The crisis unfolding in the Gulf is not only a military or diplomatic moment; it is a foreseeable political risk event signalled in advance and characterised by second-order effects. By that standard, South Africa’s response has been not just a communication oversight but a failure of risk governance.
On February 28, the US and Israel launched joint strikes on Iran, triggering Iranian retaliation across the region, including missile strikes on Gulf states hosting US military assets. Civilian infrastructure was damaged, most notably the Fairmont Palm Hotel in Dubai, a site often frequented by South Africans. While casualty figures remain unclear, political risk analysis does not wait for confirmed fatalities to assess institutional performance. Near misses matter because they expose system weaknesses before disaster strikes.
As the US assembled its largest Middle East military force since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, concentrating roughly half of its deployable air power, according to defence specialist Robert Page, it treated escalation as a known risk rather than a surprise. Layered warnings were issued well in advance through embassies, maritime advisories, aviation notices and continuous public signalling on social media. Uncertainty prompted more communication, not less. Yet South Africa did not respond in this way.
Travel advisories
The department of international relations & co-operation (Dirco) issued precautionary travel advisories and alerts to those registered on embassy databases or the Travel Smart app. Emergency contact numbers were later posted publicly on Sunday, and on Wednesday Dirco issued a media statement noting an increase in the number of South Africans who had registered on the Travel Smart system, to 6,400 individuals.
Those wanting to evacuate were advised that some airlines had resumed limited commercial flights and that they should use official channels to secure safe passage out of the region where commercial flights were not available.
While these actions indicate some level of activity, they also reveal a deeper operational flaw: an institutional reliance on opt-in systems in a high-velocity risk environment where the cost of exclusion can be severe.
The Gulf escalation clearly fell into a category of risk where civilian exposure, airspace disruption and spillover violence were plausible outcomes. Treating this as a narrow consular issue rather than a broader governance challenge suggests that South Africa’s tolerance for uncertainty in citizen protection abroad remains dangerously undefined.
Risk analysis is not simply about processing information but about interpreting behaviour and anticipating how events may affect people on the ground. The indicators were clear, from US military mobilisation to explicit public signalling by multiple governments.
By placing potentially lifesaving alerts behind registration requirements, Dirco introduced a single point of failure into its warning system. This approach conserves administrative order but sacrifices reach.
Yet Dirco appears to have analysed the situation through a procedural lens that prioritised who was registered over who was present. This assumes proactive compliance by citizens in advance of crises, ignoring the reality that many expatriates, long-term residents and casual travellers do not register with embassies or download government applications. In practice, this narrowed the state’s field of vision at the precise moment when it needed to widen it.
Gated communication
Effective mitigation in fast-moving crises depends on redundancy and openness. By placing potentially lifesaving alerts behind registration requirements, Dirco introduced a single point of failure into its warning system. This approach conserves administrative order but sacrifices reach.
The consequences were visible in real time. A South African resident in Abu Dhabi told Newzroom Afrika on February 28: “We haven’t had any response from the South African embassy. We are going based on what the US has told citizens here in Abu Dhabi.”
When citizens abroad turn to foreign states for direction during an active regional escalation, their own government ceases to function as a credible protective presence. This is not merely a communications problem but a reputational and legitimacy risk of South Africa becoming merely an abstract idea to citizens abroad.
The issue is not that South Africa failed to match the US in the scale of advisories issued. The US is a direct party to the conflict and possesses intelligence capabilities far beyond those of most states. Rather, the core failure lies in the outdated policy of gating potentially lifesaving alerts behind opt-in systems, assuming citizens will proactively register.
Social media
Dirco has a responsibility to make alerts as universally accessible as possible to all South Africans, abroad or at home, registered or not, by broadcasting them prominently on social media platforms such as X and Facebook, issuing public advisories without requiring downloads or sign-ups, and maintaining fully functional mission websites.
In 2026, information dominance is a core function of the state. Social media is no longer optional infrastructure for diplomacy or consular protection; it is the primary arena in which crises are interpreted by citizens in real time.
Those not on social media would turn to the next option, the respective official website. Yet the South African embassy in Abu Dhabi’s website remained effectively silent during a live regional escalation. The absence of visible alerts reflected an outdated institutional mindset.
The US did not wait for civilian infrastructure strikes to communicate broadly; it acted on indicators and even issued maritime advisories for vessels to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. South Africa, by contrast, prioritised selective outreach in a domain where certainty is elusive, leaving unregistered citizens to rely on foreign governments or local sources.
The most consequential aspect of this episode is that it was a near miss. No South African casualty occurred, but the system was tested and exposed. Near misses are the most valuable moments for institutional learning because they provide evidence without tragedy.
South Africa narrowly avoided a scenario in which unregistered citizens were caught unaware in an active conflict zone. Next time luck may not suffice. A capable state treats such moments as prompts for reform, not as proof that existing systems are adequate.
The question now is whether Dirco will update its approach to consular risk management by embracing open, non-gated communication and treating early warning as a public good. If this episode is quietly filed away rather than interrogated, the lesson will have been missed and the cost of that omission will eventually be paid elsewhere.
• Davhie is research associate at the Centre for Risk Analysis, focusing on political risk and foreign policy.
Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.