YACOOB ABBA OMAR: US-China tensions echo ancient rivalries as risk of conflict looms

Crafting long-term geopolitical scenarios is a fool’s errand, especially while we cannot predict how each day will end. But, as scenario practitioners would attest, uncertain times are the best periods in which to speculate how the long term could turn out.

This year could end in one of three ways. Humanity could muddle through the year; we could see the spread of limited conflicts in which entire regions are being drawn in, or we could see a systemic breakdown in the global order.

The muscular assertiveness of the US and China, especially in their respective zones of interest, and fragmentation among the middle powers, while the Middle East remains a contested terrain, makes muddling through the least likely outcome but probably the most optimistic ending to the year.

At Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney joined a growing number of geopolitics specialists in reaching back to ancient Greece to make sense of today’s world. Arguing that “the rules-based order is fading”, Carney cited Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote more than two millennia ago that “the strong can do what they can and the weak must suffer what they must”.

In 2024 the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (Mistra) hosted an international conference on what is referred to as the Thucydides Trap. It will issue a publication on this topic in April.

Thucydides documented how smaller states tried to form countervailing coalitions during the Peloponnesian War. Most failed because fear drove them to choose between the great powers rather than unite independently. The fractures we now see in Europe embody that dilemma.

In his history of the Peloponnesian War in 431-404 BCE, Thucydides captured a protracted conflict between the rising power, Athens and its challenger, Sparta. The “trap” refers to the view that violent hostilities are unavoidable in such situations, which has been used to explain various multinational conflicts over the past 2,000 years.

We now speculate on whether the rivalry between the US and China, and the alliances they are building across the globe, is yet another replay of such ancient conflicts.

Thucydides documented how smaller states tried to form countervailing coalitions during the Peloponnesian War. Most failed because fear drove them to choose between the great powers rather than unite independently. The fractures we now see in Europe embody that dilemma.

One of the Greek states, Melos, tried to remain neutral rather than join Athens. Athens found this intolerable, prompting it to carry out its threat of genocide against the Melians.

Under its newly re-elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, Japan is not only ideologically aligning itself with the US administration but is also set to break post-World War 2 convention by rearming itself. This in reaction to the threat it perceives to be posed by China — the kind of arms race Thucydides identified as the fundamental driver towards war.

The dynamics about Iran possibly display a different scenario. Given the prestige the Iranian people accord their independence and the insistence of the leadership on their right to develop nuclear capability, it may be asserting its sovereignty like Melos. But just as Melos courted destruction at the hands of Athens, and given the widespread, popular opposition to the regime, Iran could end in total capitulation, regime collapse or a desperate gambit to break the pressure through regional escalation by year-end.

Carney’s speech attempted to galvanise middle powers to give up the fiction of a rules-based order, to stop performing sovereignty while accepting subordination. His bravery lies in calling for middle powers to have the courage to confront the great powers — be it the US or China. Or, he warned, they will end up competing to display new signs of submission, as seen in political and business leaders prostrating themselves at the White House or Mar-a-Lago.

Yet Thucydides also showed that tragedy is not inevitable. The moment does require some long-term thinking so that we can begin appreciating the choices we have now. Leaders who recognise the security dilemma can work towards escaping it. States that acknowledge their mutual vulnerability can sometimes forge genuine co-operation. The question is whether contemporary leaders possess the wisdom their ancient predecessors lacked and can reforge a multipolar world.

• Abba Omar is director of operations at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.