AU, Brics and the G20. It shows that Africa will not just be a norms-taker, but also a norms-maker.
But does SA have the bandwidth for all this, with so many pressures domestically? And has the ANC’s track record of corruption in power diluted its moral authority? With power cuts, unemployment and poverty still crippling the country, SA can barely afford to divert attention and resources to a conflict rooted in Putin’s arcane musings on the “triune” Russian nation of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
The war has amplified headwinds for SA’s already fragile economy. Global oil and gas supply disruptions, caused by sanctions and infrastructure damage, have shocked fuel and electricity prices in Europe — pushing up costs of global goods and services. The rand has struggled with volatility and weakness as investors scramble for safe havens in a turbulent global economy.
Diplomacy and domestic recovery are not mutually exclusive. If SA earns more credibility abroad it could result in practical benefits such as increased foreign direct investment. Further, a ceasefire could almost immediately ameliorate the economic frictions created by the Russia-Ukraine war.
But what could realistically end this war? China remains cautious to prevent direct confrontation with either side or the risk of a flare-up with the US, while maintaining strong economic and political ties with Russia. Beijing seeks to balance global influence with strategic partnerships, avoiding direct confrontation with either side.
A negotiated settlement that tackles security and territorial concerns for both sides could certainly be an option but this would have to see both Putin and Zelensky make important concessions. It would also require Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders to be respected, with Russia receiving security guarantees alongside sustained international mediation, monitoring and economic incentives.
As long as Russia and Ukraine are willing to come to the negotiating table the situation remains hopeful. But that does not mean a peaceful resolution is imminent.
• Dr Masie is a visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics’ Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa.
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