MANDIPA B NDLOVU: SA needs a foreign policy that makes sense to the next generation

The 15-34 demographic constitutes about a third of South Africa’s 63.1-million population and it is a demographic that is increasingly determined to shape the country’s political future.

Young South Africans have a “not in education, employment or training” (Neet) rate of 45.1%, highlighting a growing skills gap relative to the needs of the market. About 2-million of the country’s 3.5-million discouraged workseekers sit in this demographic.

There is therefore a need for a foreign policy that reflects the lived realities of a generation that has a right to dignity, accountability and responsive governance for daily pressing challenges.

Young South Africans have grown up with competitive elections and public debate as the norm, not the exception. They are far less willing than earlier generations to accept opaque decision-making or unresponsive leadership.

For the past decade the acceleration of continent-wide, youth-led mobilisations, from Madagascar through to Nigeria, reflect this growing demand for transparency and a rejection of neopatrimonial politics.

These aspirations will shape Africa’s democratic trajectory and should guide South Africa’s external partnerships given the country’s strategic geopolitical role.

Assessing external alliances

Strained bilateral relations between South Africa and the US warrant close consideration. In the months preceding the Group of Twenty (G20) misleading narratives about South Africa circulated in Washington, presented as fact to justify political pressure.

Further, while the African Growth & Opportunity Act (Agoa) is moving towards renewal, South Africa’s status under the programme is in flux and may hinge on the next steps in US legislative negotiations, trade policy changes and broader bilateral relations.

This uncertainty is a clear signal to pressure domestic industries to restructure, particularly in sectors that depend heavily on US markets for job stability. However, a strengthening rand; Standard Bank’s integration into China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), thereby bypassing the dollar; and South Africa’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force greylist signify fiscal and regulatory resilience that has coped with such geopolitical shocks.

After the G20 summit the EU announced €750m in new investments to advance South Africa’s transport and energy infrastructure. While Europe remains an important democratic partner, the rise of harsh anti-immigration politics in several countries raises legitimate concerns for scaling structured mobility pathways, mutual recognition of skills and circular migration schemes that protect both African talent pipelines and European labour needs, particularly among the working age population.

With 14-million sub-Saharan young Africans expected to enter the labour market each year until 2050, the Africa-Europe Foundation’s State of Africa-Europe 2025 Report argues that job creation and mobility frameworks are essential, yet increasingly at odds with changing tides in Europe’s political climate. Addressing this remains critical given that in the next 25 years Africa is expected to host a quarter of the world’s working age population, even as Europe’s ageing population continues to rise.

With 14-million sub-Saharan young Africans expected to enter the labour market each year until 2050, the Africa-Europe Foundation’s State of Africa-Europe 2025 Report argues that job creation and mobility frameworks are essential, yet increasingly at odds with changing tides in Europe’s political climate.

China is an essential economic partner, especially in infrastructure and trade, despite concerns over widening trade deficits disproportionately favouring the global economic powerhouse. Over-reliance on any single partner exposes South Africa to geopolitical and supply-chain risks, making diversification essential.

South Africa’s relationship with China must be managed through a balanced, nonaligned foreign policy approach that protects national interests while sustaining vital economic ties. This is essential in capitalising on prevailing tensions between the US and the Brics bloc.

To safeguard growth and jobs South Africa should keep all diplomatic and trade channels open, engaging China alongside partners such as the US, EU and Taiwan. This is especially important as Pretoria has decided to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Taipei — a top 20 global economy — despite a framework agreement established in 1997 by president Nelson Mandela to efficiently manage bilateral relations.

Ultimately, along the risk-resilience-vulnerability nexus, South Africa must engage all potential allies, including Taiwan, leveraging contextual value and a strategic global orientation.

Despite its historical ties with Russia, recent reports of 17 South Africans allegedly being deceived into serving as soldiers in its war in Ukraine reflect a wider pattern in which hundreds of Africans have been drawn into similar schemes.

South Africa’s historical solidarity with Russia does not exempt it from reassessing the practical risks that contemporary Russian military networks pose to African citizens and states.

Combined with the destructive record of Wagner and its successor formations across multiple African states, a clear point emerges: Moscow values African governments as diplomatic allies, but African governments must be more intentional in safeguarding African lives or sovereignty.

South Africa’s historical solidarity with Russia does not exempt it from reassessing the practical risks that contemporary Russian military networks pose to African citizens and states. This is especially vital with South Africa assuming interim chairpersonship of the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) until August this year, taking over from Madagascar.

Africa’s democratic future is shaped by myriad complex global dynamics, as much as domestic ones. Several external actors are deepening their presence on the continent. Ultimately, on the risk-resilience-vulnerability nexus South Africa must engage all major power and emerging partners and technological giants such as Taiwan as it makes strategic sense at this moment of geopolitical reconfiguration.

Nonalignment for a multipolar era

South Africa has a rare opportunity to shape a foreign policy that leverages geopolitical tensions to advance domestic needs both at home and in sub-Saharan Africa. The country’s leadership in the recent G20 summit, former leadership at the AU, and interim leadership within the Sadc, has shown its capacity to do so.

Working in tandem with fellow Brics countries, African leaders have an opportune moment to carve out their position in an increasingly multipolar world and to diversify and leverage partnerships that deliver governance and economic gains for their constituents.

The risk of not serving constituents has been seen across Africa through youth-led mobilisations delegitimising democratically elected governments due to non-delivery of services and accountability gaps.

The risk of ignoring constituents is clear, with 49% of South Africans supporting military rule in 2025, surpassing rejections of military rule for the first time since 2011. This is indicative of a need for socioeconomic stability at a granular level.

Foreign government partnerships should enable sovereign co-creation and meaningful opportunities for co-operation in research, just transitions and industrial development, while reinforcing the importance of context-specific regulatory frameworks for sustainable domestic resource mobilisation across the continent.

At the continental level, the championing of the rollout of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) remains critical. Estimated to be a $16-trillion market opportunity in 2050 by the AfCFTA secretariat, the advancement of AfCFTA reflects a needed strategic continent-wide policy shift towards alignment with partners committed to development, multilateralism and institutional strengthening.

If South Africa aims to assume a resilient leadership position in the emerging geopolitical order it must adopt a foreign policy that resonates with the immediate needs of its young and economically vulnerable demographic while lobbying to avert the risks that influence Africa’s governance identity.

• Ndlovu is a scientific researcher at the African Studies Centre at the University of Leiden, Netherlands.