There is something wrong with how acquisitions are handled for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Not with the process, but with how it is being implemented. The outstanding example is the tender for a new armoured personnel carrier for the army.
In a normal sequence a required operational capability statement would be drawn up by the army, a user requirement specification developed by a joint project team of army officers and Armscor engineers, a request for information issued by Armscor to potential suppliers, analysis of the information provided by potential suppliers, and a request for proposals or bids submitted to the companies whose vehicles seem to best meet the requirement.
This would be followed by evaluation of the proposals/bids by the joint project team to produce a shortlist of suitable vehicles; testing of those vehicles, including mobility tests at the Gerotek range and ballistic and mine-protection tests at the Paardefontein range; evaluation of the results with price, support and the track record of the companies to arrive at a preferred bidder; delivery of a batch of the preferred vehicles for operational test and evaluation by an army team — practical user trials designed to show up any weaknesses or aspects of the design that could be tweaked — and; finally the production contract being awarded.
The process can be shortened if there are obvious contenders, for instance if vehicles are already in production and operational service. The joint project team can then ask such companies to provide vehicles for operational test and evaluation and follow that with a request for bids from the companies whose vehicles best meet the requirement. That could have been done for the armoured personnel carrier project — several South African companies have suitable vehicles in production and operational service and combat use with other African armies.
That is how this project began, but then things went awry. The mine protection requirement was dropped, which would result in a vehicle suited only for border patrols, not peace support missions. Four companies were asked to provide vehicles for user trials, but those were cancelled — after several companies had already done so — when one failed to provide vehicles for trials.
The requirement was for an “off the shelf” vehicle that would not require major design or development work. One company lacked such a vehicle, having bid a design. Another requirement was for companies to have supplied similar vehicles to African armed forces, and to have adequate production capacity. One had only supplied a small batch of a different vehicle to one other army.
The outcome should have been clear — the tender being awarded to one of the companies that had provided vehicles for the user tests, had supplied similar vehicles to other African armed forces, and had adequate production capacity. Instead, the contract was awarded to the company that failed to provide vehicles for testing, did not have a vehicle in production for “off the shelf” acquisition, and lacked the required track record.
Four companies were asked to provide vehicles for user trials, but those were cancelled — after several companies had already done so — when one failed to provide vehicles for trials.
It may well be the proposed vehicle would be outstanding, but without being able to test and evaluate it there is no way of knowing. Given the parlous state of defence funding in South Africa there is no excuse for taking risks with a major acquisition, particularly when there could be risk to soldiers’ lives. That decision should be paused pending a searching inquiry.
Meanwhile, Armscor has also issued a request for information for a new vehicle for Project Hoefyster to replace the Ratels that have been in service since the 1970s. That is another decision that is difficult to understand. Project Hoefyster has stalled — for several reasons, including decisions by Armscor — but the Patria armoured modular vehicle on which the future Badger is based is one of the best, if not the best, in its class.
That is underlined by the Japanese decision to standardise on a variant for its army, despite having the technological and financial capacity to develop their own, and by a large follow-on order by Poland, which used the armoured modular vehicle in Afghanistan. The Badger has already been extensively adapted to optimally meet the SANDF’s requirements.
The key problem seems to be Denel lacks the capacity to manufacture the vehicles, but Denel Land Systems can manufacture the turrets, which have proved very successful in the Malaysian army service. Several other South African companies can manufacture the vehicles, and there are 21 Badgers, 28 completed hulls and about 100 vehicle component sets on hand.
The rational route to follow would be to continue with the Badger by having the vehicles manufactured by one of the local companies or a consortium, and the turrets manufactured and integrated by Denel Land Systems. That is how it was done with the Eland, Ratel, Rooikat, Olifant and G6, and there is no good reason to do anything else.
Instead, Armscor wants to start from scratch with a different vehicle, which would require dumping the vehicles, hulls and component sets on hand and writing off that cost; writing off the cost of adapting the Patria vehicle to the army’s requirements; and finding the funds to adapt a different vehicle to the army requirements; conducting full trials and accepting the additional delay, or accepting one that does not fully meet the requirements.
It is not easy to think of a vehicle that would be in any respect better than the Badger as it stands, and most would not be as good. It is difficult to fathom Armscor’s thinking, which is why this is another decision that calls for a searching inquiry.
• Heitman is an independent security and defence analyst.
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