Idac is not the Scorpions — and parliament knows it

Andrea Johnson, head of the Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (Idac), appeared before parliament’s ad hoc committee last week to testify on the directorate’s mandate, operations and recent high-profile cases.

Her evidence was precise, procedural and restrained, but it also exposed a structural truth that Parliament must now confront: Idac is not the Scorpions, and it cannot be, unless the state is willing to fund and empower it to operate at scale.

Since Idac’s formation in 2019, commentators and lawmakers have asked whether it could replicate the success of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), popularly known as the Scorpions, which was disbanded in 2009 after a series of politically fraught investigations.

The Scorpions were a specialist strike unit embedded in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), with integrated investigative and prosecutorial capacity, a staff complement of more than 500, and an annual budget of R429m in their final year.

They investigated organised crime, high-level corruption and politically sensitive cases and were ultimately dissolved by Parliament after sustained political pressure.

Idac, by contrast, was created to prosecute complex corruption matters arising from commissions of inquiry, particularly the Zondo commission. It was embedded within the NPA and made permanent in 2024.

Johnson told the committee that Idac has 128 staff — “63 female, 65 male” — and that it is “expected to deal with the more complex corruption matters.” She described a unit that relies on referrals, subpoenas and interagency co-operation, and that does not have the in-house intelligence or investigative reach that the Scorpions once wielded.

The workload is substantial. Johnson said Idac is currently handling more than 80 active dockets, many of which involve multiple accused, complex financial trails and politically sensitive allegations.

She confirmed that the directorate had received complaints about 121 missing dockets, a matter that has raised concern within the committee.

The committee has asked for further documentation and clarification on the chain of custody and referral protocols.

Johnson explained that Idac cannot take over dockets from the Hawks or SAPS; it must request them or subpoena them through the national commissioner’s office.

In the matter of Lt-Gen Dumisani Khumalo, she said Idac authorised subpoenas in January and February 2025, and the national commissioner personally delivered boxes of documents to Idac’s offices.

Investigators studied the material and placed it in case files. Johnson said she informed the national director of public prosecutions (NDPP), Shamila Batohi, that Khumalo would be arrested but did not inform the national commissioner.

“If Idac took one lesson from the Scorpions, it was to not have media arrests,” she said.

Johnson described how Idac obtained a cyber-warrant after learning that devices seized from Vusimuzi Matlala were in the possession of the political killings task team (PKTT). The Hawks were unaware of the devices. Idac downloaded the data and returned the phones, but its cyber experts found gaps and deletions.

These examples show a directorate that is procedurally cautious, legally compliant and reliant on other agencies for operational access.

The Scorpions, by contrast, operated with broad powers and in-house capacity. They ran investigations from start to finish, deployed their own forensic and intelligence teams, and pursued politically sensitive cases with minimal reliance on SAPS.

In 2007, they achieved a 94% conviction rate on 182 cases and, in early 2008, initiated 39 investigations and prosecuted 28 cases. Their scale allowed them to run multiple concurrent investigations, and their integration within the NPA gave them prosecutorial reach.

But their autonomy also made them politically vulnerable. Critics accused them of selective targeting and insufficient oversight. Parliament voted to disband them in 2008, and the unit was formally closed in 2009.

The question now before Parliament is whether Idac’s limited capacity is a design flaw or a deliberate constraint. Johnson did not allege political interference, but her testimony made clear that Idac’s ability to pursue sprawling corruption networks is shaped by its size, mandate and reliance on external cooperation.

It cannot act as a strike unit. It cannot seize evidence without judicial warrants. It cannot run intelligence operations. It cannot arrest without co-ordination. It is, by design, a prosecutorial directorate, not an investigative agency.

That design has political consequences. If Idac were scaled up, given in-house intelligence and investigative powers, and funded to run multiple high-level cases, it would begin to resemble the Scorpions. But that would require political will, statutory reform and budgetary commitment. It would also expose the directorate to the same pressures that led to the Scorpions’ demise.

The ANC, which disbanded the Scorpions after they investigated senior party figures, must now decide whether it wants a new version of that model or whether it prefers a leaner, quieter directorate that prosecutes what is referred, without probing too deeply.

The ANC is under pressure to demonstrate anti-corruption resolve ahead of the 2026 local government elections. Secretary-general Fikile Mbalula said last week that members must stand firm against corruption, even if it involves friends.

“We must say ‘not in our name’,” he said. But the party has not removed suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu, who remains on special leave after disbanding the PKTT. That disbandment triggered fury within SAPS and led to inquiries into political interference and corruption.

The juxtaposition is telling: the party speaks of reform but retains ministers who obstruct investigations.

Johnson’s testimony also revealed the limits of Idac’s reach. She said the directorate has not worked with the PKTT, does not use crime intelligence unless a threat analysis is supplied, and does not receive information from her husband, who works at crime intelligence. “Pillow talk gets people killed,” she said.

These statements reflect a directorate that is cautious, compartmentalised and procedurally bound, not a strike unit with autonomous reach.

The ad hoc committee now faces a procedural and constitutional test. It has the power to summon witnesses, request documentation and recommend institutional reform. But it cannot legislate or allocate a budget. Its findings must be tabled before Parliament, and any structural changes to Idac’s mandate or funding must be enacted through the executive and the justice portfolio committee.

The committee’s next hearings with the NDPP and the ministerial chief of staff will determine whether the political appetite exists to strengthen Idac or to leave it constrained.

The Zondo Commission revealed networks of state capture that spanned departments, provinces and political factions. Investigating those networks requires capacity, independence and protection. If Idac is under-resourced, it cannot pursue those cases. If it is underpowered, it cannot subpoena, arrest or protect witnesses. If it is under-supported, it cannot withstand political pressure.

Johnson’s testimony was not a complaint. It was a procedural account of what Idac can and cannot do. But it also served as a quiet warning: if Parliament wants systemic corruption prosecuted, it must fund and empower the institutions that can do it. The Scorpions were disbanded because they did that too well. Idac may be constrained because it might do the same.

The question is not whether Idac is failing. It is whether it is being allowed to succeed. Parliament must answer that in statute, in budget, and in political will. Until then, comparisons with the Scorpions will remain rhetorical. The real test is whether the state wants corruption investigated or merely managed.