Edward Kieswetter’s tenure at the SA Revenue Service (Sars) was never meant to run forever. Appointed in March 2019 to salvage a revenue service hollowed out by state capture, he agreed last year to a two-year extension at President Cyril Ramaphosa’s request. That agreement leaves him with about eight months on the clock and a transition plan already under way with the finance minister and the presidency.
When he walked into the Sars offices, the atmosphere was akin to that of a beleaguered hospital after years of neglect. Institutional memory had been eroded, skilled officials had fled and morale was at rock bottom. He moved fast to restore merit-based hiring, re-establish checks and balances and install data-driven tax collection systems that turned reactive audits into proactive risk assessments. In less than half a decade, Sars’ headline collection recovered to pre-capture levels. Earlier this year, the Treasury advanced it an extra R5.7bn to chase down R800bn in outstanding liabilities.
Few would dispute the results. Indeed, the number of his critics is dwarfed by the chorus of praise from economists, tax practitioners and ordinary taxpayers who have watched Sars transform from a drifting bureaucracy into a leaner, sharper instrument of fiscal discipline. It is no small wonder that some would prefer Kieswetter to cling to his post as long as possible.
But even the most adept change agent is vulnerable to diminishing returns. Seven years at the helm is often the maximum a single leader can sustain before revolutionary zeal calcifies into routine.
The true test of reform is whether it can breathe on its own once its champion departs. Institutional culture hinges on embedding governance frameworks that transcend personalities. Kieswetter has attempted just that by codifying performance metrics and decentralising decision-making. His internal emails emphasise closing the mandate, not clinging to power, a mantra more commonly associated with armies in retreat than tax collections.
Still, caution is warranted. The greatest peril in any successful reform lies not in backlash but in complacency. A succession that mistakes a steady pulse for full health may neglect recurring diagnostics. The next commissioners must respect the tightly knit architecture Kieswettter leaves behind: independent oversight, a robust whistle-blower system, and data analytics that flag anomalies without waiting for political directives.
Parliament, too, has its part to play. All the goodwill in the world cannot substitute for clear terms of reference and a transparent selection process. Shortlists should be publicly vetted, professional qualifications weighted heavily and tenure secured by legislative lock-in rather than executive whim.
In practice, this may require the Sars Act to enshrine tripwire or automatic consequences when performance targets go unmet. Annual goals, negotiated privately in a performance contract with the finance minister, ensure accountability in practice, but the absence of hard stops leaves a governance gap that future incumbents must not exploit.
Comparisons with other revenue authorities are instructive. When the UK merged Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise into HM Revenue & Customs in 2005, continuity hinged on a legislative overhaul as much as on leadership. Shared systems and unified processes carried the missions forward through multiple commissioners. Sars can follow suit. Robust frameworks, rather than personalities, are the pillars of institutional culture.
Our broader political dynamics will inevitably influence Sars’ trajectory, but the confidence earned under Kieswetter should become personal loyalty.
What matters now is that systems and the people who run them have found their footing. If their foundations remain impervious to political capture, Sars will continue to hum along, raising revenue and reinforcing the social contract. In policy as in politics, transitions test systems more than people, and this one looks well under control.










Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.