SA’s foreign policy is an exercise of public power and must be guided by the constitution, not by old loyalties or outdated ideologies.
The preamble to the constitution commits us to “take our rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations”. Section 1(c) anchors the republic in the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
Section 7(2) obliges the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the bill of rights. Section 198(c) is explicit that national security must be pursued “in compliance with the law, including international law”.
Sections 231, 232 and 233 recognise treaties, customary international law and rights-consistent interpretation are part of our legal architecture.
This is not decorative constitutional language, but the lodestar that should determine how South Africa speaks, acts and votes on the international stage.
Yet we see a widening gap and a growing inconsistency between the constitutional mandate and how South Africa’s foreign policy positions the country itself in the world, eroding trust.
Government rhetoric insists on nonalignment, multilateralism and a rules-based order, and international relations & co-operation minister Ronald Lamola’s recent foreign policy outlook speech leaned heavily on Nelson Mandela’s vocabulary when he spoke about international relations and foreign policy issues.
In 1993 Mandela wrote human rights would be the light that guided our foreign affairs, and considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide relations between nations. The commitments align naturally with the constitutional settlement of 1996: universal human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law applied without fear or favour.
However, the constitutional test is not whether our speeches sound principled; it is whether our conduct reflects these principles consistently. Properly understood, nonalignment is not moral evasiveness. It is strategic independence exercised through principled criteria. It is not anti-West and not pro-East; it is a refusal to outsource judgment to any power bloc.
Engagement with powerful states is legitimate, but constitutional foreign policy cannot rely on selective silence when fundamental rights and legal obligations are at stake. The constitution demands principled consistency, not convenience.
If South Africa claims nonalignment our foreign policy must show even-handed fidelity to international law on crucial matters such as aggression, territorial integrity and sovereignty, civilian protection and accountability for atrocity crimes. That is precisely where the disjuncture between intention and action becomes most visible, and it is where the constitution’s guidance is most urgently needed.
South Africa’s commitment to international law is most clearly tested when the rules are openly breached. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violated the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and its protection of territorial integrity, yet South Africa abstained when the UN General Assembly called for Russia to withdraw. The explanation that the resolution was not conducive to diplomacy avoided the central legal reality that one state had unlawfully invaded another.
If the constitution’s commitment to the rule of law, in section 1(c), and compliance with international law, in section 198(c), is to carry real meaning, South Africa’s diplomacy must reflect clarity when the international rulebook is broken. Abstention may be procedurally neutral, but it can also signal reluctance to defend the legal and moral order to which states have committed themselves.
This pattern becomes more troubling in comparing Pretoria’s strong condemnation of Western actions with its more cautious approach toward strategic partners. South Africa declined to support UN scrutiny of credible abuse allegations in Xinjiang and reportedly abstained when Iran was removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women after the repression of women’s rights protests.
Engagement with powerful states is legitimate, but constitutional foreign policy cannot rely on selective silence when fundamental rights and legal obligations are at stake. The constitution demands principled consistency, not convenience.
Interests and values
Sovereignty is often invoked to justify these choices, but in constitutional terms it means neither isolation nor submission. The preamble’s vision of a “sovereign state in the family of nations” implies agency: the capacity to weigh interests and values independently, without being coerced and without coercing others.
When foreign policy choices appear shaped more by pressure from powerful partners than by transparent constitutional reasoning, sovereignty risks becoming performative rather than real. The reported marginalisation of Taiwan’s diplomatic presence, despite its economic footprint and role in strategic supply chains, illustrates how external pressure can blur the line between strategic alignment and constitutional autonomy.
The consequences of such perceptions are economic and reputational. The US and EU remain among South Africa’s most significant trading and investment partners. In Washington, Pretoria’s posture towards Russia and the broader impression of alignment with “malign actors” has provoked calls for a formal review of bilateral relations. That rhetoric may be exaggerated, but the policy risk is tangible.
The US African Growth & Opportunity Act, which supports jobs in African manufacturing, agriculture and related value chains, has been drawn into the debate. South Africa need not accept external political framing, but it must recognise foreign policy choices can trigger trade consequences, investor anxiety and long-term reputational costs.
The constitutional question must be asked plainly: if nonalignment is our policy, why do our actions so often resemble alignment in one direction? Why do we condemn some violations of sovereignty and rights with vigour, yet treat others as awkward inconveniences managed through procedural language? Why do we continue to lean on an anti-imperialist lexicon that frames global affairs as a binary contest, when the world of 2026 requires a modern, interests-driven, rights-consistent approach?
Liberation history is part of South Africa’s identity, but history cannot excuse double standards. The constitution is forward-looking. It does not license ideological reflexes; it demands rational, principled governance. A course correction is not a call to “choose the West”. It is a call to choose the constitution. That means the following:
- Candid legal clarity. Name aggression as aggression and rights abuses as rights abuses, regardless of who commits them.
- Consistency with international obligations. If parliament has bound South Africa to treaty duties under section 231, compliance must follow, including with mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court when they apply on our territory.
- Genuine strategic autonomy. Diversify partnerships, but do so transparently and based on South Africa’s interests and constitutional values, not on bloc loyalty or pressure from powerful partners.
- Coherence in multilateral forums. Our voting patterns should reflect a stable standard — international law and universal rights — rather than shifting standards based on who is in the dock.
Other constitutional democracies manage this balance more consistently, even when their interests are complex. Germany’s post-war constitutional culture places human dignity at the centre of state authority and has generally aligned its foreign policy with strong commitments to international legality, even when it brings economic pain.
Brazil and India also pursue strategic autonomy, but they tend to make their hedging choices in ways that are less self-contradictory in legal terms, and they work actively to preserve broad economic partnerships while avoiding gratuitous hostility. South Africa can do the same. We can maintain ties with Brics partners and with the Global South without turning nonalignment into a euphemism for selective silence.
If South Africa recentres its foreign policy on the constitution, nonalignment can become real: independent judgment grounded in universal rights and the rule of law. That would rebuild credibility across partners, protect trade and investment, and strengthen our ability to mediate rather than polarise.
The alternative is equally clear: continued inconsistency will erode trust, raise avoidable economic risks and leave our “nonalignment” looking like factional alignment in disguise. The constitution is our compass. We must follow it consistently, without fear or favour.
• Joosub is manager: constitutional advancement at the FW de Klerk Foundation.
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