MBASA MVENENE: How party funding fuels corruption and what to do about it

There’s a recurring but dangerous rhythm in our politics: private money flows into party campaigns or politicians’ lifestyles, often through middlemen. In return, donors are rewarded with government tenders. This dangerous feedback loop — from donation to procurement — is the foundation of SA’s corruption ecosystem.

The explosive revelations by Lt-Gen Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, now under investigation by both the Madlanga commission and parliament’s ad hoc committee, suggest this pattern now penetrates the criminal justice system, which is the last line of defence in any democracy.

This pattern is not new. In the early 1990s, with Soviet support gone, the ANC — a government in waiting — was cash-strapped. Domestic big business stepped in, creating a “dual constituency”, where it answered to voters and donors. Since then a recognisable pattern has repeated itself: private donations buy political influence that is repaid through government tenders.

Scandal after scandal

In 1994, Gen Bantu Holomisa revealed that Sol Kerzner donated R500,000 to the ANC’s campaign. Nelson Mandela acknowledged it — an early sign of money seeking proximity to power.

In 1999, Schabir Shaik donated nearly R1m to the ANC while funding Jacob Zuma’s lifestyle. In return, Zuma — then deputy president — used his political connections to secure tenders for Shaik’s companies. In 2005, Shaik was convicted for this “generally corrupt relationship”.

Linked to this was the 1999 “arms deal”, which married party-linked companies — including Shaik’s Nkobi Holdings — to huge defence tenders. Former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein alleged R2.1bn in bribes flowed to the ANC during the bidding, financing the 1999 campaign.

Private money buys political access and influence, which delivers tenders, protection or respectability.

Then came “Oilgate” (2004). PetroSA, under ministerial pressure, routed R11m to the ANC via Imvume Management (headed by Sandi Majali, an ally of Kgalema Motlanthe). In 2007, Hitachi Power Africa won a R38.5bn tender, in which the ANC’s Chancellor House held a 25% stake. Mohammed Valli Moosa, then Eskom chair and member of the ANC’s fundraising committee, presided over board meetings that determined the contractor to be awarded the tender.

Whether it was Morkelgate (2002), the Roodefontein scandal (2003), the Kebble controversy (2005), the elephant consortium (2005) or the VBS looting (2018) — touching different parties, the ANC, DA, New National Party or the EFF — we see the same mechanism: private money buys political access and influence, which delivers tenders, protection or respectability.

Fast forward to the Zondo commission (from 2018), which made the link crystal clear. Bosasa disguised bribes as donations totalling R75.7m (2000-16) to capture tenders with the department of correctional services. EOH handed R76m to the ANC to secure tenders worth more than R1.7bn.

In the Free State asbestos saga (2014), Blackhead Consulting channelled millions to the ANC and its top brass while scoring a R255m tender. Even the sealed CR17 campaign funding records underlined a deeper issue: private campaign funding creates dependencies that later shadow public decisions.

Which brings us to the present: different names, same mechanics.

New chapter; same story

On July 6, Mkhwanazi publicly claimed that a sophisticated criminal syndicate (controlled by the Big Five drug cartel) had infiltrated the SA Police Service (SAPS) and prosecutorial and intelligence structures. He alleged that the political killings task team, which investigated political assassinations linked to municipal tender corruption, had been disbanded due to political interference.

In response, the presidency established the Madlanga commission, while parliament launched the ad hoc committee.

During in-camera testimony, a task team member, Witness C, detailed a raid at the home of alleged cartel member Vusumuzi “Cat” Matlala. Matlala claimed connectedness to senior SAPS officials: suspended deputy national commissioner Lt-Gen Shadrack Sibiya, head of organised crime Maj-Gen Richard Shibiri and Maj-Gen Feroz Khan, who heads security and counterintelligence.

What’s at stake now is not just tender corruption. It’s the integrity of law enforcement agencies, the public’s trust in the rule of law, and the state’s capacity to protect citizens.

To back his claims, Matlala reportedly showed their personal contacts and boasted about securing a R1.2bn SAPS tender with help. He further claimed to have paid kickbacks to Sibiya after each tender payout.

The party-funding link also emerges: Brown Mogotsi (an ANC backer) reportedly acted as the middleman between Matlala and suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu. WhatsApp evidence shows Mogotsi requesting payments from Matlala to fund ANC events (including its January 8 anniversary) supposedly on Mchunu’s behalf.

In another message, Mogotsi informed Matlala that the disbanding of the political killings task team was complete, even before its public announcement, attributing it to Mchunu and noting that the “problematic unit” had been addressed.

What’s at stake now is not just tender corruption. It’s the integrity of law enforcement agencies, the public’s trust in the rule of law, and the state’s capacity to protect citizens if security institutions are vulnerable to capture by private money.

What must change

SA is not without party finance law. The Party Funding Act (PFA) has improved transparency, but transparency is not enough. As long as private money can legally enter political finance, it will seek a return, and the most direct route remains public procurement. If left unchecked, political office will keep serving as a gateway to wealth for donors and for those they sponsor.

As long as private money can legally enter political finance, it will seek a return, and the most direct route remains public procurement.

There is only one durable answer: outlaw private party funding, or strictly channel it through the Multi-Party Democracy Fund (MPDF). If donors want to support democracy, let it happen via audited, public and rules-based processes. Let no one accept direct donations, especially while holding public office.

This is not about stifling political participation. It is about protecting democracy from capture.

The criminal justice system must also be shielded from political interference, as Mkhwanazi’s testimony and that of witnesses A, B and C have shown that law enforcement is most vulnerable when it is open to partisan influence. What’s needed is institutional independence, secure budgets and appointment processes that resist capture.

But policy alone won’t fix this. The electorate must act. We know the script. We’ve seen the actors. We understand the system. Heading into the 2026 and 2029 elections, we have a civic duty to remember. Because if we don’t, the same scandals will resurface in new costumes. New donors. New fixers. Same rot.

We cannot panel-discuss our way out of this. Without real jail time for corrupt procurement, and without ending the donation-to-tender conveyor belt, money will continue to buy politicians, and with them, the state itself.

This article’s main argument is drawn from my master’s dissertation; a paper harvested from it has been accepted for publication and will further buttress the points above.