KARABO MOKGONYANA

Africa’s renewable energy transition is accelerating.

Solar parks, wind farms, battery storage facilities and transmission infrastructure are being rolled out at unprecedented speed, driven by climate urgency, energy access needs and declining technology costs.

Chinese companies sit at the centre of this transformation. From solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturing and engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts to grid infrastructure and battery supply chains, China dominates global clean energy technology.

But beneath the headlines of “green investment” lies an uncomfortable truth: Africa’s renewable energy boom risks reproducing the same labour and industrial patterns that defined the fossil fuel and extractive eras.

One of the clearest manifestations of this is what I refer to as the “China labour curse”, the systematic importation of foreign labour by Chinese renewable energy firms at the expense of local employment, skills transfer and long-term industrial development.

If left unchallenged, this model threatens to turn Africa’s clean energy transition into yet another enclave economy: green in appearance but extractive in structure.

How the China labour model works in renewables

Chinese renewable energy companies operate in a highly integrated industrial ecosystem. They often control the full value chain, from technology design and manufacturing to EPC services, financing and operation and maintenance.

This vertical integration is a major source of efficiency and cost competitiveness. But in African contexts it also enables a labour model that sidelines local workers.

In many utility-scale solar and wind projects across Africa, a clear labour hierarchy has emerged. Skilled and semi-skilled positions, such as engineers, technicians, supervisors and electricians, are frequently filled by workers brought in from China, while local workers are largely confined to low-skilled, short-term roles, including site clearing, basic construction and security.

This vertical integration is a major source of efficiency and cost competitiveness. But in African contexts it also enables a labour model that sidelines local workers.

Project contracts are typically structured to prioritise speed of delivery and cost minimisation, with little emphasis on building local capacity or embedding skills transfer into project implementation.

As a result, renewable energy technologies are often installed as a “black box”: systems are designed, constructed and commissioned by foreign teams, leaving domestic firms, engineers and training institutions with minimal exposure to the technical knowledge required to operate, maintain or replicate these projects independently.

This pattern is often justified on technical grounds. Companies argue that renewable energy projects require specialised expertise, tight timelines and familiarity with proprietary technologies.

But this argument collapses under scrutiny. Renewable energy technologies, particularly solar photovoltaic and onshore wind, are modular, standardised and increasingly mature. The claim that African engineers and technicians cannot be trained to build, operate and maintain them is less about feasibility and more about convenience.

Technology without transfer is not development

At the heart of the China labour curse is a failure of technology transfer. Renewable energy is not just about megawatts on the grid; it is about building domestic ecosystems, skills, firms, institutions and supply chains that can sustain energy systems over decades.

When foreign companies bring their own labour, the consequences extend well beyond individual projects. Domestic engineering capacity stagnates, reinforcing long-term dependence on external expertise rather than building a homegrown skills base. Universities and technical colleges struggle to align their curriculums with real-world deployment because they are excluded from live projects where practical knowledge is generated and applied.

Local firms are largely locked out of subcontracting opportunities beyond basic civil works, preventing them from moving up the value chain into higher-skilled and higher-value roles. Over time this weakens governments’ bargaining power, as the absence of strong domestic capabilities reduces their leverage to negotiate future projects on more favourable terms that prioritise localisation, skills transfer and industrial development.

This is particularly dangerous given the scale of Africa’s energy transition. The continent will require thousands of new renewable installations, grid upgrades and storage systems by 2030 and beyond. If each project is delivered as a turnkey import, Africa will remain a consumer of green technology rather than a producer of green value.

Why this is a structural risk, not a Chinese problem

It would be a mistake to frame this issue as uniquely Chinese or as a matter of nationality. The problem is structural, and Chinese firms are simply the most visible actors because they dominate global renewable manufacturing and EPC markets. This is also a trend with European and Middle Eastern companies involved in the renewable energy industry.

The real issue is that many African countries have not put in place the policy and regulatory frameworks needed to shape renewable energy investments in the public interest.

Governments often fail to impose enforceable local labour and content requirements in renewable energy contracts, allowing developers wide discretion over hiring and procurement practices.

Concessional finance and fast-tracked deals are frequently accepted without firm negotiations on employment creation, skills development or knowledge transfer.

At the same time, weak co-ordination between energy ministries, labour departments and industrial policy institutions means renewable projects are treated as isolated infrastructure interventions rather than as part of a broader development strategy.

This fragmentation leads to a narrow focus on short-term capacity additions, at the expense of long-term economic transformation and sustainable job creation.

China’s firms operate rationally within this permissive environment. Where labour rules are weak, they import labour. Where skills transfer is optional, it is deferred. Where enforcement is lax, commitments remain on paper.

The hidden costs of allowing the labour curse to continue

Allowing this model to persist carries serious risks for African countries:

It undermines the political legitimacy of the energy transition. Communities are far less likely to support renewable projects if they see foreign workers flown in while local unemployment remains high. This fuels resentment, misinformation and backlash against clean energy itself.
It weakens national energy security. When operation and maintenance expertise resides offshore, countries become dependent on foreign technicians to keep their power systems running, which is particularly dangerous during crises, currency shortages or diplomatic tensions.
It locks Africa out of green industrialisation. Renewable energy should be a gateway to domestic manufacturing of components, balance-of-system equipment, software and services. A labour-import model shuts that door.
Finally, it entrenches neo-extractive relationships, this time not around oil, gas, or minerals, but around sunshine and wind.

How African countries can and must push back

The good news is that this outcome is not inevitable. African governments retain significant policy space to reshape how renewable energy projects are delivered.

Enforce local labour thresholds. Renewable energy contracts should include mandatory minimum percentages of local labour, disaggregated by skill level, not just headcount. These thresholds must be monitored and enforced, not treated as aspirational targets.
Make skills transfer contractual, not voluntary. Training programmes, apprenticeships and knowledge-sharing arrangements should be binding contractual obligations, with penalties for noncompliance. Host country engineers must be embedded in project teams from day one.
Align energy policy with industrial policy. Energy ministries cannot negotiate in isolation. Renewable projects must be linked to national industrial strategies, including technical education, domestic manufacturing and SME development.
Use public finance strategically. Projects backed by development banks or public guarantees should meet higher labour and localisation standards. Public money must buy public value, not just electrons.
Strengthen regional co-ordination. African power pools and regional economic communities can develop common standards on labour and localisation, preventing a race to the bottom between countries competing for investment.

A just transition requires labour justice

Africa’s renewable energy future must not replicate the injustices of its fossil past. Clean energy that excludes African workers is not a just transition; it is a green façade over an old economic model.

Chinese technology will play a major role in Africa’s energy systems. That is not inherently a problem. The problem is technology without transfer, investment without employment and transition without justice.

If African governments fail to act now, the China labour curse will harden into a structural feature of the green economy. But if they assert clear rules, enforce them and negotiate from a position of long-term vision, renewable energy can become a true engine of African industrialisation.

The transition is happening. The question is who it is really for.

• Mokgonyana is the energy co-lead at Power Shift Africa.