SHAHEER GHARBIA, WILMOT JAMES AND LALITHA SUNDARAM | Act before a disease outbreak kills and hits the stock exchange

Delays in outbreak detection threaten supply chains and national finances

(Karen Moolman)

An outbreak of disease does not wait for a ministerial briefing or lab confirmation. It shows up first as staff shortages, delayed shipments, a quieter trading floor and anxious households.

In a continent stitched together by trade corridors and fast-growing cities, the economic question is blunt: can we spot the signal early enough to contain disruption before it spreads?

This is more than a public health concern. For governments and businesses it lands on the balance sheet. Recent outbreaks have shown how quickly a health shock can disrupt staffing, supply chains, ports and logistics, tourism, consumer confidence and public finances.

While the health picture is still forming, decisions cannot wait, and the costs land on households and the state. It is tempting to frame this as a trade-off between intrusive monitoring and higher risk. The reality is simpler.

We are too slow at turning early clues into credible warnings. Many countries collect signals in clinics, labs, communities, animal health and wastewater, but struggle to connect the dots fast enough to act while options are still affordable.

Why detection systems lag risk

Scientific and clinical capability is strong in many places, but detection remains uneven. Laboratories in major cities can turn around results quickly, while rural and border districts often face delays in testing and sample transport, allowing outbreaks to spread before they register.

In border regions the first cases may appear in mobile populations at crossing points or busy market towns, but thin after-hours services and long referral chains mean samples are processed late. Differences in reporting systems across neighbouring jurisdictions can also slow the sharing of alerts, even when clinicians on both sides are seeing the same pattern.

The same gap shows up in routine reporting: some areas still rely on manual tallying and delayed weekly returns, while others can spot unusual spikes within days. In some settings, private clinics and workplace health services see the first cases, but their data is not linked to public dashboards. Even basics, such as test kits and cold chain for samples, can be reliable in one province or state and scarce in the next.

When the risk feels obvious, the first damage is often already done. Many systems still follow a slow, linear logic: confirm the diagnosis, count the cases, then respond. With connected cities and trade routes, delay becomes expensive.

Earlier warning supports proportionate action, targeted testing, clear workplace guidance and readiness in clinics and hospitals before disruption spreads. Signals already exist in clinics, labs, animal health and wastewater, and mobility and trade data can hint at where trouble may travel next. The test is quickly turning those fragments into a decision-ready picture.

What holds back many early warning efforts is integration. Without shared standards, systems cannot talk to each other, and without clear escalation rules, more data adds more noise. Decisions are delayed, and early warning remains an academic exercise rather than something leaders can use with confidence.

What a workable early warning system looks like

In practice, the answer is co-operation with clear handovers, not central control. That fits a region where legal frameworks differ, capacity is uneven and trust has to be earned locally. The aim is shared visibility and faster, more consistent decisions.

Routine systems should do the everyday work: clinic reporting, testing and basic monitoring. A small set of triggers can then prompt a second look — for example unusual clusters, a shift in severity or lab results that do not fit expected patterns.

When a trigger is hit the right expertise is pulled in quickly and the question becomes practical: what do we do next, and what would change our mind?

On the front line, rapid tests and genetic sequencing can confirm what is circulating and how it is changing, fast enough to guide decisions in workplaces, clinics and public services.

A layered approach targets scarce, expensive capability where it matters most and reduces two costly errors: missing a real signal, or treating every blip as a crisis and burning public trust.

Proof points already exist. Laboratories across Africa have tracked changes in circulating infections, and tools such as wastewater monitoring and sampling of travellers can surface shifts before clinical case counts catch up.

Maria Van Kerkhove, acting director of the WHO's department of epidemic and pandemic preparedness and prevention, said the increase appeared to be driven by a rise in the number of children contracting pathogens that two years of Covid restrictions have kept them away from.
Recent outbreaks of disease have shown how quickly a health shock can disrupt staffing, supply chains, ports and logistics, tourism, consumer confidence and public finances. Picture: (cnsphoto via REUTERS / File photo)

Turning signals into action requires connective tissue: interoperability, agreed thresholds and a guide document, a playbook if you will, for acting at different confidence levels. When leaders face a false choice between doing nothing and overreacting they tend to wait until events force their hand.

Rules and accountability have to be designed in. As artificial intelligence is applied to health and environmental data early warning will only be trusted if people can see the limits, including what is collected, what is anonymised, who can access it and for how long. Safeguards should be agreed before a crisis, with escalation thresholds, independent oversight and transparency that can be audited after the fact.

When data crosses borders, sharing must feel like partnership, not extraction. Countries that contribute data should gain analytical capacity, training and practical protection in return.

Paying for prevention when budgets are tight

Outbreak shocks rarely stay inside borders. A problem that starts in one location can hit staffing, logistics and demand across a wider region within days. That makes early-warning shared economic infrastructure closer to port health or grid stability than a discretionary health project.

The science exists, but the missing piece is reliable funding for the unglamorous essentials: data pipes, laboratory uptime and clear routes from signal to action.

The politics of prevention are difficult. Crisis spending is visible and urgent, while preparedness is judged by disasters that do not happen. Yet insurers and investors treat disruption as a financial risk, and governments end up paying either way.

A focused public-private partnership can make this investable. Governments set the mandate and safeguards, business co-funds data infrastructure and training, and universities and public labs anchor capability. Start small, demonstrate value, then lock it into predictable public budgets.

Against the damage of major outbreaks the price tag is modest. The real test is whether we invest before we are forced to.

Choosing to see earlier

In public health as in economics, certainty arrives late and costs rise fast. Signals that look ambiguous at first are too easily dismissed as noise until they become impossible to ignore.

Country systems cope best when they invest in early warning, share signals quickly and act while choices are still open, rather than relying on dramatic emergency measures once disruption is widespread.

An integrated early warning system is achievable with tools already in use, but only if governments choose to connect, fund and govern them now, before the next shock forces hurried, expensive decisions.

Resilience isn’t about how we respond when disruption hits. It is about noticing the first shift and acting early, together.

• Gharbia is a professor and senior leader in pathogen surveillance in the Wellcome Sanger Institute, UK. James, a former South African MP, is a professor and senior adviser to the Pandemic Centre in the School of Public Health, Brown University, US. Sundaram is an assistant research professor at the Centre for Pandemic Risk Management at the University of Cambridge, UK.

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