JOAN SWART | Whether SA arms industry can still deliver is $8bn question

At a meeting of parliament’s joint standing committee on defence on February 20 the Aerospace, Maritime & Defence (AMD) Industries Association presented a figure that should give policymakers pause: an estimated $8bn in lost opportunities due to regulatory paralysis in South Africa’s conventional arms control environment.

That figure is not simply an industry grievance. It is a signal. And the signal raises a deeper question: can South Africa still deliver — not only products, but governance?

The briefing painted a picture of systemic dysfunction in the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and its administrative arm, the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control (DCAC). According to AMD, the NCACC has not convened for four consecutive months, in contravention of its statutory obligation to meet regularly, creating a decision-making vacuum at the apex of South Africa’s arms control system.

Compounding this, the DCAC’s electronic permitting system has been offline for weeks, with no manual contingency process activated, in effect suspending the administrative machinery of export control. Applications are delayed, lost or indefinitely “under consideration”. Companies face three sequential permits: marketing, contracting and export, each potentially taking months.

In isolation, such delays might be dismissed as bureaucratic inefficiency. In aggregate, they amount to institutional failure in a strategic sector.

South Africa’s defence industry derives more than 80% of its value from exports. It operates in a political-diplomatic market in which credibility, reliability and predictability are decisive. When permits stall, deliveries slip. When deliveries slip, contracts are cancelled. When contracts are cancelled, competitors step in. Egypt’s recent defence pact with Turkey and Libya’s procurement from Pakistan are reminders that markets do not wait for administrative reform.

South Africa’s defence industry derives more than 80% of its value from exports. It operates in a political-diplomatic market in which credibility, reliability and predictability are decisive. When permits stall, deliveries slip. When deliveries slip, contracts are cancelled.

The regulatory dysfunction described in parliament is therefore not merely an economic problem. It is a sovereignty problem. The architecture of the arms control regime concentrates approval authority at ministerial level without meaningful delegation mechanisms. If ministers are unavailable, meetings do not occur. If meetings do not occur, decisions are not taken. If decisions are not taken, exports halt. When statutory bodies depend on the availability of political office-bearers without institutional redundancy, paralysis becomes predictable rather than exceptional.

More concerning is the revelation that the NCACC inspectorate has reportedly not conducted inspections since 2014. End-user certificates and post-shipment verification are central to preventing diversion and maintaining compliance with South Africa’s international obligations, including the Arms Trade Treaty. An inspectorate that exists on paper but not in practice undermines compliance credibility and the moral authority of the regulatory regime.

Illusion of tight regulation

This combination — rigid front-end control with weak back-end enforcement — creates the illusion of tight regulation while eroding real accountability. Overregulation at the point of approval, with non-enforcement after export, is not ethical arms control. It is administrative distortion.

Predictability is another casualty. Industry representatives raised concerns about the continued application of outdated control lists under the Wassenaar Arrangement, despite annual updates internationally. Whether this is a deliberate policy choice, the absence of clarity introduces legal uncertainty. In a sector governed by compliance, uncertainty is corrosive. Firms cannot plan production cycles, negotiate delivery schedules or assure foreign clients if regulatory interpretation shifts or stalls without explanation.

Strategic autonomy is frequently invoked in South African defence discourse. Yet autonomy is not declared; it is administered. A sovereign defence capability depends not only on industrial capacity and military doctrine, but also on functional governance systems that translate policy into executable decisions. When the administrative machinery falters, autonomy becomes rhetorical.

The February parliamentary engagement also exposed the absence of a structured engagement platform between the regulator and the regulated industry. A highly controlled sector without institutionalised dialogue increases the likelihood of mistrust, misalignment and misinterpretation. Mature regulatory ecosystems incorporate formal mechanisms for feedback and refinement. The absence of such mechanisms signals a governance model frozen in formality rather than adaptive oversight.

A sovereign defence capability depends not only on industrial capacity and military doctrine, but also on functional governance systems that translate policy into executable decisions.

The consequences extend beyond export revenue. A weakened defence industrial base constrains the South African National Defence Force’s ability to sustain and modernise equipment domestically. It increases dependence on foreign suppliers. It narrows strategic options. While global defence procurement is expanding and geopolitical alignments are shifting, South Africa appears administratively immobilised.

This is occurring against the backdrop of an ageing Defence Review (2015), much of which remains underimplemented and underfunded. The review envisaged a balanced, sustainable defence posture aligned with fiscal realities and strategic ambitions. A decade later, the fiscal constraints have deepened, operational demands have increased, and the institutional environment has deteriorated.

What is required is not piecemeal permit reform alone, but an updated and comprehensive Defence Review anchored in executable implementation frameworks. Regulatory reform must be integrated into broader defence planning. The National Conventional Arms Control Act requires review not to dilute oversight, but to introduce delegation mechanisms, performance accountability, digital modernisation and enforceable timelines. Ministerial responsibility must be matched with institutional continuity. Oversight must be real, not performative.

Parliament’s role is critical. The joint standing committee’s insistence on an in-person engagement with the NCACC signals recognition that the issue transcends routine administration. Unless statutory obligations are met, consequence management must follow. A governance vacuum in the arms control system cannot be normalised.

At stake is more than $8bn. It is South Africa’s reputation as a reliable defence partner. It is the viability of advanced manufacturing sectors that sustain high-technology skills. It is the credibility of a state that aspires to continental leadership while struggling to execute its own regulatory framework.

The global defence environment is entering a period of sustained expansion and realignment. Countries that can deliver legally, reliably and predictably will participate. Those who cannot will be bypassed.

The question raised in parliament on February 20 is therefore stark: can South Africa still deliver? If the answer is to be yes, the response must be structural. Regulatory systems must function. Oversight must be enforced. The Defence Review must be updated and implemented, not merely cited. Strategic autonomy must be treated as an administrative discipline, not a political slogan.

Otherwise, the $8bn figure may prove to be only the beginning of a far higher strategic cost.

• Dr Swart is a forensic psychologist and military analyst specialising in security studies, geopolitics and strategic affairs, with a particular focus on Africa. She is completing a PhD at the University of Stellenbosch Military Academy.