JUN KAJEE: Maduro extracted, Ramaphosa next?

Leaders who side with US’s adversaries invite scrutiny long before formal enforcement

Jun Kajee

Jun Kajee

Columnist

Cyril Ramaphosa. Picture: (Thapelo Morebudi)

The extraction of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela last weekend was shocking to many, but for US strategists it confirmed a pattern long understood: leaders who side with America’s adversaries invite scrutiny long before formal enforcement.

South Africa is not Venezuela, and Cyril Ramaphosa is not Nicolás Maduro. Yet we are faced with structural parallels that demand attention, especially when perception drives diplomatic and military calculus.

Ramaphosa’s corporate career offers the first point of interest. For over a decade he chaired MTN, guiding one of Africa’s largest telecommunications companies into sanctioned and politically complex markets, most notably Iran.

MTN Irancell was later embroiled in litigation over inducements and regulatory compliance, embedding the company and its leadership in opaque financial and regulatory systems.

Corporate exposure, once confined to boardrooms, now informs perceived state risk, because investors and policymakers abroad see continuity between past corporate practices and present governance.

In Venezuela under Maduro, corporate and state entanglement, particularly in the oil sector and sanctioned networks, created vulnerabilities that external actors could exploit, demonstrating how tolerated opacity can become a lever for intervention.

This pattern extends to the personal sphere. The Phala Phala incident, involving substantial foreign currency held at Ramaphosa’s private estate, may have complied with South African law, but questions linger over custodial oversight and reporting.

Maduro’s Venezuela shows the significance of such opacity: informal, poorly documented financial flows were a key channel through which pressure was applied and political leverage exerted.

Procedural familiarity, the way external actors read patterns of risk and governance, matters more than moral equivalence. Tolerated financial shadows invite scrutiny, whether in corporate or personal domains.

Legal and diplomatic signalling compounds the effect. South Africa’s role in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel positions Pretoria as a bloc-aligned actor. Even when legal processes are sound, participation reinforces a narrative of alignment with adversarial or sanctioned states.

In Venezuela, Maduro’s bloc-aligned diplomacy and lawfare signalled defiance of US and Western norms, reinforcing risk perceptions and shaping international responses long before sanctions or legal actions escalated. South Africa’s ICJ engagement, while fully lawful, fits the same pattern: legal signalling amplifies perceived risk.

Strategic geography is yet another important consideration. The docking of the Russian vessel Lady R at Simon’s Town, alongside Brics+ naval exercises off Durban, turns South Africa’s ports into nodes of visibility. Durban and Simon’s Town are essential to legitimate trade, yet dual-use logistics or foreign naval access would most certainly rouse suspicion in Washington.

Maduro’s Venezuela provides the historical template: the ports of Caracas, entangled in sanctioned trade flows, became a focus for international monitoring and intervention. While South Africa’s institutions remain robust, perception alone can influence policy.

Under Maduro, Venezuela’s economy collapsed due to mismanaged state intervention, currency controls and elite capture. Inflation skyrocketed, productive sectors atrophied and basic services deteriorated, creating a feedback loop of political and economic vulnerability.

In South Africa, Ramaphosa’s presidency has coincided with stagnant growth, weakened industrial output and policy uncertainty. While the scale differs, the pattern is undeniable: leadership decisions can amplify structural economic weakness, heightening international risk.

Maduro consolidated power in part by reshaping institutions and marginalising political opposition. In South Africa, Ramaphosa has raised tensions within the ANC, and his interventions around land reform, property debates and policy posturing affecting Afrikaner interests illustrate a similar strategic imperative: leveraging political authority to secure factional alignment while sending signals abroad about ideological positioning.

In a post-Maduro world, pattern recognition governs perception, which in turn shapes consequence. South Africa’s ability to manage its international image will determine whether these parallels remain theoretical or begin influencing diplomatic engagement. History shows that patterns, once recognised, can drive outcomes long before formal enforcement occurs.

• Kajee is a lecturer at Southern Utah University, a non-resident research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, and a researcher for the SeaLight maritime transparency initiative at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.

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