The US’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), published in November, has justifiably received a barrage of international criticism for its positions, including appearing to espouse the racist “great replacement” conspiracy theory.
I will not go into the merits or demerits of the positions set out in the NSS. Rather, I will show that the NSS is largely self-contradictory, which makes it useless as a document on which to base the security of the US.
Six contradictions
Let me point out only six self-contradictions in the national security strategy. I leave it to the interested reader to spot more.
A first major internal self-contradiction is between non-interventionism and aggressive global management. The NSS explicitly claims a “predisposition to non-interventionism” (p. 9), citing the Founders’ preference for avoiding entanglement in foreign affairs. It criticises past elites for seeking “permanent US domination of the entire world” (p. 1).
Despite this, the document celebrates an incredibly active diplomatic interventionism, claiming the US president negotiated peace in eight specific foreign conflicts (including local disputes such as DRC-Rwanda and Cambodia-Thailand) within eight months.
Furthermore, it asserts a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine (p. 5), declaring that the US will “assert and enforce” its will to deny non-hemispheric competitors access to the Western Hemisphere (p. 5).
This level of involvement in the internal disputes of Africa, Asia and the domestic policies of Latin America sharply contradicts the stated “predisposition to non-interventionism”.
A second major internal self-contradiction is the professed respect for sovereignty versus political subversion. A core principle that the NSS professes to adhere to is “flexible realism” (p. 9), which states that the US will not impose “democratic or other social change” on other nations, and respects “differing religions, cultures and governing systems” (p. 9). It specifically criticises its own “hectoring” of Middle Eastern monarchies about their governance.
However, in contradiction to this, the NSS applies a completely different standard to Europe. It explicitly states that the US will be “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations” (p. 27). It criticises European governments for “subversion of democratic processes” (p. 26) and expresses a desire to “encourage” specific political outcomes favouring “patriotic European parties” (p. 26).
This creates a contradiction where the US respects the sovereignty of monarchies in the Middle East but actively plans to interfere in the internal political dynamics of democratic allies in Europe.
A third internal contradiction is the strategy’s position on free market capitalism versus state-directed industrial policy. The NSS praises the “dynamic free market system” (p. 15) as a US advantage and criticises others for “predatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies” (p. 21). It claims that “openness [...] and free market capitalism” differentiate the US from the world (p. 22).
In direct contradiction to itself, however, the strategy simultaneously calls for a “national mobilisation” of industry (p. 14) and the “strategic use of tariffs” to force “reindustrialisation” (p. 14). It advocates for the US government to “identify strategic acquisition … opportunities” (p. 18) and demands that agreements with allies include “sole-source contracts” for US companies (p. 19).
It also seeks to “push out foreign companies” (p. 19). These are the exact types of state-directed, protectionist and non-market interventions it condemns in adversaries.
A fourth internal contradiction is between burden-sharing and monopolising benefits. The NSS repeatedly demands that allies “step up and spend” (p. 24) and complains that allies have offloaded defence costs onto the US people. It insists on a “burden-sharing network” (p. 12).
However, the NSS then contradicts itself. While demanding allies pay more, the strategy simultaneously seeks to monopolise the economic benefits that usually incentivise alliances. It states that countries depending on the US contracts “must be sole-source contracts for our companies” (p. 19). It also explicitly aims to “re-shore” industrial production and supply chains back to the US (p. 13).
It is contradictory to expect allies to build up their own industrial bases and defence spending while simultaneously enacting policies designed to pull capital, manufacturing and contracts exclusively into the US.
A fifth contradiction is its positions on fiscal responsibility versus an enormous expansion of capabilities. The NSS critiques previous elites for overestimating “America’s ability to fund [...] a massive military … complex” [p. 1] and notes the “current account deficit is unsustainable” (p. 22).
In direct contradiction to itself, however, the strategy also proposes a huge expansion of federal expenditures and projects, including building a “Golden Dome” missile defence system, fielding the “world’s most powerful... military” (p. 3), and promoting a “national mobilisation” of the industrial base.
It is internally inconsistent to criticise the financial overextension of the past while proposing an even more expensive array of military, industrial and infrastructure projects alongside tax revenue reductions.
A final notable self-contradiction is between “America First” independence versus dependence on coalitions. The strategy asserts the US is an “independent, sovereign republic” (p. 3) and declares that the days of “propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over” (p. 12).
However, immediately contradicting this assertion, the strategy admits that to secure the First Island Chain (Taiwan/China) (p. 24), “the US military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone” (p. 24). It relies heavily on the “Hague Commitment” (p. 12) from Nato and also on “coalitions” to secure critical minerals in Africa (p. 23).
The document is split between a desire for total unilateral independence and the reality that US security goals are impossible without the very international entanglements it views with such suspicion.
The NSS 2025 is not a national security strategy for the US at all. Instead of a guideline for securing the US’s future, this strategy reflects a country that is increasingly at war with itself.
• Dr Naudé is distinguished visiting professor at the University of Johannesburg; visiting professor in innovation, trade and development at RWTH Aachen University in Germany; and a fellow of the African Studies Centre at Leiden University in the Netherlands.
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