On Friday, the US hosted the signing of an agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighbour Rwanda to end hostilities between the two countries. This pact raises hopes of peace in the war-torn country.
But the agreement, to be implemented over three months, has also raised many troubling questions.
The agreement, brokered by the US and Qatari governments, as well as businessmen close to US President Donald Trump, provides for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. Notably, the nonstate armed groups, such as the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, are not signatories to the deal. M23 is one of dozens of armed groups fighting on either side of the war.
On economic co-operation, the deal makes passing reference to a framework, also to be developed within 90 days, for regional integration. It makes no reference to market access to the US for DRC exports, especially its critical minerals.
At the heart of the conflict has been a claim by Kinshasa that Rwanda is using M23 and its own troops to help itself to the DRC’s minerals. Its mineral exports are much more than what the country produces.
The move to exclude M23 appears, on the face of it, like a concession to Felix Tshisekedi, president of the DRC, who prefers to negotiate directly with Kigali instead of its proxies such as M23.
The other unanswered questions include:
- What is America’s interest in the conflict?
- What is the role of the American businesspeople in the talks leading up to the deal?
- Except for access to US markets, what is the DRC getting from the US?
- What has Kigali been offered by the US?
- Why were African countries excluded from this breakthrough?
These are important questions given Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy.
Up until the surprise announcement of the deal, the US appeared indifferent to African wars. Its focus was on Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas and Israel-Iran.
A month ago, leaders of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community decided to withdraw all foreign troops, cease hostilities and appointed a panel of facilitators made up of former presidents including SA’s Kgalema Motlanthe.
Little progress has been made by the former presidents. The only tangible thing appears to be the phased withdrawal of regional troops, including SA’s.
It remains unclear whether there is any connection between the African mediation effort and the US one.
Rwanda, which still denies being on the ground in the DRC, has always raised security concerns as an issue. It’s not immediately clear how this concern could be addressed by Washington. After all, early this year, the US joined Germany and France in imposing sanctions on Rwanda and M23 rebels.
African capitals are none the wiser about what was agreed.
Unusually, Trump hasn’t made much of the deal. The lead was Marco Rubio, Trump’s secretary of state.
A deal that is one-sided and results in the extraction of the DRC’s critical minerals will be unpopular and hard to sell. Worse, Tshisekedi is unpopular. The war has shattered his approval ratings.
For the past two months Joseph Kabila, Tshisekedi’s predecessor and former ally, has been in the eastern DRC. He has been openly critical of the Kinshasa regime.
A one-sided deal would be a godsend to Kabila. He would use it to launch his presidential campaign. This wouldn’t be hard. Before the two truces, the DRC’s statutory forces were surrendering to the rebels who were set to shoot their way into Kinshasa.
Now that the deal is signed, Kinshasa and Kigali need to disclose the terms of the accord. At the core of the agreement, they need to assure the Congolese that the displaced people will be assisted to return to their country.
Crucially, the DRC’s mineral wealth must be used to lift its people from poverty. Durable peace will depend on the Congolese determining their own destiny through negotiations.
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