Shortly after their participation in a multinational naval exercise hosted by South Africa, several Iranian warships are lying at the bottom of the sea, courtesy of the US and Israel’s Operation Epic Fury.
Among the most notable losses is the frigate Iris Dena, one of the newest ships in Iran’s fleet. The 1,500‑ton guided missile frigate represented Iran’s effort to sustain a domestically built modern surface fleet despite decades of sanctions.
Equipped with anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, naval artillery and a helicopter deck, Dena was designed for extended deployments beyond the Persian Gulf. The vessel reportedly sank near Sri Lanka after issuing a distress call following what officials described as a submarine attack. Dozens of sailors were reported killed or missing.
Another casualty is the frigate Iris Jamaran, the lead ship of the same class. Commissioned in 2010, Jamaran was the first major warship built domestically by Iran since the 1979 revolution and long served as a symbol of Iranian naval self-sufficiency. Reports indicate it was destroyed during early strikes on Iran.
Rather than relying on large warships, the Revolutionary Guard navy emphasises asymmetric warfare using hundreds of fast attack boats, naval mines, anti-ship missiles and an increasing number of unmanned surface vessels.
Equally significant is the damage dealt to the large forward-base ship Iris Makran. Converted from an oil tanker, Makran serves as a floating logistics hub capable of carrying helicopters, drones and special forces units. The vessel allowed Iranian ships to remain at sea for extended periods and supported long-distance deployments into the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. If rendered out of service, it would reduce Iran’s ability to sustain naval operations far from home waters.
Iran’s maritime forces are split between two distinct organisations.
The conventional fleet, operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran navy, manages the country’s larger ships and submarines and conducts long-range deployments into the Indian Ocean. Alongside it operates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy, a separate service responsible for defending the Persian Gulf.
Rather than relying on large warships, the Revolutionary Guard navy emphasises asymmetric warfare using hundreds of fast attack boats, naval mines, anti-ship missiles and an increasing number of unmanned surface vessels. The strategy is designed to offset the technological advantages of larger Western navies by overwhelming them with numbers and exploiting the confined waters of the Gulf.
The recent losses place Iran’s conventional navy under considerable strain. Unlike major naval powers, Iran operates a limited number of frigates and support ships so each loss sharply reduces its ability to project power beyond the Persian Gulf.
Strikes against naval bases may prove equally damaging. Ports such as Bandar Abbas and Chabahar host repair facilities, logistics depots and submarine infrastructure. Damage to these facilities can effectively immobilise vessels even if they survive initial attacks.
Iran’s submarine fleet, particularly its Russian-built Kilo-class boats, remains one of its most capable naval assets. But these submarines depend heavily on shore-based support, making them vulnerable if naval infrastructure continues to be targeted.
In the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis, US forces destroyed much of Iran’s navy in a single day after Iranian mines damaged an American warship. Several Iranian vessels were sunk or disabled during what became the largest naval battle involving the US since the World War 2.
Although the current conflict is unfolding under different geopolitical circumstances, the parallels are notable: once again, Iran’s surface fleet appears highly vulnerable when facing technologically superior naval forces.
For South Africa, the sequence of events yields an unmistakable irony. The January drills off Cape Town were intended to showcase Brics’ naval co-operation as a challenge to western hegemony. Instead, they now serve as a stark reminder of how quickly rhetoric can bleed into conflict.
Ships that only weeks ago sailed alongside their South African counterparts are now wreckage on the ocean floor, symbols of a partnership seemingly hollow. Maritime exercises intended to project power have instead exposed the ANC’s enduring penchant for the lawless.
The diplomatic fallout stretches across time: last year South Africa’s ambassador was ejected from Washington, and President Cyril Ramaphosa suffered public humiliation at the White House. This year the party watches its international ambitions sink in real time, yet another chapter in a long history of misguided policy.
• Kajee is a lecturer at Southern Utah University, a nonresident research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, and a researcher for the SeaLight maritime transparency initiative at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.
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