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IAN BREMMER: Trump’s Iran gamble risks turning bravado into wider war

Military pressure, regime change dreams and oil markets collide in a dangerous escalation

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Ian Bremmer

Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting in Tehran, Iran, October 20 2025. Picture: (Office of the Iranian Supreme Le)

Iran is not in the Western Hemisphere, but it may well be the next theatre where US President Donald Trump tries to reshape reality with military force — and unlike his quick win in Venezuela, this one could spiral.

Trump has made his position clear: Iran can do this the easy way or the hard way.

The easy way means a deal tougher than the JCPOA nuclear agreement he walked away from in his first term: surrender the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, agree to halt enrichment indefinitely, dismantle what remains of the nuclear programme, accept limits on ballistic missiles with full inspections, and end support for regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis.

The hard way means military strikes. Big ones.

This isn’t idle talk. Trump came within a hair’s breadth of ordering attacks just weeks ago, after the Iranian regime killed thousands — possibly tens of thousands — of protesters in a brutal crackdown. What stopped him wasn’t second thoughts but insufficient US military capacity in the region to shield Israel and American bases if Iran retaliated hard.

US President Donald Trump has sent a carrier group, including the USS Abraham Lincoln, 10 destroyers, dozens of F-15s and other strike aircraft, plus a THAAD and Patriot battery to the region. Picture: (Mike Blake)

Now they’re putting the pieces in place: a carrier group, 10 destroyers, dozens of F-15s and other strike aircraft, plus a THAAD and Patriot battery. The goal is to cover the entire region with a defensive umbrella so there’s little risk of mass casualties if Iran hits back.

Regional powers are scrambling to avert a wider war, with Turkey, Qatar, Oman and Egypt trying to broker talks. Trump claims diplomatic progress is being made, but take that with scepticism. His demands go way beyond what supreme leader Ali Khamenei will accept. The Islamic Republic may be willing to make concessions on its nuclear programme to avoid strikes and ease the domestic economic crisis. Iran will not, however, formally surrender the right to enrich uranium domestically. And Iranian officials have made clear that ballistic missiles are off the table.

So either Trump backs down and takes a smaller deal he can spin as a victory, or we’re looking at military action. Given he has already hit Iran twice without blowback, and given he walked away from a nuclear deal once before because he thought it was inadequate, it seems unlikely that he would settle for a nuclear-only arrangement now. Though Trump could probably sell one if he wanted to.

But with the military build-up accelerating, Trump is more likely using talks to apply maximum pressure while getting pieces into place to strike. And the real possibility is not just strikes on nuclear or missile sites. It is a Venezuela-style decapitation: taking out Khamenei himself.

Forcing Iran to surrender its uranium would neutralise the immediate nuclear breakout threat. Trump could pocket that win, point to Israel’s degradation of the missile programme and regional proxies, and declare he solved the nuclear problem his predecessors could not.

But with the military build-up accelerating, Trump is more likely using talks to apply maximum pressure while getting pieces into place to strike. And the real possibility is not just strikes on nuclear or missile sites. It is a Venezuela-style decapitation: taking out Khamenei himself.

Trump’s team is emboldened by recent experience. Venezuela’s success is fresh. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2019 drew minimal Iranian retaliation against American targets. So did the joint strikes with Israel last year. That pattern has Trump convinced he can do it again.

The bet is that pragmatic conservatives within the Supreme National Security Council and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders would take control after the supreme leader’s death and prioritise regime survival.

Intelligence efforts have been under way to cultivate senior figures in the Revolutionary Guards and Khamenei’s inner circle — regime insiders who might co-operate with the decapitation strike and helm a successor government Washington could live with.

But Iran isn’t Venezuela. The regime has more capacity to hit back, deeper internal loyalty, larger and more capable security forces, and succession is far less likely to go smoothly. Khamenei is not just Iran’s supreme leader; he’s a spiritual figurehead for Shia Islam. His death would shock the system in ways that might not produce the orderly transition Washington is counting on.

Even if Iran’s leaders want to avoid escalation, Khamenei’s stature would require a sizeable retaliation, including strikes on US bases and ships in the Gulf. If that attack causes significant American casualties, the situation could easily spiral. And if hardliners seize control instead of pragmatists, we could see massive retaliation against energy flows.

Oil prices have already ticked up despite ample global crude supply and tepid demand growth. If Trump actually strikes Khamenei, expect a bigger spike — $5-10 per barrel, possibly more if the transition goes badly. That means inflation at home less than nine months before the midterm elections.

Then there’s the great power dimension. Unlike Venezuela — where Moscow and Beijing mostly grumbled as Trump installed a friendlier government — regime change in Iran crosses a line both care deeply about.

Unlike Venezuela — where Moscow and Beijing mostly grumbled as Trump installed a friendlier government — regime change in Iran crosses a line both care deeply about.

Tehran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China, not to mention geopolitical alignment across the Middle East. Taking down Khamenei would set a precedent neither wants normalised: that the US can topple leaders they are aligned with anywhere in the world. They will both want to impose costs on Trump, if only to deter similar moves in their own spheres of influence.

The risk of a wider war with real consequences for oil and regional stability makes a diplomatic climbdown more attractive than in Venezuela, where the downside was minimal. But a breakthrough remains unlikely, and momentum for military action is still building.

Maybe Trump will accept a limited deal that punts on missiles and keeps the regime intact, but I wouldn’t bet on it. The president has shown he believes audacity pays off. Venezuela worked, after all. The question now is whether the Iran gamble will, too.

The answer matters well beyond the Middle East. If Trump pulls this off, he will come out the other side ever more convinced that raw American power can solve any problem and achieve any goal. Each success raises the stakes for the next gamble.

If it goes sideways — if Hezbollah and the Houthis co-ordinate attacks across the region, if hardliners take over and close Hormuz, if oil hits $90 and stays there, if Russia and China impose real costs — we’ll find out just how dangerous these bets really are.

• Bremmer is president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.

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