Ukraine, fighting for its survival, is reconciling itself to the fact that war with Russia may continue for years to come, and that it cannot rely on American support.
A negotiated settlement is far off; US President Donald Trump’s erratic peacemaking efforts have gone nowhere. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has conceded nothing, and may just have been emboldened by US interventions to increase his demands.
That the emperor has no clothes when it comes to peacemaking is something Ukrainians have long recognised. Trump’s recent, telling, declaration that Ukraine can win back its lost territories with the help of the EU appears to signal American disengagement.
This alleged peacemaking may actually be a distraction whose diplomatic failure could hasten the end of the war. Europe would do well to draw its own conclusions and take further responsibility for its own security. A resolute Ukraine and EU are still capable of raising the costs for Russia and determining the outcome of the war in the long run.
Russia’s military and economic strain
Russia projects inevitability about victory in Ukraine. However, its objectives exceed its military capabilities, and it is attempting to bypass this through its messaging to the world. But it cannot ignore the war’s costs indefinitely. They are catastrophic in human terms alone — more than 1-million dead or injured.
Russia is indeed gradually capturing more territory, but the Ukrainians are exacting a heavy cost for every inch of land given up. At this rate Russia will not be able to sustain the war effort. In the past year it captured just 0.6% of Ukraine’s territory and is estimated to have lost 300,000 men through death or injury.
Until now the Russian armed forces have generally been getting the manpower they need, replacing losses with recruits at the rate of 30,000/month, attracted by high and rising salaries. But this fell to below 13,000/month in the second quarter of 2025. These military recruitment needs will increasingly bump up against labour scarcity in Russia’s fully mobilised war economy.
Rising economic costs
The costs for the Russian economy are rising as the boost from wartime spending fades. Official growth forecasts have been revised downward to 1% in 2025, from 4.3% last year, below Ukraine’s own projected growth of 2.5%. Stagflation may already be in force, with the Russian economy hitting supply-side constraints that are producing rising inflation, high real interest rates and low growth.
Non-war-related sectors are sluggish, productivity is low and long-term growth potential is deteriorating. There is still room to go on financing the war, but with increasing costs and trade-offs. Militarily, the two sides are deadlocked. Ukrainian defences are holding and advances in drone warfare make an armoured, or any other, breakthrough unlikely.
Ukraine, together with the EU, must now prove its own staying power and that it is willing to outlast Russian aggression by raising costs to a level too high for it to bear. This can happen with or without an American security backstop involving intelligence sharing and some air support at best.
Ukrainian resilience and EU support
Faltering US support is a disappointment to Ukraine and Europe, but need not be a fatal one — Ukraine’s allies, who are raising defence spending as fast as they can, have enough military industrial capability to determine how this war ends.
With characteristic clarity, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signalled to Russia on behalf of the EU in a statement in Financial Times last week exactly this kind of message — that Ukraine can depend on financial and military backing for years to come.
A proposed swap of a first tranche of €140bn of €200bn in frozen Russian assets in the Euroclear financial clearing system would fund Ukraine’s weapons supplies and war needs. Though not to be taken lightly for systemic reasons, this is justified in a balance of risks calculation as exactly the action needed to tip the balance decisively in Ukraine’s favour at this point in the war.
Canada is also amending legislation — the Special Economic Measures Act — that could see C$22bn (€13bn) of Russian assets held by Canadian banks turned over to Ukraine. The issue could be expedited as early as November 4 in a Canadian budget vote.
‘Coalition of the willing’
The “coalition of the willing” must, critically, decide what it is willing to do. High-low scenarios are under consideration. A proposed reassurance force that would put Western troops on the ground behind Ukrainian forces remains on the table, but only after a ceasefire is reached. This grants a veto to Putin, creating incentives to never agree on a ceasefire.
Better a long war that ensures a democratic and free Ukraine than war without end...
Bold thinking is needed, and this is starting to emerge in internal discussion over potential assertion of Western military assets. A proposed drone wall following recent Russian incursions into Western Europe would be a start, but could be followed by anti-missile defences over Ukrainian airspace, and aircraft with shoot down capability.
Going further would see Western troops on the ground but in rear areas, enabling more Ukrainian troops to be deployed to the frontlines. That being on the east side of the Dnieper River, this would serve to guarantee the security of the national government in Kyiv.
That could open the way for direct contact with Russian troops if Western forces return fire if fired on. Putin, who trades in escalation threats, has vowed to respond in this event. However, this ignores one salient fact — Russia already regards itself to be at war with Nato and behaves accordingly.
Securing Ukraine’s future
Western countries have long been subject to a range of war-like actions under Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine, which includes disinformation, subversion, cyberattacks, sabotage of public infrastructure, bombings and assassinations. Third-party forces in the form of North Korean troops have in the past year been introduced to a land war on the European land mass where EU security is at stake.
Such escalation cannot only belong to Russia — a true coalition of the willing must set its own lines. Ensuring the security of a democratically elected government chosen by Ukraine’s own people — the stated policy of Western backers — requires that Russian aggressions be firmly checked.
For a war-weary Ukraine, years of war lie ahead. The lack of acceptable alternatives — subjugation is an anathema — leaves no other choice. Better a long war that ensures a democratic and free Ukraine than war without end, or a messy peace that creates a compromised Russian-aligned proxy state.
• Mason, an associate of Johannesburg-based risk and resilience consultancy Eunomix who lives in Rosendal, Free State, is on assignment in Ukraine.
Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.