KEVIN ALLAN | Tightening the screws on municipalities

New fiscal rules challenge local government sustainability

Finance minister Enoch Godongwana, flanked by Reserve Bank governor Lesetja Kganyago and outgoing South African Revenue Service commissioner Edward Kieswetter, emerge from parliament after delivering the 2026 budget speech on Wednesday. Picture: SUPPLIED (Supplied)

This year’s national budget marks a decisive shift in how South Africa confronts municipal dysfunction. Not only does it not expand funding to local government, it also tightens conditions, restructures oversight and signals a reduced tolerance for failure. Indeed, for local government the 2026/27 budget is about structural discipline.

For over a decade national government has attempted to stabilise municipalities through a mixture of transfers, oversight mechanisms and ad hoc interventions. How well has this worked? The results are visible in collapsing water systems, growing Eskom arrears, persistent audit failures and mounting infrastructure backlogs.

The Treasury’s own assessment is stark: roughly two thirds of municipalities are in financial distress. Clean audits remain the exception rather than the rule. Revenue collection is weakening in many towns while capital budgets are routinely underspent or misallocated.

Against this backdrop, the 2026/27 budget reframes the problem. The message is clear: fiscal consolidation at national level cannot succeed while municipalities continue to leak revenue, misallocate trading surpluses and defer maintenance. The new approach is built on three pillars — enforce fiscal integrity, protect infrastructure spending and intervene structurally where governance fails.

The division of nationally raised revenue remains broadly stable with local government receiving just under 10% of total allocations. That share grows modestly over the medium term, but not enough to transform the municipal landscape. The equitable share increases gradually and funding for free basic services continues to support millions of indigent households. Yet in real terms these increases are largely absorbed by rising wage pressures and inflationary input costs.

For the first time since democracy, the critical change lies not in the size of transfers but in their conditions. A central theme of the budget is “fiscal integrity” in municipal trading services. For years electricity and water surpluses have quietly subsidised broader municipal operations. This model worked when demand was growing, losses were contained and infrastructure was relatively stable. It no longer works in an era of declining electricity sales, rising nontechnical losses and deteriorating water systems.

The Treasury’s stance is explicit: revenue collected for water and electricity must first sustain those services before cross-subsidisation occurs. In some metros, most notably Johannesburg, the gap between revenue and reinvestment has become untenable. Deferred maintenance has compounded over years, producing escalating backlogs that now threaten economic activity and household stability.

To address this, the budget sets aside R27.7bn over the medium term for metro trading services reform. This is not a bailout. It is performance-linked funding. Metros will be expected to demonstrate:

  • Ring-fencing of trading service revenue
  • Improved maintenance and asset management ratios
  • Stronger billing and collection discipline
  • Transparent reporting on infrastructure reinvestment

Failure to meet reform benchmarks may result in reduced allocations. That conditionality marks a departure from past practice. For the first time the Treasury is attaching meaningful downside risk to nonperformance at the metro level.

For non-metros and weaker municipalities, the reform path is even more interventionist. Chronic underspending and governance failures in infrastructure grants have led to a structural rethink of delivery mechanisms. The 2026 division of revenue framework allows for infrastructure grants to be redirected to capable implementing agents where municipalities lack the capacity to execute projects.

In practical terms, this means that in certain towns:

  • Infrastructure funding may bypass municipal administrations.
  • Delivery could shift to districts or accredited agencies.
  • Municipal autonomy over capital projects may shrink.

This move reflects frustration with persistent project delays, procurement irregularities and weak contract management. Redirecting grants may protect communities from further service collapse. But it also signals a profound erosion of local institutional authority where performance remains weak.

Electricity distribution presents another structural faultline. Municipal arrears to Eskom remain substantial, despite the Municipal Debt Relief Programme. Compliance with programme conditions has been disappointing. In response, the government will introduce distribution agency agreements under which Eskom can assume responsibility for electricity distribution in defaulting municipalities.

The implications are significant. Electricity distribution is not merely a technical function, it is a core municipal revenue stream and political lever. If Eskom assumes operational control in certain jurisdictions municipal revenue architecture will shift materially. Cash flow planning, credit risk profiles and political accountability will all be affected.

For lenders and insurers, this alters the municipal risk map. Revenue security may improve in some areas, but fiscal autonomy may decline. The long-term effect will depend on how these agreements are structured and whether they stabilise payment flows without triggering institutional paralysis.

Legislative reform underpins the broader strategy. An amendment to the Municipal Finance Management Act is expected to tighten the enforcement of funded budgets, strengthen consequence management and clarify the treatment of irregular expenditure. The Treasury has also signalled continued willingness to withhold transfers where municipalities persistently fail to meet compliance requirements.

Taken together, these measures reflect a shift from co-operative encouragement to conditional enforcement. The era of passive oversight is ending. Structural intervention is becoming normalised. The budget therefore poses a central question: can stronger enforcement rebuild municipal capability, or will it merely manage decline more tightly?

There are reasons for cautious optimism. Ring-fencing trading services could restore infrastructure sustainability in well-governed metros. Redirecting infrastructure delivery may prevent further deterioration in struggling towns. Distribution agency agreements could stabilise electricity collections and reduce arrears growth.

Yet risks remain substantial. Conditional funding assumes capacity to comply. Some municipalities lack the technical depth to meet new reporting and performance requirements. Political instability, especially in coalition councils, may complicate reform implementation. Redirecting functions can protect assets in the short term but may weaken incentives to build internal administrative competence over time.

Moreover, the fiscal envelope itself remains constrained. Local government’s share of nationally raised revenue has not expanded meaningfully. Infrastructure backlogs accumulated over decades cannot be erased by moderate grant growth. Without sustained economic recovery and improved local revenue performance, structural reform alone cannot close the gap.

For the private sector and financial institutions the message is nuanced. The environment is becoming more interventionist and more rule-bound. Risk is not disappearing, it is changing. Strong municipalities that can demonstrate compliance and operational discipline may benefit from greater clarity and support. Weaker municipalities may experience tighter controls, reduced discretion and possible loss of functions.

Over the next year, several indicators will be critical:

  • Which municipalities are moved to indirect infrastructure delivery.
  • Whether metro trading services show measurable improvements in maintenance and reinvestment.
  • How distribution agency agreements reshape electricity revenue flows.
  • The specific provisions of the Municipal Finance Management Act Amendment Bill.
  • Trends in financial distress indicators during 2026/27.

The 2026/27 budget does not offer a dramatic financial rescue for local government. Instead, it offers something more consequential: a recalibration of the governance framework. Accountability is tightening. Autonomy is becoming conditional. Performance is moving to the centre of fiscal policy.

For municipalities this is a moment of reckoning. For investors, lenders and residents, it is a reminder that local government reform will not be achieved through larger transfers alone. It will require institutional discipline, credible enforcement and a reassertion of fiscal integrity at the coalface of service delivery.

Whether this strategy restores stability or deepens fragmentation will depend less on the words of the budget speech and more on the rigour of implementation in the months ahead.

Allan, a former special adviser to a previous local government minister, is MD of data and intelligence organisation Municipal IQ.

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