ZIYANDA THANDO NZIMANDE: The battle for a new Sahel

When Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s security forces intercepted the fifth assassination plot against him in three years on January 3, the world saw another foiled coup in Africa’s turbulent Sahel. But this near-miss assassination reveals something far more consequential than one young leader’s survival: the violent birth pangs of a new regional order that could reshape West Africa’s geopolitical architecture for decades to come.

The plot itself followed a now-familiar script. Intelligence services uncovered plans to assassinate Traoré at his residence, disable Burkina Faso’s strategic drone base, and clear the way for foreign military intervention. Security minister Mahamadou Sana named Lt-Col Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the man Traoré overthrew in September 2022, as the mastermind, allegedly co-ordinating from exile in Togo with funding traced to Ivory Coast.

Within hours of the plot’s discovery thousands of Burkinabè took to Ouagadougou’s streets, not in protest but in defence of their president, forming human shields around key government installations. It was political theatre that revealed genuine popular mobilisation, a pattern that has repeated with each alleged coup attempt.

Alliance of Sahel States

Yet focusing solely on Traoré’s personal jeopardy misses the forest for the trees. The assassination attempt occurred just days after the formal withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on January 29, marking the most significant fracture in West African regional integration since the bloc’s founding in 1975.

These three nations, accounting for 15% of Ecowas’s population and nearly half its territory, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States, a confederation that now issues its own passports, maintains a 5,000-strong joint military force, and positions itself as an alternative to what its leaders characterise as a Western-influenced, ineffective regional bloc.

This is where Traoré’s survival becomes strategically critical. At 34, Africa’s youngest head of state has emerged as the ideological architect of Sahelian sovereignty, articulating a pan-Africanist vision that resonates powerfully with youth across the continent and diaspora. His government expelled French forces in February 2023, ended decades of security co-operation with Paris, and pivoted dramatically toward Russia, Turkey and Iran for military equipment and training.

While previous African leaders spoke cautiously about reducing Western influence, Traoré frames contemporary security threats as manifestations of persistent neocolonial structures designed to perpetuate resource extraction and strategic dominance. It is revolutionary rhetoric backed by concrete policy shifts that have fundamentally reoriented Burkina Faso’s external alignments.

The political implications extend far beyond Ouagadougou. The Alliance of Sahel States confederation represents an explicit rejection of Ecowas’ traditional tools of regional governance sanctions, isolation threats and military intervention. When Ecowas threatened to intervene militarily in Niger after the July 2023 coup, Mali and Burkina Faso’s military pledge to defend their neighbour exposed the bloc’s impotence.

That threat, which might have succeeded a decade ago, instead accelerated the Sahelian states’ exit and demonstrated that regional power dynamics have shifted irreversibly. The three countries have strengthened ties with Russia, which has deployed about 1,000 Wagner Group fighters to Mali and security advisers to Burkina Faso and Niger, creating an alternative security architecture that bypasses Ecowas and Western military partnerships.

High stakes

Economically, the stakes are enormous. As landlocked nations, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger face significant challenges in maintaining trade flows and market access outside Ecowas. Yet their governments have calculated that sovereignty and security co-operation outweigh these costs. Burkina Faso claims to have achieved food self-sufficiency in 2025 through improved seed distribution, mechanisation and co-ordinated production campaigns, a politically charged assertion of independence from food aid dependency.

The confederation’s emphasis on resource nationalisation, particularly regarding gold and uranium, signals a determination to capture greater value from mineral wealth that has historically flowed to external actors with minimal domestic benefit. Whether these economic gambles succeed will determine if the Alliance of Sahel States model proves sustainable or collapses under the weight of isolation and underdevelopment.

Jihadist violence

The security dimension remains the confederation’s core justification. Jihadist violence has escalated dramatically across the Sahel, with conflict-related deaths rising from about 5,400 in 2017 to 25,000 in 2024, according to the global terrorism index. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen have demonstrated sophisticated capabilities, controlling territory and conducting urban terrorism that neither French forces nor Ecowas could effectively counter.

The Alliance of Sahel States countries argue that their co-ordinated military approach, using drones and aggressive counterinsurgency operations, represents the only viable path to defeating these threats. However, human rights organisations have documented severe abuses, with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project reporting that Burkinabè military and militia forces killed more than 1,000 civilians between January and July 2024, including mass summary executions. This raises fundamental questions about whether the security gains justify the human costs and whether military-led governments can maintain popular legitimacy amid such violence.

This paradox — a leader simultaneously restricting freedoms and claiming popular legitimacy — defines contemporary Sahelian politics, in which populations appear willing to trade democratic processes for promises of security and sovereignty.

Traoré’s consolidation of power has followed predictable authoritarian patterns. His government has extended transitional timelines indefinitely, cracked down on press freedoms, and conscripted critics, journalists and activists into military service. The Government of National Unity coalition masks the reality of military dominance over civilian institutions. Yet these authoritarian moves coexist with genuine popular support, particularly among the youth, who view Traoré as defending national dignity against external domination. This paradox — a leader simultaneously restricting freedoms and claiming popular legitimacy — defines contemporary Sahelian politics, in which populations appear willing to trade democratic processes for promises of security and sovereignty.

The assassination plot’s failure therefore represents more than Traoré’s continued survival. It signals that the Sahelian experiment in post-Ecowas regional order will continue, at least for now. Whether this experiment ultimately succeeds in delivering security, prosperity and genuine sovereignty, or devolves into isolated authoritarianism and deeper instability, will shape West Africa’s trajectory for a generation.

The next 12 months will prove critical as the Alliance of Sahel States confederation faces its first major tests: maintaining economic functionality outside Ecowas, demonstrating security improvements against jihadist threats, and managing internal political pressures as transitional timelines stretch indefinitely.

Traoré survived January’s assassination attempt, but the real question is whether his vision for a new Sahel can survive the brutal realities of governance, security and development in one of the world’s most challenging regions.

• Nzimande is the Middle East Africa Research Institute’s Future Voices Scholar for 2025/2026. A former Wits student leader, he is completing a master’s in neuroscience at the university.