Jacob Zuma has made his intentions for the ANC and SA clear. The question is, will he succeed?
A number of factors could contribute to the success or failure of his bid for his MK party to become SA’s largest.
Zuma is aware that the most critical propeller of his project to replace the ANC as the majority party is the ANC itself.
How the ANC and its structures respond to the MK party, to the government of national unity (GNU) and to the renewal process it has undertaken will determine Zuma’s success or failure.
This week, the party confirmed Zuma’s expulsion from the ANC.
He responded predictably, saying he was not giving up the fight to remain a member of the party that formed part of his life for six decades. He will head to court and appeal to the party’s national general council (NGC) and national conference in 2027, hoping for a similar outcome he received in 2005 when the NGC reversed the decision to remove him from his post as deputy president.
This is despite forming and leading an opposition party that is actively agitating for the ANC’s demise — at least for the demise of “Ramaphosa’s ANC”. What is difficult for Zuma to accept is that there is no “Ramaphosa’s ANC” — he makes the assumption that the ANC belongs to an individual because during his tenure, the ANC had become Zuma and Zuma was the ANC.
His narcissistic tendencies were fatally nurtured by the ANC itself to a point where he continues to believe that his ANC was and is the only legitimate one.
Between 2007 and 2017, his narcissistic tendencies were fatally nurtured by the ANC itself to a point where he continues to believe that his ANC was and is the only legitimate one.
There are scenarios in which Zuma can succeed in replacing the ANC as the country’s majority party.
Sunday Times political editor Sibongakonke Shoba conducted a revealing interview with Zuma last week, in which he made clear his plan: for his MK party to replace the ANC as the majority party and then to subsume what is left of the ANC.
This would deal a fatal blow to SA’s democratic project, for obvious reasons: Zuma’s party wants to replace the constitution with parliamentary sovereignty, send pregnant teenage girls to Robben Island and nationalise all major sectors of the economy.
These are MK’s stated aims. The unspoken — which SA endured through the nine years of Zuma’s presidency — is the kleptocracy that emerged under him: the politically connected eat, while the rest of the population are duped into thinking that their corrupt gorging is for the benefit of us all.
It is difficult to determine the precise course of the future over the medium term due to the volatility of the ANC itself — for instance, the party’s alliance partners are actively agitating for an end to the GNU, as is its Gauteng provincial executive committee led by Panyaza Lesufi and TK Nciza.
In KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial ANC is split into two groups — those who are loyal to the party but are frustrated by dynamics in the government of provincial unity, which includes the DA, and, crucially, the IFP and those who are secretly loyal to Zuma but biding their time inside the ANC.
The ANC faces a potentially bruising succession battle in 2027, which is opening up considerably with at least four candidates lining up for the post. It could emerge as quite the showdown.
The result of the 2026 local election will mark another inflection point on the road to the 2029 national election.
These dynamics pose a stark political risk for SA over the medium term and will determine the fate of the country for decades.
This is no overstatement: a misstep by the ANC in the coming years could see the emergence of a kleptocratic, authoritarian government with both the ANC and MK at its core — with dire consequences for the country.
MK’s emergence has placed the ANC itself at a crossroads: should it remain a centre-left formation, loyal to the constitution and the democratic principles espoused by former leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, or is it time to abandon the constitution, which many in the ANC itself — its radical economic transformation faction in particular, which still remains influential — have vocally charged has failed to bring about economic and social transformation in SA.
Insiders tell Business Day that the ANC’s renewal programme under way is targeted at members who are not split in their loyalty between it and MK.
“We are not talking to people who in their hearts have long left the ANC, those caught up in their small factions,” a senior leader tells Business Day. The ANC’s “recovery strategy” after its loss in the 2024 election does not focus on individuals it has “already lost”.
The renewal initiatives in the recent past, ironically, were fixating on problems in the ANC that emerged during Zuma’s presidency.
“It’s not just about the Zuma years, but what was going wrong before that, even under [former president Thabo] Mbeki … it’s about going back to the old, to emerge with something new,” another source says.
The MK party and Zuma are meanwhile focusing their attention on the EFF.
Zuma told the Sunday Times that all “black parties” should unite under the MK banner.
EFF leader Julius Malema in an EFF podcast this month said Zuma had directly asked that the EFF be collapsed into MK. He refused.
Since then, senior EFF leaders have been defecting to Zuma’s outfit, including its former deputy president Floyd Shivambu, who is now the MK secretary-general and organiser.
The EFF is just a snack on the journey, the ANC is the main meal.
— ANC NEC insider
“[MK] is cannibalising the ANC and EFF. The EFF is just a snack on the journey, the ANC is the main meal,” said an ANC national executive committee member who wished to remain anonymous.
Social Research Foundation director Frans Cronje said that if the ANC played its cards right, it can once again increase its share of the vote to more than 50% — however, it’s a big if and there is little evidence that it will.
“I think the ANC can go back to 50% pretty easily. But they don’t seem to be thinking about that,” he said.
“If you analyse the ANC’s electoral performance over the past three decades, when the party behaves moderately, its support increases. When the ANC behaves in a volatile, radical way, it sheds support.”
Cronje said that the perception that Zuma was “persecuted” had historically helped his cause and continues to do so.
“Voters for MK are not voting for the party’s policies, but for Zuma, the man. Zuma secured the ethnic Zule bloc. There is a great risk for MK holding together if Zuma is not there. And if the ANC begins to deliver, especially at local government level, it will take back those supporters behind Zuma,” Cronje said.
For Cronje, it is more feasible for the ANC to increase its vote to more than 50% once more, than it would be for MK to become the majority party in SA.
“If the ANC flirts with populism, it will be hard. They simply have to hold their current course,” he said.
Holding its current course should be easy for the ANC — but “fat-tail” level events are on the horizon for the party. The most significant is the ANC’s elective conference in 2027 — Ramaphosa’s term as party president ends. There is a frenzy of activity under the radar on potential successors, despite this crucial gathering being nearly three years off.
The strongest contenders thus far are incumbent deputy president Paul Mashatile, secretary-general Fikile Mbalula, chairperson Gwede Mantashe and a potential dark horse candidate, police minister Senzo Mchunu.
The front-runner or natural successor should be Mashatile, but it is understood that Ramaphosa backers don’t rate him and would prefer Mchunu or a female candidate such as treasurer Gwen Ramokgopa. Would Mashatile easily align with MK?
Logically, the answer would be no.
Mashatile was historically at the forefront of the opposition to Zuma inside the ANC during his presidency, he is close to big business and describes himself as a “social democrat”. He hardly fits the bill for a leader who would collapse the ANC into Zuma’s MK or enter a coalition with it.
However, some in the ANC are not convinced of this, describing Mashatile as a “pragmatic politician” who will shift his stance to ensure he gets the best deal for himself — for instance, if aligning with MK means the difference between power and sitting in opposition, Mashatile will choose the former.
“He’s very flexible. He treads very carefully … he conveniently avoids locking himself out of any faction of the ANC and MK is in the end a faction of the ANC,” a source sympathetic to the deputy president said.
Another potential risk for the ANC is the failure or collapse of the GNU, which could push it into MK’s arms in KwaZulu-Natal in particular.
The dynamics there centre not on the tension between MK as the majority party in the provincial legislature and the ANC, but rather on the historic tussle between the ANC and the IFP, which has the premier position in the province.
“Comrades are getting frustrated with the IFP, it’s a matter of time before they are pushed to MK because of the IFP’s arrogance. Another problem is people are betraying the ANC in dark corners with MK, especially in eThekwini,” a provincial ANC source said. “ANC there will sell out the GPU [government of provincial unity, which includes the DA and IFP]. They are not happy.”
One factor holding back MK’s growth is that it is not in government anywhere in the country, limiting its ability to dispense patronage. Allowing MK to take over the KZN legislature would be a huge boost for its future political fortunes.
A collapse of the KZN arrangement would place at risk the broader GNU, which is already on tenterhooks given disagreements over the Basic Education Laws Amendment Act (Bela) and the National Health Insurance Act.
It appears that the ANC will not budge on the Bela legislation, given discussions in its latest national working committee meeting, which could put the DA in an awkward position — and could result in it reassessing its role in the governing pact.
The 2026 local election should provide an indication of MK’s longevity.
So far, it has not performed well in by-elections since May 29, securing only two seats and there are those who believe its success in the May polls was simply a protest vote against an arrogant ANC that will be short-lived.
MK’s fate is also tied to Zuma’s, who at 82 hardly has decades ahead to build and nurture a new political formation.
Either way, the MK project poses a stark risk to SA’s constitutional dispensation — whether Zuma will once more be unleashed to wreak havoc on SA is once again largely in the hands of the ANC.
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