There has been near-total public silence on the part of the South African government concerning the ongoing aggressive American move to acquire Greenland. Is this explained by a lack of material interests for Pretoria?
To be sure, there is little in the way of direct trade with Greenland. In 2024, for example, South Africa’s exports to the island totalled a mere R3.6m (largely concentrated in machinery), while imports totalled R1.17m, mainly fish. The low trade is to be expected given the sparse population of Greenland, counted at 56,000.
However, when accounting for South African trade with Denmark, the country within which Greenland is an autonomous territory, the picture improves quite a bit. The trade is diverse and has shown signs of growth.
Since 2018, when President Cyril Ramaphosa took over and subsequently placed considerable emphasis on the relationship with Europe, imports to Denmark have grown from R4bn to R6bn by 2024. In turn, South African exports to Denmark have moved from R1.5bn in 2018 to a peak of R5.5bn in 2022, before moderating to R2.3bn and then R1.6bn in 2024.
South Africa’s R6bn worth of Danish imports largely covered pharmaceuticals (R1.3bn), machinery (R970m) and various food types (R858m). In comparison, South Africa’s top three exports to Denmark in 2024 were animal and vegetable oils (R437.4m), beverages (R357m) and animal feed (R285m). Given Trump’s cruel taunt that the only defence system Greenland has is sledge dogs, maybe South Africa should vie to be among the leading suppliers of the latter product.
The relationship between Copenhagen and Pretoria has come a long way, with numerous initiatives undertaken, but more can certainly be done in terms of trade. The website of the department of international relations & co-operation notes areas of co-operation being wind energy mapping in Mpumalanga, smart grid and metering systems and what it calls “progressive policy design to advance the green transition”.
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The just energy transition was the main focus area of the June 20 2023 joint visit by the prime ministers of Denmark and the Netherlands, Mette Frederiksen and Mark Rutte (who has since become the head of Nato). The Denmark-Netherlands-South Africa Business Forum, hosted by the department of trade, industry & competition, also convened under the theme Green Energy Transition and Green Hydrogen Partnerships for Impact and resulted in a $200m investment by Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners in Cape Town-based Mulilo Energy Holdings.
The meetings also saw representation by organised labour, with the formation of a labour market consortium on social dialogue and skills development between the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa and the Steel & Engineering Industries Federation of Southern Africa.
The purpose of the compact agreement was “to collaboratively work with the various employer and social partners in establishing a framework and approach to identify the skills that will be required to promote a socially just and inclusive energy transition in South Africa.” These are lofty and welcome plans. With so much hanging on political attention spans in international relations, the intensification of US relations with Denmark could be a major disruptor as the country, along with its other European allies, shift their focus to the defence of the Atlantic.
Needless to say, these developments present a perfect pretext for the EU countries to step away from America’s G20 presidency and reconsider their attendance in December, just as Washington boycotted South Africa’s G20 process and summit last year.
As seen from the trade data, Denmark sells more products to South Africa than it imports, despite the population disparity in favour of South Africa. At 6-million and 65-million people, respectively, there are 10 times more South Africans than Danes. Yet Denmark enjoys a trade surplus of R3bn-R4bn. That is with the sole exception of 2022, when South African exports to the country spiked. This shows that more can be done by South Africa to access the Danish market.
Clearly, South Africa is outside the league of major powers interested in Greenland for its energy reserves and strategic geographical position. But the escalation poses a risk for Danish-South African initiatives. American moves against its own Nato ally also present an opportunity to sideline Washington after its aggressive stance towards SA.
Both Ukraine and Greenland are about 12,000km from South Africa, and South African exports to Russia were not much higher than those to Denmark when South Africa led an African effort to mediate between the belligerents.
This is a decidedly different situation, of course, and it is still early days, which may explain the department’s silence on Greenland. But one would hope that amid the veneer of public silence, work is quietly going on to express support for the Danes and their Western European allies in the battle of wills against the Americans.
Needless to say, these developments present a perfect pretext for the EU countries to step away from America’s G20 presidency and reconsider their attendance in December, just as Washington boycotted South Africa’s G20 process and summit last year.
Beyond the inherent and sacrosanct importance of sovereignty — for which South Africa has spoken out for in recent conflicts, though not always with the same level of audibility — the country also has a direct material interest in a stable northern Atlantic.
• Ndzendze is professor of politics and international relations at the University of Johannesburg and author of “The Political Economy of Sino-South African Trade and Regional Competition”.
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