The US-Israeli offensive to constrain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) made assumptions about the missiles and drones it had access to — and the prospects for defending against them.
The IRGC’s predetermined response was to demonstrate its willingness and ability to attack the economic interests of its neighbours and those countries that relied on energy from the Middle East.
US President Donald Trump was almost certainly advised before he decided to attack Iran on February 28 that the “missile math” was less favourable for Iran than it now seems. His decision to halt military operations after 12 days last June probably contributed to this. Nor can the US military’s uniformed and political leaders be excused for having fallen far behind the world-leading Ukrainian defence force in low-cost missile and drone defences.
But Trump’s decision to attack Iran on February 28 with Israel was not unreasonable. Rather, it was overdue. The proverbial can had been kicked down the road for many years despite mounting evidence — amid keen concerns at the Pentagon — of Iran’s growing capacity to dominate the Persian Gulf.
If the IRGC retains control of the proceeds from Iran, exporting large volumes of oil, it will expand its stockpile of armaments such that it will be able to routinely threaten Persian Gulf traffic, as it will enjoy effective immunity from efforts to topple the Iranian regime.
Despite our conditioning by social and legacy media to judge, we should seek to nonjudgmentally appreciate the trade-offs involved in constraining the IRGC and how Trump should weigh such costs. If the Strait of Hormuz were to remain blocked for a year or longer, the economic costs would be extremely harsh for countries as diverse as Qatar and the Philippines.
However, the cost-benefit analysis would be favourable for Israel, and perhaps for the US. The United Arab Emirates’ interests also seem to favour renewed military confrontation with Iran.
As the IRGC has long been the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism, once it is again flush with cash, neighbouring countries will justifiably presume that it will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among others, would then be motivated to do the same.
As the leaders of both the US and the Soviet Union were broadly reasonable, Mutually Assured Destruction provoked a Cold War detente. Conversely, IRGC leaders obsess about the death and destruction of those who do not submit to their zealotry.
Despite his campaigning against “forever wars”, Trump initiated this one, and he won’t easily reduce the US’s elevated commitment of military assets to the region. His counter-argument would be that the can had been kicked down the road by his predecessors to the point where he had no choice but to act.
However, if he negotiates a deal to reopen the Strait that floods the IRGC with cash, he will probably have only delayed Iran’s nuclear programme by a couple of years. That is, more can-kicking.
What is the most favourable outcome Trump can pursue while not risking extreme costs? There are many complex and formidable peripheral considerations, but overall Trump wants the Middle East to be sufficiently stable so that it can be less of a military priority for the US.
Ideally, other Middle Eastern countries would be as skilled at economic development and integration into the global economy as the UAE. It was also the first Arab country to sign on to Trump’s Abraham Accords initiative, and it has subsequently aligned with Israel militarily.
It would certainly have occurred to Trump that his best-case outcome now is to ratchet down US involvement while leaving Iran’s neighbours increasingly dependent on Israel to constrain Iran. This seems implausible, but so did the build-out of Dubai, the Abraham Accords and the UAE’s military alignment with Israel.
The other two leading options are more can-kicking or a renewal of full-scale combat operations.
• Hagedorn is an independent strategy adviser.
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