The Sunday Times has reported that Lebogang Maile, the departing Gauteng economic development & finance MEC, issued a memo seeking to limit the authority of incoming economic development MEC Vuyiswa Ramokgopa (“Outgoing Gauteng finance chief strips powers from his successors”, April 5).
The article suggests Maile introduced last-minute directives centralising control over key functions — in particular the recruitment and appointment of senior executives in provincial entities — thereby constraining his successor and entity boards.
At face value the directive appears administrative. In substance, it raises a far more fundamental question of governance: who holds the authority to appoint senior executives in public entities — and has that authority been correctly exercised at all?
While the directive is framed as necessary for fiscal discipline, consistency of governance and to prevent unfunded or irregular appointments, critics argue that it undermines board independence, may lack a sound legal basis and appears strategically timed to retain influence during a leadership transition — especially as several entities are undergoing board changes and recruitment processes.
The directive was issued on April 1, the same day premier Panyaza Lesufi announced the cabinet reshuffle. While the timing and urgency raise legitimate concerns, the more consequential issue is doctrinal rather than political. There is no governance framework that vests the power to appoint senior executives in the MEC. So why would the MEC need to issue such a directive?
Governance rules are explicit and well established, grounded in principles of separation of powers and fiduciary accountability. Members of the executive appoint boards; boards govern and manage entities at a strategic level. Boards oversee the recruitment of CEOs, whose appointments require MEC concurrence. In turn, CEOs appoint senior managers. Neither the MEC nor the boards appoint senior managers directly — boards exercise oversight over these processes as part of their governance mandate.
Uncomfortable terrain
Viewed in that context, the directive does not in fact strip power from the incoming MEC; rather, it appears to correct a longstanding irregularity. That, however, shifts the inquiry to a more uncomfortable terrain: why was the MEC involved in appointing senior managers in the first place? Why did the boards permit that encroachment? And why the urgency to correct it precisely at the point of political transition? Can all the appointments made be reviewed and declared irregular?
A closer look at the Gauteng Growth and Development Agency (GGDA) — where I previously served as board chair — illustrates the point. The Blue IQ Act provides that the MEC appoints board members, the chair and the CEO. It further mandates that the board manage the organisation. The relationship between the MEC and the board is governed through a shareholder compact, which reinforces that the board manages the entity and reports to the MEC via the chair.
The shareholder compact, read together with provincial recruitment policy, confirms that the board appoints the CEO with MEC concurrence. These governance instruments are clear and binding. It is therefore unusual for an MEC to issue a directive framed in terms such as “I have taken a decision” and “henceforth are no longer”, which imply unilateral authority. Governance does not operate through declarations of power; it operates through clearly defined roles, separation of powers and accountability mechanisms.
This context is particularly relevant, given the ongoing, well-publicised dispute involving former acting CEO Simphiwe Hamilton and the MEC. The MEC refused to issue Hamilton’s appointment letter, despite the appointment having been approved by former MEC Parks Tau, on the basis that Tau was removed before he could obtain the concurrence of the provincial executive committee.
The High Court ruled in Hamilton’s favour, confirming that he had been duly appointed in accordance with the board’s recommendation and the MEC’s approval. The court directed that the appointment be formalised. Rather than comply, the MEC appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, arguing that the High Court lacked jurisdiction and that the matter should have been heard in the Labour Court.
Significant inconsistency
Against this backdrop it is notable that a source quoted in the Sunday Times reportedly played down the importance of concurrence, suggesting it was not a legal requirement and had no material impact. That inconsistency is not trivial; it goes to the heart of governance discipline. Selective reliance on governance principles erodes institutional credibility and weakens accountability while directly and negatively impacting innocent people’s lives and careers.
Governance frameworks — whether articulated through legislation, shareholder compacts or principles such as those embodied in King IV — exist to do one thing above all: to constrain power through structure, not to legitimise it through assertion. Governance, at its core, exists to constrain power — not to accommodate it.
• Dr Vilakazi is an academic and organisational development practitioner whose work focuses on building ethical, human-centred systems in business and institutions.
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