The launch of US President Donald Trump administration’s critical minerals initiative by vice-president JD Vance in Washington on February 4, and the establishment of its forum on resource geostrategic engagement to replace the minerals security partnership of former president Joe Biden’s administration, is no accident.
Nor is the fact that key African mineral producers of critical minerals — Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Morocco and Zambia — were invited to the party. In what does not augur well for its continued membership of Agoa beyond this year, South Africa was not invited. Somewhat surprisingly, Kenya did crack the nod (presumably for geostrategic reasons).
Critical minerals and rare earths are essential for modern technologies and will become increasingly important for artificial intelligence, robotics, batteries, other autonomous devices, defence and renewable energy generally. As US secretary of state Marco Rubio noted at the launch, the market for critical minerals and rare earths is “highly concentrated, leaving it a tool of political coercion and supply chain disruption, putting our core interests at risk” (for which read China).
For this, secure, resilient critical mineral supply chains are essential, which is one of the reasons the US has entered African critical mineral frameworks with, among others, the DRC, Zambia, Guinea and Morocco.
According to the IMF, Sub-Saharan Africa holds about 30% of proven global critical mineral reserves. The DRC is the world’s biggest producer of cobalt — used for batteries and electronics — accounting for about 70% of global production. It is also the third biggest producer of copper globally and in pole position to overtake Peru, the second largest producer.
South Africa is likewise the biggest producer of platinum — used for catalytic converters and electronics — with about 70% of global production. It also produces about 40% of palladium, used for emissions controls and industrially. Ghana and South Africa jointly provide about 40% of global manganese production used for steel and batteries. South Africa is likewise responsible for nearly half of global chromium production used for stainless steel. Zimbabwe and Namibia contribute about 10% of global lithium production.
This places Africa at the centre of global supply chains for renewable energy and high-tech manufacturing. This alters the balance of power for African mineral producers as it gives them significant leverage in the race for critical minerals. Where this is headed is evident from the announcement on February 3 that a US government-backed investment fund, the Orion Critical Minerals Consortium, is to purchase a 40% stake in Glencore’s DRC copper and cobalt assets for $3.6bn.
If the transaction proceeds it would in effect consummate December’s US-DRC strategic partnership agreement and herald the first significant US investment in the DRC since Freeport McMoran disinvested in 2016. This comes on top of the launch of Project Vault by Trump on February 2, a $12bn initiative to stockpile strategic reserves of 50 critical minerals through a public-private partnership involving the US Export-Import Bank and the private sector.
No doubt aware of this — and the significant shift in the balance of power it represents — several African mineral producers have become increasingly nationalistic about their patrimony by compelling the domestic beneficiation of their resources and, in some cases, banning the export of raw minerals.
While there is an economic rationale for this — beneficiation captures greater economic rents, adds jobs and increases skills while developing downstream industries — it is notably capital and energy intensive. This means it requires a reliable supply of low-cost energy, adequate transport infrastructure and logistics (including rail and ports), skilled labour and an adequate water supply. Many African mining jurisdictions do not tick these boxes.
The DRC is no exception to this. In 2025 it placed a 10-month ban on certain cobalt exports to stabilise global prices and boost government revenue. It was replaced by a regulated quota system in October of about 96,000 tonnes per year, with a portion of annual production reserved for the domestic market. As DRC President Etienne Tshisekedi explained in Washington DC last week, “We want industrial projects that create local jobs, transfer technology and respect environmental and social standards.”
Some producers have gone even further. Zimbabwe banned the export of lithium ore in 2022 and plans to ban exports of lithium concentrate from 2027. Namibia introduced an export licensing system for lithium ore, cobalt and manganese in 2023. Malawi, albeit not a significant player, has banned the export of any unprocessed minerals — uranium, rare earths and graphite in particular. Ghana, Africa’s biggest gold producer, has made some threatening noises in the same direction.
Somewhat surprisingly, South Africa has not fully joined the beneficiation party, though a draft bill to amend the mining code this year will potentially require mineral producers to “make available” minerals for domestic beneficiation, without explaining how or on what basis.
Article XI.I of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (Gatt) prohibits World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states from imposing quantitative restrictions on exports or imports, including through quotas or export licences, subject to limited exceptions. In a recent WTO case against Indonesia — the world’s biggest producer of nickel ore — brought by the EU, a WTO panel found Indonesia’s ban on the export of nickel ore, which requires that all such ore should be processed domestically, contravened Article XI.I.
A subsequent appeal by Indonesia to the WTO appellate body has gone into the void, as that body has been inquorate — ironically due to the US — since December 2019. The result is that while export bans and export licensing systems to compel the domestic beneficiation of critical minerals violate a key tenet of the Gatt, the absence of an appellate mechanism in effect means panel decisions against a miscreant country can go unpoliced and unpunished.
Writing about the natural world 2,000 years ago, Pliny the Elder pithily remarked “ex Africa semper aliquid novi” — “out of Africa there is always something new”. The US may soon discover this.
• Leon is a partner at Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer.
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